

**Competitive Authoritarianism:
International Linkage, Organizational Power, and the Fate of Hybrid Regimes**

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The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes. Single-party and military dictatorships collapsed throughout Africa and post-communist Eurasia, and in much of Asia and Latin America, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the formal architecture of democracy—particularly multiparty elections—diffused widely across the globe.

Transitions did not always lead to democracy, however. In much of Africa and the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Central and South-Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Americas, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of autocracy. Unlike single-party regimes or military dictatorships, post-Cold War regimes in Cambodia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive, in that opposition forces used democratic institutions to contest vigorously—and in some cases, successfully—for power. Nevertheless, they were not democratic. Electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence skewed the playing field in favor of incumbents. In other words, competition was real, but unfair.¹ We call such regimes *competitive authoritarian*. Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated during the post-Cold War period. In 1995, at least 35 regimes were competitive authoritarian, a figure that, by some measures, exceeded the number of full democracies among developing and post-communist countries.²

Contrary to widespread expectations that transition to democracy, competitive authoritarian regimes followed diverse trajectories during the post-Cold War period. Although some of them democratized (e.g., Ghana, Mexico, Slovakia), most did not. Many regimes either remained stable (Malaysia, Tanzania) or became increasingly authoritarian (Russia, Zimbabwe). In other cases (Georgia, Malawi, Zambia), authoritarian governments fell but were succeeded by new authoritarians. Several regimes experienced two or more transitions without democratizing.³ Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time to abandon teleological characterizations of hybrid regimes as “incomplete” or “transitional” democracies. Competitive authoritarian regimes should be conceptualized—and theorized—for what they are: a distinct, non-democratic regime type. Rather than assume that such regimes are in transition to democracy, it is more useful to ask why some democratized and others did not.

This study examines the trajectories of all 35 regimes that were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995.⁴ The study spans five regions of the world: it includes six countries in the Americas (Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua); six in Central Europe (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia); three in Asia (Cambodia, Malaysia, Taiwan); six in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); and 14 in Africa (Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,

¹On post-Cold War hybrid regimes, see Carothers (2002), Ottaway (2003); Schedler (2006a), and the cluster of articles in the April 2002 *Journal of Democracy*.

²See, for example, the scoring of Diamond (2002: 30-31) and Schedler (2002b: 47).

³These include Albania, Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar, and Moldova.

⁴Several cases of competitive authoritarianism emerged after 1995, including the Gambia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Venezuela.

Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). We seek to explain why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized during the post-Cold War period (e.g., Dominican Republic, Slovakia) while others remained stable and authoritarian (e.g., Malaysia, Russia), and still others experienced turnover without democratization (e.g., Georgia, Malawi). Our central argument focuses on two factors: ties to the West and the strength of governing party and state organizations. Where linkage to the West was extensive, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents' organizational power: where state and governing party organizations were strong, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; where they were weak, regimes were generally unstable, but they only rarely democratized.

What is Competitive Authoritarianism?

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are *competitive*, in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic, as the playing field is highly skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.

Situating the Concept

Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime type, with characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism.⁵ Competitive authoritarian regimes may be distinguished from full authoritarian regimes in that legal and (semi) effective channels exist through which opposition groups compete seriously for power.⁶ Elections are held regularly, and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above ground. Civil liberties are sufficiently respected for opposition parties to open offices, recruit candidates, and organize campaigns, and opposition figures are generally not exiled or imprisoned. In short, democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power. What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates *at least one* of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections; (2) broad protection of civil liberties; and (3) a reasonably level playing field.

Elections

⁵For discussions of hybrid regimes, see Karl (1995), Collier and Levitsky (1997), Carothers (2002), Ottaway (2003), Schedler (2006a, 2006b), and the articles in the April 2002 issue of *Journal of Democracy*.

⁶We characterize as *full authoritarian* those regimes in which no viable channels exist through which opposition forces may contest legally for power. This category includes closed regimes in which national-level democratic institutions do not exist (e.g., China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia), as well as hegemonic regimes, in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to façade status in practice. In hegemonic regimes, elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Much of the opposition is forced underground, and leading regime critics are often imprisoned or exiled. Thus, in Nicaragua under the Somozas, Mexico at the height of PRI hegemony, and post-Cold War Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, formal democratic institutions served primarily a legitimizing function; opponents did not view them as viable means to achieve power.

In democracies, elections are *free*, in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters, and *fair*, in the sense that opposition parties are able to campaign on relatively even footing: they are not subject to repression or harassment, and they are not systematically denied access to the media and other resources.⁷ In full authoritarian regimes, multiparty elections are either non-existent or non-competitive. Elections may be considered non-competitive when (1) major candidates are excluded (via bans, imprisonment, or exile); (2) repression or legal controls make it impossible for opposition parties to run public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between public preferences and electoral results.

Competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes. On the one hand, elections are competitive, in that major opposition candidates are not excluded; opposition parties are able to campaign publicly; and there is no massive fraud. On the other hand, elections are often unfair and almost always unfair. In some cases, elections are marred by the manipulation of voter lists, ballot stuffing, and/or falsification of results (e.g., Dominican Republic 1994, Ukraine 2004). Although such fraud may alter the outcome of elections, it is not so severe as to make the act of voting meaningless.⁸ Elections may also be marred by large-scale intimidation of opposition activists, voters, and poll watchers, and even the establishment of opposition “no go” areas (e.g., Cambodia 1993, Zimbabwe 2002). However, such abuse is not sufficiently severe or systematic to prevent the opposition from running a national campaign. In other cases, voting and vote-counting processes are reasonably clean, but a highly uneven playing field renders the overall electoral process manifestly unfair. In these cases, unequal access to finance and the media and incumbent abuse of state institutions make elections unfair even in the absence of violence or fraud (Greene forthcoming).

Civil Liberties

In democracies, civil liberties, including rights of free speech and association, and a free press, are broadly protected. Although these rights may be periodically violated (e.g., the 1970 Kent State killings in the U.S.), such violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to challenge incumbents. In full authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are often so systematically violated that opposition parties, civic groups, and the media are not even minimally protected (e.g., Egypt, Kazakhstan). As a result, much opposition activity takes place underground or in exile.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are nominally guaranteed and at least partially respected. Independent media exist, and civic and opposition groups operate above ground: they meet, demonstrate, and criticize the government in public. Yet civil liberties are frequently violated. Opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent attacks. Independent media are frequently threatened, attacked, and in some cases, suspended or closed. In some regimes, overt repression—including the arrest of opposition leaders, killing of opposition activists, and violent repression of protest—is widespread, pushing regimes to the brink of full authoritarianism

⁷See Elklit and Svensson (1997).

⁸For example, vote fraud in Serbia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004 accounted for about 10 percent of the vote, which was large enough to alter the results but small enough to make voting meaningful.

(e.g., Belarus, Cambodia, Zimbabwe). More frequently, assaults on civil liberties take subtler forms, including surveillance and blackmail, use of tax and anti-corruption agencies to target critics, denial of licenses, credit, or government contracts to opponents and their private sector backers, denial of licenses, newsprint, or advertising to independent media, and the use of libel or defamation laws against critics. Although these abuses are not systematic or severe enough to force opposition underground or into exile, they clearly exceed what is permissible in a democracy. By raising the cost of critical media coverage (and thus encouraging self-censorship) and opposition activity (and thus convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelines), even intermittent civil liberties violations can seriously hinder the opposition's capacity to organize and challenge the government.

An Uneven Playing Field

Finally, nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by an uneven playing field.⁹ Obviously, a degree of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies. Indeed, many new democracies in Central Europe and Latin America are characterized by extensive clientelism and politicization of state bureaucracies. To distinguish such cases from those of unfair competition, we set a high threshold for unevenness. We consider the playing field uneven where: (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; (2) the incumbent party is systematically favored at the expense of the opposition; *and* (3) the opposition's ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources, media access, and access to the law.

Access to Resources. Access to resources is uneven where incumbents use the state to create or maintain resource disparities that hinder the opposition's ability to compete.¹⁰ This may occur in several ways. First, incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources. In a few cases, this funding is legal. In Guyana and Zimbabwe during the 1980s, governing parties were financed by special public ministries and/or official state subventions. More frequently, state finance is illicit.¹¹ Incumbents may also make systematic use of state infrastructure—including buildings, vehicles, communications equipment, and personnel—for electoral campaigns, which, in poor countries with weak private sectors (e.g., Cambodia, much of sub-Saharan Africa), provides them with a vast resource advantage over opponents.¹² Security forces may also be mobilized on behalf of governing parties.¹³

⁹For discussions of uneven playing fields in hybrid regimes, see Schedler (2002a, 2002b); Mozaffar and Schedler (2002); Ottaway (2003: 138-156); and Greene (forthcoming).

¹⁰For a sophisticated discussion of how incumbent abuse of state resources shapes party competition, see Greene (forthcoming).

¹¹In Mexico, for example, the PRI reportedly drew \$1 billion in illicit state finance during the early 1990s (Oppenheimer 1996: 88); in Russia, tens of millions of dollars in government bonds were diverted to Yeltsin's 1996 re-election campaign (Hoffman 2002: 348-351).

¹²In numerous countries, public employees were mobilized in large numbers to work for the governing party. In former Soviet countries such as Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, this mobilization included not only low level bureaucrats but also teachers, doctors and other budget-financed professionals (Allina-Pisano 2005; Way 2006).

¹³In Guyana and Peru, soldiers were mobilized for electoral campaigns (Singh 1988: 78; Rospigliosi 1994: 49), and in Serbia, the security apparatus provided logistical support for the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" movement that helped Milosevic consolidate power (Le Bor 2002: 200-1; Silber and Little 1996: 37-59).

Incumbents may also use the state to monopolize access to private sector finance. Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit, licenses, state contracts, and other resources to enrich themselves via party owned enterprises (Taiwan), benefit crony or proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back into party coffers (Malaysia), or corner the market in private sector donations (Mexico, Russia). The state may also be used to deny opposition parties access to resources. In Ukraine, for example, businesses that financed the opposition were routinely targeted by tax authorities.¹⁴

In these cases, resource disparities far exceeded anything seen in established democracies. In Taiwan, for example, the KMT's \$4.5 billion business empire gave it "an independent financial base which operated on an unheard of scale in any representative democracy" (Chu 1992: 150), and the KMT outspent its opponents by more than 50-to-1 during elections (Wu 1995: 79; Guo et. al 1998). In Mexico, the PRI admitted to spending 13 times more than the two major opposition parties *combined* during the 1994 election, and some observers claim that the ratio may have been 20-to-1.¹⁵ In Russia, the Yeltsin campaign spent between 30 and 150 times the amount permitted the opposition in 1996 (McFaul 1997: 13).

Access to Media. Where opposition parties lack access to (state or private) media that reaches most of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Media access may be denied in several ways. Frequently, the most important disparities exist in access to electronic media (television and radio), combined with biased and partisan coverage. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the state controls all television and most—if not all—radio broadcasting. Although print media is often pluralist, with a diversity of independent newspapers and magazines circulating freely, these papers were often confined to a small urban elite. In such cases, if radio and television are in the hands of the state, and state-run channels are biased in favor of the governing party, opposition forces are effectively denied access to the media.¹⁶ In other cases, such as Malaysia, private media is widespread but major media outlets are closely linked to the governing party—via proxy ownership, patronage, and other illicit means.

Biased Referees: Uneven Access to the Law. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the courts, electoral authorities, and other nominally independent arbiters of the rules of the game are not only controlled by incumbents (via packing, blackmail, bribery, or intimidation) but also are systematically employed as partisan tools against the opposition. Consequently, in electoral, judicial, and other critical disputes, agencies that are designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents.

¹⁴ In Ghana, entrepreneurs who financed opposition parties during the mid-1990s "were blacklisted, denied government contracts and [had] their businesses openly sabotaged" (Oquaye 1998: 109), and in Cambodia, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) was "starved for funds by a business community told by [the government] that financing SRP was committing economic suicide" (Heder 2005: 118).

¹⁵ See Oppenheimer (1996: 110); Bruhn (1997: 283-4); and de Swaan (1998: 165).

¹⁶ This was the case, for example, in Cameroon, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua in 1990, Guyana through 1992, and Belarus, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Russia, Senegal and Ukraine through the early-to-mid-1990s.

Incumbent manipulation of the legal system may affect political competition in at least two ways. First, where the judiciary is solidly controlled by the governing party, the government may violate democratic procedure with impunity. Second, incumbents may engage in “legal” repression, or the discretionary use of legal instruments—such as tax, libel, or defamation laws—as a weapon against opponents. Although such repression may involve the technically correct application of the law, its use is selective and partisan, rather than universal. An example is Putin’s Russia. After the independent NTV television network backed the opposition in 1999 and subsequently aired criticism of Putin, the government used debt arrears to the quasi-state gas company (Gasprom) to take over the station and install a new pro-government management (Lipman and McFaul 2001).

Perhaps the most widespread form of “legal” repression is the use of libel or defamation laws against journalists, editors and media outlets. Thus, in Malaysia, the Mahathir government entered into a “suing craze” in the wake of the 1998-99 political crisis, making widespread use of defamation suits to silence critical reporting (Felker 2000: 51; Rodan 2004: 149-150); in Cameroon, more than 50 journalists were prosecuted for libel during the late 1990s, and several newspapers were forced to close due to heavy fines (Fombad 2003: 324); and in Croatia, independent newspapers were hit by more than 230 libel suits as of 1997 (Pusic 1998).

Finally, partisan control over nominally independent electoral authorities may allow incumbents to engage in electoral abuse. In numerous cases, including Armenia, Belarus, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, biased electoral authorities either directly engaged in fraud or tolerated fraud and other illicit acts committed by incumbents. In other cases, electoral and judicial authorities issued rulings that had a decisive impact on opposition chances. Examples include the decision to ban Kenneth Kaunda from the 1996 presidential election in Zambia and the legalization of Fujimori’s 2000 presidential candidacy in Peru.

Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Non-Democracies

Table 1 summarizes the major differences among democratic, full authoritarian, and competitive authoritarian regimes. As the table suggests, a distinguishing feature of competitive authoritarianism is *unfair competition*. Whereas full authoritarian regimes are characterized by the absence of legal competition (and hence, of uncertainty) and democracy is characterized by fair competition, competitive authoritarianism is marked by competition that is real (and often intense) but unfair. Formal democratic institutions are meaningful. Opposition parties are legal, operate above ground, and compete seriously in elections. However, they are subject to surveillance, harassment, and occasional violence, their access to media and finance is limited, electoral and judicial institutions are politicized and used as weapons against them, and elections are often marred by fraud, intimidation, and other abuse. Yet such unfairness does not preclude serious contestation, and even occasional opposition victories.¹⁷ Put another way, whereas officials in full authoritarian regimes can rest easy on the eve of elections, as neither they nor opposition leaders expect anything but an incumbent victory, incumbents

¹⁷Examples include opposition electoral victories in Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, Guyana in 1992, Belarus, Malawi, and Ukraine in 1994, Albania in 1997, Croatia in 2000, and Kenya in 2002.

in competitive authoritarian regimes can not. Government officials fear a possible opposition victory (and must work hard to thwart it), and opposition leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory. In competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents are often forced to sweat.

--Table 1 about here—

What this suggests is that uncertainty and even incumbent turnover are not defining features of democracy. Influential scholars, particularly Adam Przeworski and his collaborators,¹⁸ have argued that what distinguishes democratic from non-democratic regimes is uncertainty of outcomes and the possibility of electoral turnover.¹⁹ Such a conceptualization ignores the real possibility that serious violation of democratic procedure may occur in competitive elections. At times during the 1990-2007 period, elections in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Cameroon, Cambodia, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Russia, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe were characterized by considerable uncertainty and, in some cases, incumbent defeat. However, none of them were democratic, and some were not even remotely so. We must therefore be able to conceptualize regimes that are sufficiently competitive to generate real uncertainty (and even turnover), but which fall short of democracy. As this book shows, such regimes were widespread during the post-Cold War period.

Diverging Outcomes: Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories, 1990-2007

Competitive authoritarian regimes followed three distinct paths between 1990 and 2007 (See Table 2). The first is *democratization*, or the establishment of free and fair elections, the broad protection of civil liberties, and a leveling of the political playing field, such that no single party dominates access to state, media, and other critical resources. Such reforms may be overseen by autocratic incumbents, as in Ghana, Mexico, and Taiwan, or they may occur after autocrats fall from power, as in Croatia, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia, and Slovakia. Although the removal of autocratic incumbents is not necessary for democratization,²⁰ all of our democratizing cases experienced turnover. As Table 2 shows, 14 of 35 cases democratized between 1990 and 2007: Benin, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

--Table 2 about here—

The second outcome is *unstable authoritarianism*, or cases that undergo one or more transition but do not democratize. In these cases, autocratic incumbents were removed at least once, but new leaders continued to rule autocratically. Successor governments inherited an uneven playing field and politicized state and regime institutions, which they used to weaken and/or disadvantage their opponents. Cases of brief democratization followed by a reversion to competitive authoritarianism (e.g.,

¹⁸See Przeworski (1986, 1991); Alvarez et al. (1996); also McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov (2004: 5-6).

¹⁹As Przeworski famously put it, democracy is a “system in which parties lose elections” (1991: 10).

²⁰Arguably, democratization occurred in Mexico and Taiwan before incumbents lost elections.

Madagascar, Moldova) are scored as unstable authoritarian. Eleven cases fell into the unstable authoritarianism category: Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Senegal, and Zambia.

The third outcome is *stable authoritarianism*. In these cases, autocratic governments or their chosen successors remained in power—via non-democratic means—through 2007. This category includes cases, such as Cambodia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, that became increasingly hegemonic over time. Ten of our 35 cases remained stable and authoritarian during the 1990-2007 period: Armenia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Russia, Zimbabwe.

This diversity of outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that underlie much of the recent literature on regime change. Neither the breakdown of authoritarian regimes nor the holding of multiparty elections necessarily led to democratization during the post-Cold War period. Sixty percent (21 of 35) of our cases failed to democratize between 1990 and 2007. Indeed, the regime patterns examined here suggest that electoral turnover—even where longtime autocrats are removed—should not be equated with democratic transition. In many cases, the electoral defeat (or post-electoral removal) of autocratic incumbents generated little institutional change, and successor parties did not govern democratically. In some cases (Albania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Moldova), two or more transitions occurred without democratization. Such cases are simply too numerous to be ignored or treated as exceptions.

Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories: International Linkage and Organizational Power

Our explanation combines a domestic structuralist approach to regime change with insights from recent work on the international dimension of democratization. Earlier studies of regime change, ranging from the more structuralist theories of the 1960s and 1970s to the agency-centered literature of the 1980s,²¹ focused overwhelmingly on domestic variables. Scholars viewed democratization as “a domestic affair *par excellence*” (Schmitter 1996: 27), with external factors playing an “indirect and usually marginal role” (Schmitter 1986: 5). However, widespread democratization during the 1980s and 1990s compelled scholars to take the international environment seriously.²² Indeed, the spatial and temporal clustering of third and fourth wave transitions convinced even leading proponents of domestic-centered approaches that it was “time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change” (Schmitter 1996: 27). Thus, the debate turned from whether international factors matter to *how much* they matter. On the one hand, some scholars posited the primacy of

²¹Classical regime analyses include Lipset (1959, 1960); Almond and Verba (1963); Moore (1966); Huntington (1968); O’Donnell (1973); and Skocpol (1979). The “transitology” literature of the 1980s and 1990s includes O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Di Palma (1990); and Karl (1990).

²²On the international dimension of democratization, see Huntington (1991); Pridham (1991a); Starr (1991); Pridham et al. (1997); Diamond (1992, 1995); Whitehead (1996a); Grugel (1999a) Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Schraeder (2002a); Kelley (2004); Levitsky and Way (2005, 2006); Mainwaring and Perez Liñan (2005); Pevehouse (2005); Vachudova (2005); Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

external factors, arguing that international effects outweigh those of domestic variables.²³ In this view, international pressure may so decisively change actor calculations that that “the influence of many traditionally important domestic variables may be mitigated” (Pevehouse 2005: 209). Other scholars argued that the international environment plays a secondary role,²⁴ or that its effects are largely superficial, yielding “virtual” (Joseph 1999b) or “artificial” (Pinkney 1997: 216) democracies.

We offer a different take on this debate. Rather than assert the primacy of either international or domestic factors, we argue that their relative causal weight *varies across countries and regions*.²⁵ In countries with extensive ties to the West (i.e., Central Europe, the Americas), post-Cold War international influences were so intense that they contributed to democratization even where domestic conditions were unfavorable. In these cases, we concur with those who posit the primacy of international variables. However, where ties to the West were less extensive, post-Cold War international democratizing pressure was weaker, and consequently, domestic factors weighed more heavily. In these cases, regime outcomes are explained primarily by domestic structural variables, particularly the strength of state and governing party organizations.

The International Dimension: Leverage and Linkage

Analyses of the international dimension of democratization proliferated during the post-Cold War era. These studies point to at least five distinct mechanisms of international influence:²⁶ (1) *diffusion*, or the “relatively neutral transmissions of information” across borders (Whitehead 1996b: 5), via either “demonstration effects” in neighboring countries or modeling on successful democracies;²⁷ (2) *direct democracy promotion* by Western powers, via diplomatic persuasion, threats, or military force;²⁸ (3) *multilateral conditionality*, in which external assistance or membership in international organizations is linked to countries’ democratic or human rights performance;²⁹ (4) external *democracy assistance*;³⁰ and (5) the role of *transnational advocacy networks*.³¹

²³For example, see Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005); and Vachudova (2005).

²⁴See Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Linz and Stepan (1996); McFaul (2001, 2005); and Fish (2005).

²⁵Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); and Brinks and Coppedge (2006) make similar arguments.

²⁶For summaries of the various mechanisms international influence, see Diamond (1993, 1995); Schmitter (1996); Whitehead (1996a); Grugel (1999b); Burnell (2000b); and Schraeder (2003).

²⁷See Huntington (1991); Starr (1991); Drake 1998; O’Laughlin et al. (1998); Schmitz and Sell (1999); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Starr and Lindborg (2003); and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

²⁸Whitehead (1996b: 8-15) calls this democratization “by control.” See Carothers (1991); Lowenthal (1991); Smith (1994); Robinson (1996); Whitehead (1996c); Peceny (1999); Cox et al. (2000); Rose (2000); von Hippel (2000); and Schraeder (2002a).

²⁹See Nelson and Englington (1992); Stokke (1995a); Crawford (2001); Zielonka and Pravda (2001); Linden (2002); and Clinkenbeard (2004). On EU conditionality, see Pridham (1991); Pridham et al. (1997); Schimmelfennig et al. (2003, 2005); Jacoby (2004); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); and Vachudova (2005).

³⁰See Diamond (1995); Carothers (1999, 2000b); Ottaway and Chung (1999); Erklit (1999); Burnell (2000a, 2000b); Ottaway and Carothers (2000); and Ethier (2003). U.S. funding for democracy assistance programs “took off” in the 1990s (Burnell 2000b: 39-44), increasing from near zero in the early 1980s to \$700 million at the turn of the century (Carothers 1999: 6; Burnell 2000b: 49).

Despite this heightened scholarly attention, however, the relationship between the international environment and regime change remains poorly understood. Two problems are worth noting. First, there has been little effort either to adjudicate among the various mechanisms of international influence cited above or to integrate them into a coherent theoretical framework (Pevehouse 2005: 204). Most studies either simply present a laundry list of the various mechanisms of international influence or limit their focus to a single mechanism.

Second, many analyses of international democratizing pressure pay insufficient attention to how it varies—in both character and intensity—across cases and regions.³² For example, democratic diffusion has been shown to be “spatially dependent,” or contingent upon geographic proximity.³³ For example, diffusion effects were far more pronounced in the Americas and Central Europe than in Asia and the former Soviet Union.³⁴ Regional variation was also manifest in Western efforts to promote democracy.³⁵ Whereas Western powers invested heavily in democracy promotion in Central Europe and Latin America during the 1990s, democracy promotion was trumped by “power politics” in much of Asia (Inoguchi 2000), and in Africa, Western “indifference and neglect” (Alden 2000: 355) limited democracy promotion to the realm of the “rhetorical” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 241). The effectiveness of conditionality also varied by region. Whereas EU membership conditionality was relatively effective,³⁶ conditionality had a limited democratizing impact in Russia and sub-Saharan Africa.³⁷ Finally, the impact of transnational advocacy networks varied across regions. Transnational human rights movements were more influential in Central Europe and Latin America than in other regions during the 1990s,³⁸ while Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African countries were said to be “severely underrepresented” in these networks (Florini and Simmons 2000: 7).

Post-Cold War international democratizing pressure thus varied considerably by region (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Gleditsch 2002). The international dimension was

³¹On transnational human rights networks, see Sikkink (1993); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse et al. (1999); Florini (2000a); Orenstein and Schmitz (2006).

³²An exception is the literature on diffusion. On regional variation in international influences, see Schmitter 1996: (28, 47); Whitehead (1996: 395-396); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan (2003, 2005); Orenstein and Schmitz (2006) and Brinks and Coppedge (2006)

³³Kopstein and Reilly (2000: 1-2); also see Starr (1991); O’Loughlin et al. (1998); Gleditsch (2002: 4-5); and Brinks and Coppedge (2006)

³⁴Starr (1991); Chu et al. (1997); Prizel (1999); Whitehead (1999); Kopstein and Reilly (2000).

³⁵Western funding for democracy assistance programs also followed a regional pattern. Both the U.S. and the EU spent more on democracy promotion in their neighboring regions than in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Crawford 2001: 109, 113; Bunce and Wolchik 2007: 12-13). In the early 1990s, seven of the top ten U.S. political aid recipients were located in Latin America (Crawford 2001: 109), and U.S. spending on democracy assistance in Latin America was more than three times greater than its spending in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East combined (Carothers 1999: 51).

³⁶Linden (2002); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); Vachudova (2005).

³⁷On Russia, see Goldgeier and McFaul (2003) and McFaul (2005). On Sub-Saharan Africa, see Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 182, 219) and Roessler 2005 (210-211).

³⁸Sikkink (1993: 435-436); C. Kumar (2000: 137); Risse and Ropp (1999: 240); Smith and Wiest (2005).

decidedly “thicker” in some regions (Central Europe, Latin America) than in others (Africa, former Soviet Union). To capture and explain this variation, and to integrate the large number of seemingly disparate mechanisms of international influence into a concise theoretical framework, we organize the post-Cold War international environment into two dimensions: *Western leverage* and *linkage to the West*.

Western Leverage

Western leverage may be defined as governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. Our conceptualization of leverage includes both (1) regimes’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the West, or its ability to avoid Western action aimed at punishing autocratic abuse or encouraging political liberalization and (2) the potential economic, security, or other impact of Western action on target states. Leverage thus refers not to the exercise of external pressure, *per se*, but instead to a country’s vulnerability to such pressure. Where countries lack bargaining power and are heavily affected by Western punitive action, leverage is high. Where countries possess substantial bargaining power and/or can weather Western punitive action without substantial harm, leverage is low.

Leverage is rooted in three factors.³⁹ The most important factor is the size and strength of countries’ states and economies. Governments in weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (e.g., much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those in larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (e.g., China, India, Russia) (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20, 47). These latter states have the bargaining power to prevent pressure from being applied; and the various types of pressure employed by Western powers—such as aid withdrawal, trade sanctions, and the threat of military force—are less likely to inflict significant damage.

Second, Western leverage may be limited by competing Western foreign policy objectives. Where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments often possess the bargaining power to ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves—and regime stability—as the best means of protecting those interests (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Crawford 1997: 87). Thus, Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producers (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) or states that are deemed strategically important (e.g., Egypt, Pakistan). In such cases, efforts to take punitive action are likely to divide Western governments, thereby diluting the effectiveness of those efforts (Crawford 2001: 211-227).

Third, Western leverage may be reduced by the existence of what Hufbauer et al. (1990: 12) call “black knights,” or counter-hegemonic powers whose economic, military, and/or diplomatic support helps mitigate the impact of U.S. or European democratizing pressure. Russia, China, Japan, and France played this role at times during the post-Cold War period, using economic, diplomatic, and other assistance to shore up autocratic governments in neighboring (or in the case of France, former colonial) states. Examples include Russian backing of governments in Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine and France’s support for autocrats in former colonies such as Cameroon and Gabon. In Central and South-Eastern Europe and the Americas, by contrast, no significant countervailing power (regional or otherwise) existed during the post-Cold War period. For countries in those

³⁹For operationalization of Western leverage, see Appendix II.

regions, the EU and the U.S. were “the only game in town,” which heightened their vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure.

Leverage raised the cost of building and maintaining authoritarian regimes during the post-Cold War period. In externally vulnerable states, autocratic holdouts were frequent targets of Western democratizing pressure after 1990 (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Crawford 2001: 210-227; Vachudova 2005). Western punitive action often triggered severe fiscal crises, which, by eroding incumbents’ capacity to distribute patronage and pay the salaries of civil servants and security personnel, seriously threatened regime survival. Indeed, even the threat of punitive action or—in the case of Central Europe—the promise of external reward may powerfully shape the calculation of autocrats and their backers.

By itself, however, leverage rarely translated into effective democratizing pressure. First, outside the EU and its potential member states, Western powers employed democratizing pressure inconsistently during the post-Cold War period, allowing many autocrats to escape sanction (Crawford 1997; Lawson 1999; Ethier 2003). Even where Western powers pushed for political change, these efforts were limited in important ways. First, Western democracy promotion strategies (again, with the exception of EU membership conditionality) were markedly “electoralist,” in that they focused on the holding of multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties (Karl 1986; Diamond 1999: 55-56). Thus, while coups and other blatant acts of authoritarianism often triggered strong Western responses, “violations that are less spectacular yet systematic tend[ed] to be left aside” (Stokke 1995b: 63). Even in internationally-monitored elections, incumbents often got away with harassment of opponents, abuse of state resources, near-total control over the media, and substantial manipulation of the vote (Geisler 1993; Carothers 1997b; Lawson 1999). Moreover, Western pressure tended to ease up after the holding of elections, even if the elections did not result in democratization. During the mid-1990s, for example, autocratic governments in Armenia, Georgia, Kenya, Mozambique, Peru, Tanzania, and Zambia faced little external pressure after elections had been held.

Electoralism was exacerbated by difficulties in monitoring and enforcing conditionality. Although external pressure may be used effectively for easily-monitored “one shot” measures, such as blocking coups or forcing governments to hold elections, it is less effective at guaranteeing other aspects of democracy, such as the protection of civil liberties and the maintenance of a reasonably level electoral field (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 35; Stokke 1995b: 63-67; Ottaway 2003). Outside of the EU, the mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement required to impose the full package of democracy were largely absent. Hence, it is not surprising that cross-national studies have found that political conditionality had little impact on regime outcomes during the post-Cold War period.⁴⁰ Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where Western leverage is greatest, scholars have found no positive relationship between conditionality and democratization (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Leverage alone thus generated blunt and often ineffective forms of external pressure during the post-Cold War period. Even where political conditionality was applied, autocrats frequently enjoyed substantial room to maneuver. Though compelled to hold elections and avoid massive human rights abuses, they frequently got away with

⁴⁰According to one study, conditionality made a “significant contribution” to democratization in only two of 29 cases during the 1990s (Crawford 2001: 187). Also see Nelson and Eglinton (1992); Stokke (1995b); and Burnell (2000b: 26-7).

minimal reforms—such as holding elections without ensuring civil liberties or a level playing field—that fell short of democracy.⁴¹ In other words, leverage was at times sufficient to force transitions from closed to competitive authoritarianism, but it was rarely sufficient to induce democratization.

Linkage to the West

A second dimension—linkage—is central to understanding variation in the effectiveness of international democratizing pressure during the post-Cold War period. We define linkage to the West as the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the U.S., the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.⁴² Linkage is a multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks of interdependence that connect individual polities, economies, and societies to Western democratic communities.⁴³ Six dimensions are of particular importance:

**Economic* linkage, or flows of trade, investment, and credit.

**Intergovernmental linkage*, which includes both bilateral diplomatic and military ties and participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations.

**Technocratic* linkage, or the share of a country's elite that is educated in the West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led multilateral institutions.

**Social* linkage, or flows of people across borders, including tourism, immigration and refugee flows, and diaspora networks.

**Information* linkage, or flows of information across borders, via telecommunications, internet connections, and Western media penetration.

**Civil Society* linkage, or local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and party organizations, and other transnational networks.

Linkage is rooted in a variety of historical factors, including colonialism, military occupation, and geopolitical alliances. It is enhanced by capitalist development, which increases cross-border economic activity, communication, and travel, as well as by sustained periods of political and economic openness. However, the most important source of linkage

⁴¹Ottaway (2003: 193-4); Carothers (1997a, 1999, 2000); Joseph (1999a, 1999b).

⁴²This discussion draws on the work of Laurence Whitehead (1991, 1996b, 1996d, 1996e) and Geoffrey Pridham (1991b).

⁴³This conceptualization draws on Keohane and Nye's work on "complex interdependence," a central characteristic of which is "multiple channels of contact among societies" (Keohane and Nye 1989: 33-4). However, whereas Keohane and Nye focus on linkage *among* Western powers, we examine countries' ties *to* Western powers. Our conceptualization of linkage is broadly similar to those of Geoffrey Pridham (1991b, 1991c) and Barbara Stallings (1992), as well as to Rosenau's use of the term "penetrative linkage" (1969b: 46), Scott's (1982) use of "informal penetration," Li's (1993) use of "penetration," and Kopstein and Reilly's (2000) use of "flows." Our conceptualization differs from international relations work on "linkage diplomacy," which has been defined as government attempts to project power "from an area of strength to secure objectives in areas of weakness" (Oye et al. 1979: 13; Hass 1980; Stein 1980; Li 1993).

is geographic proximity.⁴⁴ Proximity “induces interdependence among states” and creates “opportunity for interaction” (Gleditsch 2002: 4-5). Countries in regions that are geographically proximate to the U.S. and the EU, such as Latin America and Central Europe, generally have closer economic ties, more extensive diplomatic contact, and higher cross-border flows of people, organizations, and information than countries in less proximate areas such as sub-Saharan Africa or the former Soviet Union.

Linkage contributed to democratization in three ways during the post-Cold War period: (1) it heightened the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse, thereby raising the cost of such abuse; (2) it created domestic constituencies for democratic norm-abiding behavior; and (3) it reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthening democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats.⁴⁵

Shaping Incentives: International Reverberation and the Cost of Autocratic Abuse

Linkage heightens the international reverberation triggered by autocratic abuse, thereby raising the cost of non-democratic behavior. All else equal, extensive media, intergovernmental, and NGO penetration and cross-border flows of people and information increase the likelihood that fraud or repression will become “news” in Western capitals. The activities of transnational NGO networks, exile communities, and multilateral organizations have an amplifying effect, turning what would otherwise be a minor news item into an international scandal (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18). In such a context, even relatively minor abuses may gain substantial attention in the West. Whereas stolen elections in Armenia, Cameroon and Gabon went virtually unnoticed in the U.S. media during the 1990s, fraud in two of Mexico’s *gubernatorial* elections gained widespread U.S. media coverage in 1991 (Dresser 199b: 332). Similarly, the 1994 Zapatista uprising attracted a massive influx of international media and human rights organizations to Southern Mexico (Dresser 1996b: 334), and army repression “inspired an overwhelming reaction from civic groups throughout the United States” (Kumar 2000: 117). In Central Europe, a dense array of multilateral organizations allows for perpetual monitoring at a level of detail not seen in other parts of the world (Pridham 2002; Schimmelfennig 2002). For example, the Slovak government was once cited for violating *informal* parliamentary norms of committee assignment (Vachudova 2005: 158). By contrast, where Western media and INGO penetration is weak, even egregious abuses often fail to make international headlines. In parts of Africa, even regimes that “rely overwhelmingly on violence and exclusionary tactics...manage to slip almost completely beneath the radar of the international media” (Joseph 2003: 160). Similarly, months after the 2005 massacre of more than 100 protesters by Uzbek security forces, even Western regional experts knew “very little” about what had happened.⁴⁶

Linkage also increases the probability that, all else equal, Western governments will take action in response to reported abuse. Extensive media coverage and lobbying by

⁴⁴See Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

⁴⁵This argument draws heavily on the work of Pridham (1991c), Whitehead (1991, 1996d, 1996e), Schmitter (1996), and Kopstein and Reilly (2000).

⁴⁶Presentation by Victoria Clement, “Yellow Revolution? Recent Referendums and Elections in Central Asia,” at the conference “Shades of Revolution: Democratization in the Former Soviet Union,” University of Illinois, 12 September 2005. See also, “A Show Trial,” *The Economist*, October 1, 2005.

INGOs, exile and diaspora communities, and religious and party networks often generates a “do something” effect that puts pressure on Western governments to act (von Hippel 2000: 102-3). In Haiti, for example, intense lobbying by Haitian refugee organizations, human rights groups, and the Congressional Black Caucus played a critical role in pushing the Clinton Administration to take action against the military regime (Malone 1998: 166; Martin 1999: 725-726). Western governments are also more likely to take action in high linkage cases because they perceive direct interests to be at stake. For the U.S. and EU members, the potential social, political, and economic effects of instability in the Caribbean Basin and Central and Southern Europe are greater than those of instability in Sub-Saharan Africa or most of the former Soviet Union. For example, Serbia’s proximity to Western Europe explains why NATO opted for a military response to abuse in Kosovo, but took little action in response to similar or worse crises (in terms of number of refugees) in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 194). Similarly, the domestic impact of large-scale refugee flows helped trigger U.S. military action in Haiti (von Hippel 2000: 102) and European intervention to resolve the Albanian crisis in 1997 (Johnson 2001). EU choices regarding potential new members were also tied to proximity and security concerns. For example, the 1999 decision to offer or accelerate membership applications to underdeveloped Balkan states (but not Moldova or Ukraine) was clearly linked to the threat of regional instability (Türkes and Gökgöz 2006: 667).

Where linkage is less extensive, the probability of Western response is lower. For example, due to limited media coverage, weak intergovernmental ties, and the relative weakness of African diaspora communities and Africa-oriented human rights networks, Western governments have felt little domestic pressure to take action against autocratic abuses in Africa (Moss 1995: 198-199; Schraeder 2001: 391-394). U.S. politicians thus view it as “politically unwise to incur the possibility of alienating their constituencies by focusing on Africa,” and consequently, even fairly major problems—such as the Congo civil war in 1999—have often “failed to rise to the level of a policy making crisis” in Washington (Schraeder 2001: 392). A similar pattern can be seen in the former Soviet Union. For example, there existed relatively little pressure on Western governments to respond to Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003: 138-144) or the 2005 massacre of unarmed protestors in Uzbekistan.

In sum, linkage increases the probability that government abuses will gain the attention of—and trigger responses by—Western powers, thereby narrowing autocrats’ room for maneuver. In such a context, even leaders who engage in relatively minor abuses, such as Vladimir Meciar (Slovakia) in the mid-1990s or Hugo Chavez (Venezuela) in the mid-2000s, are likely to be tagged as rogue autocrats, even though they are often less repressive than governments in low linkage countries (e.g., Zenawi in Ethiopia, Chiluba in Zambia) that are accepted—and even embraced—by the West.

Shaping Interests: Creating Domestic Constituencies for Democratic Behavior

Linkage also shapes the distribution of domestic preferences, increasing the number of domestic actors with a stake in adhering to regional or international democratic norms. Where linkage is extensive, a plethora of individuals, firms, and organizations maintain personal, financial, or professional ties to the West. Because international isolation triggered by flawed elections, human rights abuses, or other

violations of democratic norms would put these ties—and consequently, valued markets, investment flows, grants, job prospects, and reputations—at risk, internationally-linked actors have a stake in avoiding such behavior. For example, regional economic integration increases the number of businesses for whom a sudden shift in trade or foreign investment flows would be costly. These economic actors will have a stake in their governments’ adherence to regional democratic norms (Pridham 1991c: 220-225; Pevehouse 2005). As a European official describing the effect of integration put it,

You can never prevent an adventurer trying to overthrow the government if he is backed by the real economic powers, the banks and the businesses. But once in the Community, you create a network of interests for those banks and businesses....; as a result, those powers would refuse to back the adventurer for fear of losing all those links.⁴⁷

This dynamic was apparent in the Dominican Republic, where, despite a severe political-economic crisis in the early 1990s, business leaders opposed a coup out of fear that it would “hurt the country’s economic prospects, affect tourism, and impact relations with the United States” (Hartlyn 1993: 166).

A similar dynamic exists with technocrats with ties to Western universities, INGOs, and international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF. Not only are technocrats sensitive to developments in the international arena, but they often aspire to either funding from, or positions in, Western universities or international agencies (such as the European Union or the IMF) in the future. Fearing the professional or reputational costs of association with a norm-violating government, they are more likely to advocate reforms that improve the country’s international standing and/or oppose abusive acts that threaten international rebuke. Likewise, close ties to the West may induce politicians within authoritarian governing parties to seek to reform those parties from within, as occurred in Croatia, Mexico, and Taiwan, or to defect to the opposition, as occurred in Slovakia and (to a lesser extent) Romania during the mid-1990s (Vachudova 2005: 161, 163, 172). Linkage may even shape voter preferences. Citizens who expect integration with the Europe or the U.S. to bring prosperity are likely to vote against parties whose behavior appears to threaten the process of integration. Thus, oppositions in Croatia in 2000, Romania in 1996, and Slovakia in 1998 focused their campaigns on a promise to end their countries’ relative estrangement from the EU (Vachudova 2005: 177; Fisher 2006).

Linkage thus creates new domestic constituencies for adherence to regional and international norms. By heightening domestic actors’ sensitivity to shifts in a regime’s image abroad, linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international norms into domestic demands. When much of the elite perceive it has something to lose from international isolation, it becomes difficult to sustain a coalition behind authoritarian rule. For example, when President Fujimori’s “self-coup” threatened Peru’s re-integration into the international financial system, technocrats and business allies convinced him to abandon plans for dictatorship and call early elections (Mauceri 1996: 89). Likewise, Serbia’s increasing isolation from the West in the late 1990s led key military and security officials to defect, which undermined Milosevic’s subsequent ability to crack down on opposition protest (Cohen 2001: 214; Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003: 24-26). By

⁴⁷Quoted in Pridham (1991c: 235).

contrast, in Armenia, Belarus, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe, where Western-linked elites were less numerous and influential, authoritarian coalitions remained cohesive in the face of criticism and even isolation from the West.

Shaping the Distribution of Power and Resources

Linkage also reshapes domestic power balances in ways that favor democratization. For one, ties to the West help to protect opposition leaders and groups who would otherwise be vulnerable to repression. Because individuals who gain Western media attention and have influential allies in the West are more difficult to imprison or kill, governments in high linkage contexts are often forced to tolerate voices of criticism and opposition that they otherwise might have silenced. For example, although the Mexican army possessed the raw coercive capacity to destroy the Zapatista rebels, heavy international media attention and the presence of thousands of international human rights observers “made it literally impossible for the Mexican government to use repression” against them (Castells 1997: 80). In Romania, international criticism brought about by intense European engagement during the early 1990s helped convince the Iliescu government to end coal miners’ violent attacks on opposition (Vachudova 2005: 102).

Second, ties to Western governments, transnational party networks, international agencies, and INGOs may provide critical resources to opposition and pro-democracy movements, helping to level the playing field against autocratic governments. Where autocrats monopolize access to the media and sources of finance, opposition parties are often so starved of resources that they cannot mount effective national electoral campaigns. External ties may help compensate for these resource asymmetries by providing assistance to opposition parties, independent media, and human rights and election monitoring groups. High levels of Western engagement may also help encourage fragmented oppositions to unite (Vachudova 2005; Fisher 2006). Thus, in Slovakia, support from the EU and European party networks helped a relatively weak and fragmented opposition defeat Meciar in 1998 (Pridham 1999: 1229-1239); in Serbia, U.S. and European assistance helped level the playing field by financing independent media, opposition activists’ salaries, and a massive get-out-the-vote campaign (Carothers 2001); and in Nicaragua, where a weak and fragmented opposition stood little chance of wresting power from the Sandinistas on its own, U.S. officials helped unify anti-Sandinista forces, select their presidential candidate, and build a national campaign infrastructure (Robinson 1992; López Pintor 1998: 41-44). In East Asia, by contrast, opposition party ties to the West are generally weaker (Sachsenroder 1998: 13), and power and resource asymmetries have often been more difficult to overcome (Gomez 2002a; Rodan 2004).

Third, ties to the West may enhance domestic support for opposition groups. Western media penetration heightens citizens’ awareness of their country’s international standing—and its consequences. The availability of the internet, cable television, and Western news sources makes it harder for autocrats to hide foreign criticism from citizens. In such a context, opposition politicians who enjoy close ties to the West may gain prestige and support, either because they are identified with valued Western ideals or because they can credibly claim an ability to improve their country’s international standing (for example, by securing entry into the EU or improving relations with the U.S.). Thus, in Nicaragua,

where the Sandinista government suffered a costly U.S.-sponsored war and trade embargo, the National Opposition Union's ties to the U.S. allowed it to "claim with confidence that if it won the election, the United States would end its economic embargo...and open the floodgates of U.S. economic assistance" (Moreno 1995: 240), which proved to be a critical source of electoral support (Anderson and Dodd 2004: 152-154).

At the same time, linkage may erode domestic support for autocratic incumbents. Leaders whose pariah status is perceived to threaten their countries' regional or international standing may pay a significant cost in terms of domestic support. In Slovakia, for example, most voters and politicians viewed Vladimir Meciar as an obstacle to European integration, which was widely seen as a leading priority (Vachudova 2005: 174-5; Schimmelfennig et al. 2005: 40; Fisher 2006). Not only did Meciar's pariah status become a major issue in the 1998 election, but it undermined his party's ability to find coalition partners with which to form a government—despite the fact that it had won a plurality of votes (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 515). Pariah politics also played a role in Croatia and Romania, where the EU actively discouraged alliances with parties that were viewed as non-democratic, governments pushed those parties out of ruling coalitions.

Finally, linkage increases the likelihood that autocratic collapse will lead to stable democratization. In a high linkage context, successor governments have stronger and more permanent incentives to play by democratic rules. For one, in nearly all cases, officials in successor governments maintained close ties with Western actors that were forged during periods of opposition. In the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and elsewhere, opposition leaders relied heavily on Western allies for resources, protection, and legitimacy. In many cases, their domestic public support was rooted in their promise to deliver better relations with the West. Once these opposition leaders came to power, they were unlikely to "bite the hand" that helped get them there.⁴⁸ Second, because the infrastructure of international monitoring remains in place, new governments face the same level of scrutiny—or nearly so—as their autocratic predecessors. Hence, even former opposition leaders who are not committed democrats face strong domestic and international pressure to govern democratically.

Where linkage is less extensive, opposition groups maintain weaker ties to Western actors, and in the absence of an infrastructure of media, NGOs and other transnational actors, new governments enjoy greater room for maneuver. Consequently, as long as domestic pro-democracy forces remain weak, few incentives exist to play by fully democratic rules. Consequently, transitions are more likely to bring new authoritarians to power (e.g., Georgia, Malawi, Zambia), and even where new governments are democratic (e.g. Benin, Ukraine), regimes will be more vulnerable to authoritarian reversal.

Compared to military force, diplomatic pressure, or conditionality, the effects of linkage are often subtle and diffuse.⁴⁹ Linkage influences a variety of non-state actors,

⁴⁸Examples include Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, Emil Constantinescu in Romania, Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia, Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic, and Alejandro Toledo in Peru.

⁴⁹Not all linkage is Western. In many countries, there exist significant social, economic, or political ties to important non-Western states (e.g., China, Russia) or communities (e.g., the international Muslim community). Where these ties are strong, they can be expected to shape how governments respond to Western pressure. The existence of a significant non-Western audience could blunt the impact of ties to the West. Indeed, in a few of our cases, extensive *non-Western linkage* appears to have

generating multiple and decentralized forms of pressure that often operate below the radar screens of international observers. Indeed, linkage effects are often obscured by formal mechanisms of external pressure, leading observers to overstate the latter's causal impact. For example, scholars have attributed the region-wide success of democracy in Central Europe and the Americas to pressures exercised by regional organizations such as the EU and the OAS.⁵⁰ Although conditionality was indeed effective in these cases (particularly in Europe), its effectiveness was rooted, to a considerable degree, in linkage.

In sum, the democratizing impact of Western leverage varies with Western linkage. In the absence of linkage, the effects of leverage are too limited and too inconsistent to contribute in a significant way to democratization. Where linkage is high, however, more rigorous monitoring, more systematic sanctioning, and greater domestic pressure for international norm-abiding behavior raise considerably the cost of autocratic abuse—making authoritarian rule more difficult to sustain. In such a context, external pressure is often highly effective in bringing down autocratic governments. Moreover, transitions in high linkage cases are more likely to result in stable democratization.

Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization

Both linkage to the West and Western leverage raised the costs of autocracy in the post-Cold War era. However, they did so in distinct ways and to different degrees. As noted above, leverage alone generates inconsistent and superficial democratizing pressure. Where linkage is low, external monitoring and sanctioning is usually limited to elections and large-scale human rights violations, which leaves autocrats with considerable room to maneuver. Even where external pressure succeeds in removing autocrats from power, transitions may not result in democracy. Without extensive ties to the West, and usually facing little domestic pressure, new governments have weaker incentives to play by democratic rules. Indeed, low linkage transitions have frequently ushered in new autocratic governments.

Where linkage is high, leverage is more likely to generate pressure for full-scale democratization. Linkage enhances the democratizing impact of leverage in at least three ways. First, it vastly improves external monitoring. In a context of extensive penetration by international media, INGOs, and multilateral organizations, autocratic governments face intense scrutiny. Crucially, this scrutiny extends beyond elections to include civil liberties, media freedom, and other democratic procedures—in other words, the full package of democracy. Moreover, monitoring tends to be permanent, rather than limited to crises or election cycles. Consequently, Western attention is less likely to wane after elections are held and/or autocrats are removed.

Second, linkage increases the probability that Western states will actually use leverage for democratizing ends. Because autocratic abuse is more likely to reverberate in Western capitals and trigger demands for a response, norm-violating governments are

had such an effect. In Malaysia, for example, social, political, and civil society ties to the international Muslim community increased the UMNO government's sensitivity to developments in the Muslim world and countered the political influence of Western actors (Nair 1997). In Belarus and Ukraine, ties to Russia—rooted in the Soviet period—similarly blunted the impact of Western pressure.

⁵⁰See, for example, Halperin (1993); Pevehouse (2005); and Schimmelfennig et al. (2005).

more likely to suffer punitive action. In other words, the “boomerang effect” discussed by scholars of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999) is more likely to be set in motion in a context of extensive linkage.

Third, linkage magnifies the *domestic* impact of external pressure, by increasing the likelihood that it will trigger broad domestic opposition. Because economic elites, politicians, technocrats, and voters are more aware of how their country is perceived abroad and more likely to believe they have something to lose from international isolation, norm-violating governments confront a *double boomerang effect*: abuse triggers a hostile reactions on both the international and domestic fronts. For example, after Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano’s 1993 “self-coup” was condemned by the U.S. government, the “threat of international economic and diplomatic isolation loomed in the minds of both economic and military elites, both of which valued their international contacts” (Pevehouse 2005: 192). “[F]ear of the international consequences of allowing the coup to stand” led them to mobilize against Serrano, forcing his resignation (Pevehouse 2005: 190-2).

Linkage also increases the likelihood that autocratic collapse will lead to stable democratization. In a high linkage context, successor governments have stronger and more permanent incentives to play by democratic rules. For one, in nearly all cases, officials in successor governments maintained close ties with Western actors that were forged during periods of opposition. In the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and elsewhere, opposition leaders relied heavily on Western allies for resources, protection, and legitimacy. In many cases, their domestic public support was rooted in their promise to deliver better relations with the West. Once these opposition leaders came to power, they were unlikely to “bite the hand” that helped get them there.⁵¹ Second, because the infrastructure of international monitoring remains in place, new governments face the same level of scrutiny—or nearly so—as their autocratic predecessors. Hence, even former opposition leaders who are not committed democrats face strong domestic and international pressure to govern democratically.

Where linkage is less extensive, opposition groups maintain weaker ties to Western actors, and in the absence of an infrastructure of media, NGOs and other transnational actors, new governments enjoy greater room for maneuver. Consequently, as long as domestic pro-democracy forces remain weak, few incentives exist to play by fully democratic rules. Consequently, transitions are more likely to bring new authoritarians to power (e.g., Georgia, Malawi, Zambia), and even where new governments are democratic (e.g. Benin, Ukraine), regimes will be more vulnerable to authoritarian reversal.

In sum, the democratizing impact of Western leverage varies with linkage. In the absence of linkage, the effects of leverage are too limited and too inconsistent to contribute in a significant way to democratization. Where linkage is high, however, more rigorous monitoring, more systematic sanctioning, and greater domestic pressure for international norm-abiding behavior raise considerably the cost of autocratic abuse—making authoritarian rule more difficult to sustain. In such a context, external pressure is often highly effective in bringing down autocratic governments. Moreover, transitions in high linkage cases are more likely to result in stable democratization.

⁵¹Examples include Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, Emil Constantinescu in Romania, Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia, Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic, and Alejandro Toledo in Peru.

The Domestic Dimension: Organizational Power and Authoritarian Stability

Our domestic-level analysis centers on the balance of power between autocrats and their opponents.⁵² Much of the recent literature has focused on the opposition—or societal—side of this story. An established body of scholarship has highlighted the centrality of organized labor and other class actors,⁵³ civil society,⁵⁴ mass protest,⁵⁵ and insurgency⁵⁶ in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy. Other recent studies point to the importance of opposition strategy. For example, Marc Howard and Philip Roessler (2006) have linked the formation of broad opposition coalitions to the liberalization of competitive authoritarian regimes, while Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2006: 12) attribute the success of recent “electoral revolutions” in the post-Communist world to the diffusion of particular opposition techniques and tactics that were initially developed in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Serbia.

Yet regime outcomes also hinge on incumbents’ capacity to resist opposition challenges.⁵⁷ Autocratic governments vary considerably in their ability to control civil society, co-opt or divide oppositions, repress protest, and steal elections. Consider the story of the three little pigs. Setting normative preferences aside, imagine that the pigs are autocratic incumbents, their houses are their regimes, and the wolf represents pro-democracy movements. The wolf huffs and puffs at all three houses, but the impact of his huffing and puffing varies across cases: whereas houses of straw and sticks quickly collapse, the brick house remains intact. The key to explaining these outcomes lies not in the wolf’s abilities or strategies, but in differences in the strength of the houses.

Much of the recent literature on regime change has focused on democratic huffing and puffing,⁵⁸ while paying insufficient attention to variation in the strength of authoritarian houses. In some countries, bankrupt states, weak, underpaid, and disorganized security services, and fragmented elites left regimes vulnerable to collapse in the face of minimal protest (Herbst 2001; Way 2002a; 2003; 2005a). Thus it was “the weakness of African states rather than the strength of democratic opposition” that drove many regime transitions in that region (Herbst 2001: 364). Many African democracy movements confronted states that “were rotting from within. With a mere push many

⁵²Here we draw on Theda Skocpol’s work on the causes of social revolution (1973, 1979), as well as more recent regime analyses that highlight the role of state and party organization and the balance of power between state and societal actors, including Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992); Slater (2003); Brownlee (2004); Bellin (2004); Smith (2005); Waldner (2005); and Way (2005a).

⁵³See Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Collier (1999); and Bellin (2000).

⁵⁴See Fish (1995); Diamond (1999); and Howard (2003).

⁵⁵See Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Beissinger (2002); Thompson and Kuntz (2004, 2005); and Tucker (2005).

⁵⁶See Wood (2000).

⁵⁷On this issue, see Skocpol (1973, 1979); Luckham (1996); Snyder (1998); Brownlee (2002); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004); and Way (2005a, 2005b).

⁵⁸Notable exceptions include O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Geddes (1999); Bellin (2004); Brownlee (2004); and Greene (forthcoming).

would collapse” (Herbst 2001: 361). One finds a similar dynamic in parts of the former Soviet Union (Way 2002a, 2005a, 2005b). For example, in Georgia, where police had not been paid in three months, Eduard Shevardnadze abandoned the presidency in the face of “undersized” crowds, largely because he “no longer controlled the military and security forces” and was thus “too politically weak” to order repression (Mitchell 2004: 345, 348). In Kyrgyzstan, it took only 5,000-10,000 protesters to overthrow President Akayev (Silitski 2005). Finally, in Haiti, the Aristide government was “toppled by a rag-tag army of as few as 200 rebels.”⁵⁹ The rebels “did not fight a single battle. The police simply changed out of their uniforms, grabbed bottles of rum, and headed for the hills” (Dudley 2004: 27).

In other cases, the story played out differently. Where state and/or governing party institutions were strong, autocrats often thwarted serious opposition challenges. In Armenia, for example, the government, backed by army veterans who had recently returned from a successful war with Azerbaijan, faced down crowds of up to 200,000 protesters following a rigged presidential election in 1996.⁶⁰ In Zimbabwe, opposition plans for “mass action” to protest the flawed 2000 elections were “deferred indefinitely” in the face of brutal police repression.⁶¹ Two years later, opposition leaders were “unwilling to consider” mass protest “given the vast repressive machinery that would confront them” (Raftopoulos 2002: 418). In Malaysia, although the 1998 arrest of Anwar Ibrahim gave rise to an unprecedented *Reformasi* movement, regime opponents confronted a “highly effective and repressive police force” (Slater 2003: 89). Protest was “met forcefully” by riot police (Hilley 2001: 151) and ultimately “posed no threat to the government’s stability” (Felker 1999: 46). Finally, in Serbia, the opposition to Milosevic was highly mobilized throughout the 1990s, but autocratic breakdown occurred only after four military defeats and a severe economic crisis had eroded the power of the state and the governing party. Opposition movements in Armenia, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia were arguably stronger than those in Haiti, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. The fact that regime change occurred in the *latter* cases (or in Serbia, only *after* the state was battered by successive military defeats) suggests that the fate of authoritarian regimes rests not only on the opposition forces but also on the robustness of the regime they are up against.

Variation in incumbent power is particularly important in the study of competitive authoritarianism. The regimes analyzed in this study had not democratized by 1990 (or, in a few cases, suffered authoritarian reversals between 1990 and 1995), despite a highly favorable international environment. In nearly all of these cases, the domestic impetus for democratization was weak (Howard 2003). With a few exceptions (most notably Mexico and Taiwan), civil societies lacked the organization, resources, and rural presence to sustain the kind of robust democracy movements seen in countries such as Poland, South Korea, or South Africa. Given this lack of variation, opposition-centered variables are of limited utility in explaining diverging outcomes.

Our approach to incumbent power is *organizational*. Sustaining modern authoritarianism is a complex and costly endeavor. It entails dissuading diverse social and political actors from challenging the regime (through co-optation, intimidation, or

⁵⁹*The Economist*, March 6, 2004. Also see Wucker (2004).

⁶⁰See Fuller (1996: 45); Stefes (2005).

⁶¹*Africa Today*, January 2001, p. 25; Also Raftopoulos (2001: 23)

repression), as well as maintaining the loyalty and cooperation of powerful actors within the regime. These challenges are especially great in competitive authoritarian regimes, as incumbents must tolerate—but also control—myriad actors (parties, media, judges, NGOs) and arenas of contestation (elections, legislatures, courts) that do not exist—or exist merely as a façade—in fully closed regimes. In all but the most traditional societies, these tasks require robust organizational mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, and enforcement.⁶²

Building in part on Lucan Way's work on failed authoritarianism in the former Soviet Union (Way 2005a), we focus on two organizations: states and parties. Effective state and party organizations enhance incumbents' capacity to prevent elite defection, co-opt or repress opponents, defuse or crack down on protest, and win (or steal) elections. Where states and governing parties are strong, autocrats are often able to survive despite vigorous opposition challenges. Where they are weak, incumbents may fall in the face of relatively weak opposition movements.

State Coercive Capacity

The role of state coercive capacity has received relatively little attention in recent regime studies.⁶³ Recent analyses have highlighted the importance of state strength to democracy. Scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell (1993, 1999) and Stephen Holmes (1997, 2002) have argued cogently that an effective state, grounded in the rule of law, is essential to protecting basic liberal-democratic rights.⁶⁴ Yet as an earlier generation of scholarship made clear, strong states also enhance autocratic stability (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979). Whereas some state institutions check executive power and uphold a democratic rule of law, others provide mechanisms to suppress opposition and maintain political hegemony. *Authoritarian* state institutions—from security forces to local prefects to intelligence agencies—furnish governments with tools to monitor, co-opt, intimidate, and repress potential opponents, both in civil society and within the regime itself (Slater 2003).

Coercive capacity is central to competitive authoritarian stability. The greater is incumbents' capacity to crack down on opposition protest (or prevent it from emerging in the first place), either on the street or at the ballot box, the greater are the prospects for incumbent survival. Incumbents may employ distinct forms of coercion. Some, which we label *high intensity coercion*, are high visibility acts that target large numbers of people, well-known individuals, or major institutions. A clear example is the violent repression—often involving security forces firing on crowds—of high profile mass demonstrations, as occurred in Mexico City in 1968 and Tiananmen Square, China in 1989 (and more recently, in Uzbekistan in 2005). Although such massacres are uncommon in competitive authoritarian regimes, violent repression of protest—in each case, with dozens of reported deaths—occurred in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, and Tanzania. Other forms of high intensity coercion include campaigns of violence against opposition parties (e.g., Cambodia 1997; Zimbabwe 2000-2002), the attempted assassination (Belarus, Ukraine) or imprisonment (Malaysia, Russia) of major

⁶²See Selznick (1960); Slater (2003); Brownlee (2004); and Smith (2005).

⁶³Recent exceptions include Thompson (2001); Brownlee (2002); Way (2002; 2005a, 2005b); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004), and Darden (forthcoming).

⁶⁴Also see Linz and Stepan (1996); Sperling (2000); Carothers (2002: 16); van de Walle (2002: 76); Bunce (2003: 180-81); Joseph (2003: 16); Mengisteab and Daddieh (2003); Gonzales and King (2004); and Bratton (2005).

opposition leaders, and—in competitive authoritarian regimes—high profile assaults on existing democratic institutions, such as the closure of legislatures (e.g., Yeltsin’s 1993 assault on parliament) and the cancellation or the theft of elections (e.g., Serbia 2000).

Competitive authoritarian regimes also rely on other, less visible, forms of coercion—which we label *low intensity coercion*. Because these coercive acts do not involve major events or high profile targets, and thus rarely make headlines or trigger international condemnation, they are often critical to sustaining competitive authoritarian rule. Low intensity coercion takes myriad forms. One is surveillance. Governments in Belarus, Nicaragua, Russia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe used large surveillance apparatuses and extensive informant networks to monitor opposition activity throughout the country. Another type of low intensity coercion is low profile physical harassment, or localized attacks—often in rural or urban marginal settings—that target lower level opposition activists and supporters. This includes the use of security forces or paramilitary thugs to break up opposition meetings, vandalize opposition or independent media offices, and detain, threaten, harass, beat, and occasionally kill journalists and opposition activists. Low intensity coercion may also take non-physical forms, including denial of employment to opposition activists, denial of public services—such as heat and electricity—to communities with ties to the opposition, and the use of tax, regulatory, or other state agencies to investigate and prosecute opposition politicians, businesspeople, and media owners.

Whereas high intensity coercion is often a response to an imminent—and highly threatening—opposition challenge, low intensity coercion is often aimed at preventing such challenges from emerging in the first place. Where it is effective, many opposition supporters conclude that anti-government activity is simply not worth the risk, leaving only the most die-hard activists to oppose the regime. By deterring opposition protest (or nipping it in the bud), successful low intensity coercion thus reduces the need for high intensity coercion. Where opposition movements are so thoroughly beaten down that they pose no serious challenge, incumbents have little need to steal elections or order police to fire on crowds.

Coercive capacity may be measured along two dimensions: *scope* and *cohesion*.⁶⁵ Scope refers to the effective reach of the state’s coercive apparatus. Specifically, we focus on the size and quality of the “internal security sector,” or the “cluster of organizations with direct responsibility for internal security and domestic order” (Weitzer 1990: 3). This includes army and police forces, presidential guards, gendarmes and riot police, secret police and other specialized internal security units, and the domestic intelligence apparatus (Weitzer 1990: 3; Luckham 1996: 8), but it may also include informal or paramilitary organizations such as death squads, militias, and armed “youth wings” (Roessler 2005). It may also include a variety of other state agents—local prefects, tax officials, state enterprise directors—who are mobilized to harass the opposition. Where scope is high, as in Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe, states possess a developed and effective internal security sector, usually equipped with extensive intelligence networks and specialized police and paramilitary units, that can “act on” society throughout the national territory. Security forces are thus well-funded, well-trained, and well-equipped, and they have a proven capacity to monitor opposition activity and to put down protest in all parts of the country.

⁶⁵These dimensions are operationalized in Appendix IV.

Where scope is low, as in Albania, Georgia, Haiti, and Macedonia, armed forces are small, poorly-equipped, and often lacking in specialized internal security agencies. Security forces do not effectively penetrate the national territory; law enforcement agents are non-existent, or maintain only a token presence, in much of the country; or alternatively are underpaid to the extent that they largely ineffective and refuse to obey orders. Such cases are frequently characterized by extensive “brown areas” (O’Donnell 1993), or territories that lack even a minimal state presence. For example, Haiti possessed no standing army after 1994, and its police force was one of the smallest, per capita, in the world (Erikson and Minson 2005: 4). The Haitian police “often lack[ed] lacks the means to conduct basic operations” and were largely non-existent in rural areas (Schulz 1997-98: 85; McCoy 1997: 18). In Georgia, police often went unpaid for months and large parts of the country lay outside central state control.

Scope is particularly important for low intensity coercion. Systematic surveillance, harassment, and intimidation of opponents require an infrastructure capable of directing, coordinating, and supplying agents across the national territory. Where such an infrastructure is absent or ineffective, incumbents’ ability to monitor and check grassroots opposition activity will be limited. This (often *de facto*) space for mobilization makes it easier for opposition groups to organize electoral campaigns or protest movements. Indeed, the (attempted) use of high intensity coercion is often evidence that mechanisms of low intensity coercion are weak or have broken down.

Cohesion refers to the level of compliance *within* the state apparatus. For coercion to be effective, subordinates within the state must reliably follow their superiors’ commands. Where cohesion is high, incumbents can be confident that even highly controversial or illegal orders (such as firing on crowds of protesters, killing opposition leaders, or stealing elections) will be carried out, both by high-level security officials and by rank-and-file soldiers and bureaucrats. Where cohesion is low, leaders cannot be confident that such orders will be complied with, either by high level security officials or by the rank-and-file. Noncompliance may take a variety of forms. In extreme cases, security officials may openly disobey presidential orders and even cooperate with (or defect to) the opposition (e.g., Georgia 2003; Madagascar 2001-02; Ukraine 2004) and rank-and-file soldiers may desert en masse (e.g., Haiti in 2004). Subtler forms of non-compliance include calling in sick when coercive action is expected, promising compliance but failing to carry it out, and carrying out orders in ritualistic—and thus ineffective—ways.

Cohesion is often critical to the success of high intensity coercion. Acts of high intensity coercion are high risk ventures. Because they are likely to trigger strong negative reactions both at home and abroad, such acts often exacerbate regime crises and may even contribute to regime collapse. State officials responsible for ordering or carrying out the repression thus run considerable risks, for if it fails and the regime collapses, they will be vulnerable to retribution. Hence, acts of high intensity coercion pose a particular threat to the chain of command, increasing the likelihood of internal disobedience. Breakdown in the coercive command structures undermined incumbents’ capacity to engage in high intensity coercion in Benin in 1990, Mali in 1991, Georgia in 1991 and 2003, Russia in 1993, Ukraine in 1994 and 2004, and Madagascar in 2001-02. Only where the state

apparatus is cohesive (e.g., Armenia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe) can incumbents confidently order acts of large-scale repression or abuse.

State cohesion is rooted in several factors. One is fiscal health (Decalo 1998: 27; Gros 1998: 9-10). Unpaid state officials are less likely to follow orders, especially high-risk orders such as repression or vote-stealing. Thus, in much of Africa and the former Soviet Union, fiscal crises eroded discipline within states during the immediate post-Cold War period. In extreme cases, such as Benin, Malawi, and Georgia, the non-compliance of unpaid security forces left incumbents' without means to crack down on opposition protest. However, material resources are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure cohesion. In Armenia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, state apparatuses remained intact despite severe fiscal constraints. Indeed, incumbents who rely exclusively on material payoffs are often most vulnerable to insubordination during crises.

The highest levels of cohesion are usually found where material payments are complemented by one of four alternative sources of cohesion. The first is personal ties. As the literature on sultanistic regimes has shown, the appointment of family members and cronies to head army, police, intelligence, and other state agencies is often an important means of enhancing intra-regime trust and reducing the likelihood of elite defection (Chehabi and Linz 1998; Snyder 1998; Decalo 1998: 23). A second source of cohesion is shared ethnicity. In deeply divided societies (e.g., Guyana, Malaysia), autocrats have enhanced loyalty within security agencies by packing them with ethnic allies (Enloe 1976, 1980; Decalo 1998: 19-21). Third, cohesion may be enhanced where state elites are bound by shared (usually nationalist or revolutionary) ideologies, as in Moldova, Nicaragua, and Serbia. Finally, cohesion may be rooted in solidarity ties forged during periods of violent struggle, such as war, revolution, or liberation movements.⁶⁶ Where top state positions are controlled by a generation of elites that won a war (Armenia) or led a successful insurgency (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe), state actors are more likely to possess the cohesion, self-confidence and "stomach" to use force.⁶⁷

Measuring cohesion is tricky. One cannot know for certain how cohesive an organization is until it is seriously tested. However, using state responses to regime crises during the period under study as an indicator of cohesion would obviously be tautological. To avoid this problem, we rely on two types of indicator. First, wherever possible, we examine levels of cohesion during periods *prior to* that under study. For example, coercive apparatuses in Mozambique and Nicaragua remained cohesive despite serious external challenges during the 1980s, while those in Benin and Haiti showed evidence of repeated indiscipline during the 1980s. Second, we look for evidence of the sources of cohesion discussed above, including kinship, ethnic, or ideological ties, or shared military struggle. Where we find evidence of either prior discipline under stress or non-material bases of

⁶⁶The different literatures on the origins of both states and parties have long emphasized the important role played by histories of conflict in generating strong and cohesive organizations (Tilly 1975, 1992; Huntington 1970; Shefter 1994; Hale 2006).

⁶⁷Along similar lines, Mark Thompson (2001) and Andrew Nathan (2001) argue that the survival of the revolutionary generation in the Chinese Communist Party was key to its decision to crack down on protestors in 1989.

cohesion, we score cohesion as high. Where we find evidence of prior indiscipline, we score cohesion as low. All other cases are scored as medium.

The Role of Party Organization

Much of the recent literature on political parties and regimes has focused on the relationship between parties and democracy.⁶⁸ Like states, however, strong parties may also serve as pillars of authoritarian rule.⁶⁹ As Barbara Geddes (1999) and Jason Brownlee (2004) have argued, governing parties help manage elite conflict, usually through the organization and distribution of patronage. Strong ruling parties “encourage continued cooperation over defection” (Brownlee 2004: 57), by providing institutional mechanisms to reward loyalists (with public posts, policy influence, and patronage resources), and by lengthening actors’ time horizons through the offer of future opportunities for career advancement (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2004). As long as the party is expected to remain in power, even short-term losers in struggles over policy and patronage are likely to remain loyal in the expectation of access to spoils in future rounds (Geddes 1999: 129, 131). Where governing parties are weak or absent, elites see fewer long-term opportunities for political advancement from within and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime (Way 2002; Brownlee 2004: 55). Such elite defection is often a major cause of authoritarian breakdown.⁷⁰

Strong parties do more than limit elite defection, however. They also contribute to authoritarian stability “on the ground.” Grassroots party organizations deliver votes, distribute clientelist goods, and mobilize supporters for pro-government campaigns. Thus, the KMT’s mass organization “transformed millions of Taiwanese into members and supporters” (Rigger 2000: 137), providing the party with “overpowering” mobilizational capacity (Cheng 1989: 482), and the Serbian Communist Party helped mobilize up to five million supporters in the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that allowed Slobodan Milosevic to overcome local opposition and consolidate power (Thomas 1999: 44-51). Party organization also enhances coercive capacity. Autocratic governments may use local party cells, “youth wings,” and other grassroots structures to monitor and suppress opposition, transforming them into an “extension of the state’s police power” (Widner 1992: 8).⁷¹

⁶⁸See, for example, .

⁶⁹See Zolberg (1966); Huntington (1968: 400-01), Huntington and Moore (1970); Widner (1992); Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2004); Smith (2005); Way (2005a). Analyses of Latin American and post-Communist politics, for example, have associated weak parties with a range of phenomena—such as low executive accountability, executive-legislative conflict, electoral volatility, and the rise of neopopulist “outsiders”—that undermine the quality and stability of democracy Mainwaring and Scully (1995); Kitschelt and Smyth (2002); and Hale (2006). Similarly, students of Russian politics have argued that Boris Yeltsin’s failure to invest in a governing party weakened democratic forces and contributed to democratic failure White (1993: 212) and McFaul (2001: 316-317).

⁷⁰This argument is made by Easter (1997), Geddes (1999) and Brownlee (2004), and is in line with earlier work by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

⁷¹In Kenya, for example, President Moi used the governing KANU as an “adjunct to the security forces in monitoring and controlling opposition,” deploying its “youth wing” to “patrol the country, instill support for the party, and monitor dissent” (Widner 1992: 7, 132). In Taiwan, the KMT’s “extensive network of secret police and informers” (Gold 1997: 170) was used to “keep watch over neighborhoods, factories, military units, businesses, and government offices” (Hood 1997: 59).

Parties are particularly important under competitive authoritarianism, where incumbents must retain and exercise power through democratic institutions. For example, strong parties enhance incumbents' capacity to manage elections. First, they help prevent electoral challenges from within. In countries with weak civil societies and oppositions, government officials often pose the most serious challenge to incumbents (Way 2005a: 236). Given the paucity of resources and media access outside the state, prime ministers, cabinet members, and other regime insiders are often best positioned to launch viable presidential bids. Name recognition, access to media, and control over administrative resources give regime insiders an opportunity to build support that most opposition leaders lack. Where high level insider defections occur, incumbents are more vulnerable to defeat. By providing mechanisms to manage elite conflict, strong parties help limit such defections. Strong party organizations also help *win* elections. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are often hard fought contests. Winning them usually entails some mix of voter mobilization and fraud, both of which require organization. Mass parties provide an infrastructure for electoral mobilization, through large-scale clientelism, door-to-door campaigning, public rallies, and other means. Similarly, illicit electoral strategies such as ballot stuffing, vote buying, and other forms of fraud require coordination and discipline: a large number of lower level authorities across the territory must reliably carry out controversial orders and keep them secret.

In addition, parties help control legislatures. Legislative control is critical in competitive authoritarian regimes. First, it enhances the executive's capacity to manipulate and control other areas of politics. Because top judicial and electoral authorities are often directly chosen by legislatures or require legislative approval, executive control over constitutional courts, electoral commissions, and other agents of horizontal accountability often requires a reliable legislative majority. Control over the legislature may also allow the governing party to modify the constitution (for example, eliminating presidential term limits) to extend or deepen authoritarian rule. Finally, legislative control has a defensive purpose: to eliminate the legislature as a potential arena for contestation. When not controlled by the executive, legislatures may thwart presidential appointments (including, in some countries, prime ministers), create new mechanisms of oversight, conduct high profile investigations into government abuse, and even threaten the incumbent's political survival by voting to remove him (as occurred in Madagascar in 1996 and nearly occurred in Russia in 1993 and 1999).

Strong parties facilitate legislative control in two ways. First, they are more likely to win legislative elections. Presidents without strong parties (e.g., Soglo in Benin, Fujimori in Peru, Yeltsin in Russia; Kravchuk in Ukraine) have weaker coattails: they often fail to translate their own electoral success into legislative majorities. By contrast, where governing parties are strong (e.g., Malaysia, Tanzania, Mexico under the PRI), incumbent victories frequently generate solid legislative majorities. Second, strong parties help maintain legislative control between elections. Strong parties offer incumbents a variety of mechanisms (patronage distribution, a valuable label, ideology or other sources of cohesion) that help keep legislative allies in line. Where governing parties are weak, legislative factions are more prone to internal rebellion and schism (Way 2005c: 200-204). Such internal crises create opportunities for opposition forces to gain control of the legislature, which can result in the weakening (Benin, Ukraine),

paralysis (Haiti, Russia), or removal (Madagascar 1996) of incumbent governments. Where governing parties are strong, such parliamentary challenges rarely emerge.

Finally, strong parties facilitate executive succession. Succession is a difficult challenge for most autocracies. Because they must worry about prosecution after leaving office, incumbents generally place a high value on finding a successor who will ensure their protection. This requires not only winning the election, but doing so with a candidate who can be trusted or controlled. Strong parties facilitate succession in several ways: they have a larger pool from which to draw strong candidates; they offer mechanisms to prevent the defection of losing aspirants; and they possess electoral capacity that is independent of the outgoing executive. Thus, it is not surprising that smooth competitive authoritarian successions almost always occur in countries with strong governing parties.⁷² Where parties are weak, succession is more traumatic: candidate pools are smaller; the likelihood of internal conflict and defection is greater, and the party's electoral viability is less certain. In such a context, incumbents often face a dilemma. On the one hand, the most electable alternatives are often (non-party) figures with independent resources or support bases, which make them difficult to control. On the other hand, loyal regime insiders can be trusted but often lack the stature to ensure electoral success. This dilemma has often undermined regime stability. In Ukraine, President Kuchma chose Viktor Yanukovich, a corrupt official with a criminal past, apparently because he could be controlled through blackmail; but Yanukovich's poor public image undermined his ability win the 2004 election (Way 2005d: 58). In Peru, the absence of a viable successor induced Alberto Fujimori to seek an illegal third term, which contributed to the unraveling of the regime.

Party strength may also be measured in terms of scope and cohesion.⁷³ Scope refers to the size of a party's infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Where scope is high, as in Taiwan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, and Tanzania, parties possess extensive organizations—frequently, with mass memberships and large activist bases—with an active presence throughout the national territory. Party branches operate in virtually every population center, including those in the countryside, and they remain active in between elections. For example, UMNO's 16,500 branch organizations allowed it to penetrate “every village in the country”⁷⁴ and assign a party agent to monitor every 10 households (Case 2001a: 52, 2001b: 37); similarly, the Tanzanian CCM's “extensive apparatus” and two million members enabled it to operate a “ten-house” cell structure in villages throughout the country (Barkan 1994: 16; Berg Schlosser and Siegler 1990: 81). Where scope is low, as in Benin, Peru, Ukraine, and Russia under Yeltsin, parties lack any real organization, membership, or activist base. Party operations are confined to major urban centers, the president's home region, and in some cases, the presidential palace.⁷⁵

⁷²Examples include Malaysia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Taiwan, and Mexico.

⁷³These dimensions are operationalized in Appendix IV.

⁷⁴*Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 24, 1999, p. 1.

⁷⁵Thus, Alberto Fujimori's New Majority “had scarcely any organizational presence outside the national congress” (Roberts 2002: 18), while in Ukraine, President Kravchuk “did not have the support of any political force in parliament” (Kravchuk 2002: 248).

Cohesion refers to incumbents' ability to secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level. Cohesion is crucial to preventing elite defection, particularly during periods of crisis, when the incumbent's grip on power is threatened. Where cohesion is high, as in Malaysia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zimbabwe, allied ministers, legislators, and governors routinely support the government, implement presidential directives, and vote the party line. Internal rebellion or defection is rare, even in the face of major crises or opposition challenges, and when defections occur, they tend not to attract many followers. For example, the Sandinista leadership did not experience a single public schism during the 1980s, despite a civil war and severe economic crisis. Where cohesion is low, as in Benin, Georgia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Russia under Yeltsin, parties are little more than loose coalitions of relatively autonomous actors, many of which derive their power and status from outside the party. Incumbents routinely confront insubordination, rebellion, or defection within the cabinet, in the legislative bloc, and among regional bosses. Consequently, regimes are vulnerable to internal crisis triggered by splits within the governing coalition, which give rise to opposition takeovers of the legislature or strong electoral challengers from erstwhile regime insiders. Indeed, in several cases, crises emerged even in the absence of a significant external challenge.

Sources of cohesion vary. Personal ties are a relatively weak source of cohesion. Charismatic parties, in which politicians' careers hinge on personal ties to the leader, often exhibit high levels of internal discipline, but discipline tends to be precarious outside the leader's inner circle, and cohesion rarely endures beyond the leader's tenure in office (Panebianco 1988: 144-146, 162). Patronage is another relatively weak source of cohesion. Although patronage may help hold elites together during normal times, parties that are based exclusively on patronage ties become vulnerable during periods of crisis. When economic crisis threatens incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage, or when incumbents appear vulnerable to defeat, patronage-based parties often suffer large-scale defection (e.g., Zambia 1990-1991; Kenya 2002; Georgia 2001-2003). Cohesion tends to be greater in what might be called consolidated political machines, or highly institutionalized patronage-based parties with an established track record in surviving crises and winning multiparty elections. Thus, in parties such as the PRI, the KMT, and UMNO, entrenched norms of patronage distribution and career advancement lengthened actors' time horizons, and repeated electoral success in multi-party elections enhanced the value of the party label, which raised the cost of defection. High levels of cohesion may also be rooted in shared ethnicity (e.g., Guyana) or ideology (e.g., Nicaragua, Moldova). Perhaps the most robust source of cohesion, however, is bonds of solidarity forged out of periods of violent struggle (Smith 2005). Parties that emerge out of successful revolutionary or liberation movements (e.g., Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe) tend to be highly cohesive, at least while the founding generation survives.

Again, efforts to measure cohesion must be careful to avoid tautology. We do not use levels of internal discipline during the period of study as evidence of cohesion. Instead, we rely on three types of indicator: (1) existence or absence of a single ruling party organization; (2) instances of discipline or indiscipline prior to 1990; and (3) evidence of non-material bases of cohesion. Most obviously, coalitions of parties (or the absence of any party) are probably the most prone to disintegration and are therefore scored as low cohesion. In addition, newly-formed parties whose internal glue is clearly nothing more

than short-term political or patronage deals (e.g., new governing parties in Benin and Ukraine during the 1990s) are scored as low cohesion. Charismatic parties (e.g., Peru) and established patronage-based parties without proven track records in winning multiparty elections (e.g., Kenya, Zambia) are scored as medium cohesion. Parties that exhibit strong ideological (Moldova) or ethnic (Guyana) ties, parties that emerged out of revolutionary or liberation movements (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe), and consolidated machines with proven track records in winning multiparty elections (Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan) are scored as high cohesion.

Economic Control as a Substitute for Coercive and Party Organization

It is worth noting that discretionary state control over the economy also enhances incumbents' capacity to pre-empt or thwart opposition challenges (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005; Greene 2005). Where such control is extensive, it may effectively substitute for powerful coercive and party organizations. Incumbents' economic power may be considered high when resources are concentrated in state hands *and* governments enjoy substantial discretionary power in allocating those resources. Economic resources are concentrated where the state maintains control over key means of production and finance, as in many partially reformed command economies (Fish 2005), or where a large percentage of national income takes the form of rents controlled by the state, as in many mineral-based rentier states. Rulers exert discretionary control where they can routinely use the tax system, the financial system, licensing, government contracts, and other economic policy levers to punish opponents and reward allies.⁷⁶

Discretionary economic power furnishes autocratic governments with powerful tools to compel compliance and punish opposition. Where the livelihoods, careers, and business prospects of much of the population can be easily and decisively affected by government decisions, opposition activity becomes a high risk venture. Businesses linked to the opposition may be denied access to government credit, licenses, contracts, or even property rights; independent media may be deprived of access to newsprint or advertising; public employees may be forced to work for the governing party; and critics may be fired, blacklisted, or denied access to essential goods and services.

Discretionary state economic power may also be used to starve oppositions of resources (Greene forthcoming). For political oppositions to be viable, they must have access to resources. Unless those resources are distributed equitably by the state, they must come from the private sector and civil society. Where states control most means of production or monopolize the main sources wealth, private sectors will be small and civil societies will be poor (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005: 156-157; Greene forthcoming), leaving "no conceivable financial base for opposition" (Riker 1982: 7). Where vast discretionary power allow governments to punish businesses in the economic arena for their behavior in the political arena, opposition parties, independent media, and other civil society groups will have few reliable channels of finance.

⁷⁶In the absence of substantial discretionary power, even extensive state intervention may be compatible with democracy (e.g., Sweden). At the same time, where states have vast discretionary power, they may be put to autocratic ends even in predominantly private economies (e.g., Nicaragua under Somoza; Malawi under Banda; Ukraine under Kuchma).

In some cases, then, discretionary economic power may partly substitute for strong party and state organizations in limiting elite defection and thwarting opposition challenges. Where state economic coercive power is extensive, as in Belarus and Gabon, it may be so costly for elites to defect and so difficult for opposition forces to mobilize resources that incumbents go largely unchallenged even in the absence of strong state or party organization.

Combining State and Party Strength

Strong states and parties contribute to authoritarian stability in different ways. State coercive and economic power enhances incumbents' capacity to suppress opponents and critics and defuse or pre-empt potential opposition movements through intimidation, co-optation, and deprivation of resources. Strong parties help incumbents manage intra-elite conflict, mobilize support, and win or steal elections.

State and party functions often overlap, and to some degree, they may be substitutable. For example, strong parties may be so successful at mobilizing support and maintaining elite cohesion that incumbents are able to survive even in the absence of particularly strong states (Moldova under the Communists, Mozambique, Tanzania). In addition, strong parties facilitate efforts to establish tight control over a wide range of state institutions through the provision of a pool of loyal cadres bound by a strong partisan identity. Finally, well-organized parties may also perform state-like coercive functions, including surveillance and other forms of low intensity coercion.

Strong states may also partially substitute for weak parties. For example, state agencies may also be deployed as "party substitutes" (Hale 2005a). In Peru and Ukraine, state intelligence agencies played a central role in maintaining elite cohesion, through surveillance, blackmail, and bribery (Cameron 2006; Darden forthcoming). In other cases, incumbents have used state agencies as party-like mobilizational tools. In Ukraine, governments mobilized public teachers and doctors for electoral campaigns (Allina-Pisano 2005; Way 2005b); in Peru and Serbia, army, police, and other security branches were used for campaign activities (Planas 2000: 357-8; Le Bor 2002: 200-201).

There are limits to substitutability, however. In Peru and Ukraine, succession crises and legislative weakness—both exacerbated by party weakness—contributed to crises that ultimately toppled regimes. Although such crises did not occur in Belarus and Russia through 2007, party weakness—and the potential for elite defection—remained a point of vulnerability. Moreover, elite conflict rooted in party weakness may undermine incumbent control over coercive and other state agencies (Way 2005a: 238). When the governing elite is divided, security forces may be paralyzed by conflicting orders, and state officials may resist carrying out risky coercive action on behalf of any side. Incumbents may lose control over entire security agencies—or be sufficiently uncertain about their loyalty that they cannot order repression.

Organizational power is thus highest where both states and parties are strong. These are clear cases of brick houses: strong state and party organizations give incumbent governments the capacity to hold together even under serious crisis, and to thwart even relatively strong opposition movements—both at the ballot box and in the streets.

Malaysia, Taiwan, and—to a lesser degree—Mexico, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe fall into this category. Organizational power is lowest where both state and party organizations are weak. These are unambiguous cases of straw houses. Incumbents lack substantial capacity to win (or steal) elections or to crack down on protest. Moreover, they routinely suffer intra-elite conflict and defection. As a result, governments are vulnerable to collapse in the face of even modest opposition challenges. Examples include Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, and Ukraine under Kravchuk.

Other cases exhibit mixes of state and party strength. A few cases, including Mozambique, Tanzania, and Moldova under the Communists, are characterized by strong governing parties but only moderately strong states. In these cases, incumbents' capacity to win elections and limit elite conflict may be sufficient to ensure regime stability. However, these regimes remain vulnerable to medium or large-scale opposition mobilization. In other cases, including Armenia, Belarus, and Russia under Putin, incumbents possessed considerable state capacity but relatively weak parties. Although such regimes may be less vulnerable to mass protest, they are probably more vulnerable to internal conflict than those with strong governing parties.

The Impact of Opposition Strength

Incumbent organizational power is, of course, only one side of the story. Opposition strength is also important in explaining regime trajectories. The strength and behavior of societal opposition forces are widely viewed as critical to democratization.⁷⁷ Strong civic and opposition movements shift the balance of power and resources away from state elites, which raises the cost of sustaining autocracy. Where opposition forces mobilize large numbers of people for elections or protest movements, incumbents must employ more nakedly autocratic means to retain power (e.g., steal elections or crack down violently on street protest), which erode public support, generate tension within the regime elite, and risk international punitive action. Thus, the greater the opposition's mobilizational and electoral capacity, the higher the probability that incumbents will opt for toleration over repression (Dahl 1971).

Opposition strength is clearly important to explaining regime outcomes. During the Third Wave, opposition mobilization played a central role in democratization in Argentina, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, South Africa, South Korea, and elsewhere. Among our cases, opposition strength was critical to democratization in Mexico, Taiwan, and perhaps Ghana and Serbia. In these countries, political and civic organizations developed a capacity to mobilize citizens across territory and over time. This gave opposition forces the ability to launch sustained protest, compete effectively in elections, and monitor electoral processes, which increased the cost of repression and fraud. In other cases (e.g., Benin 1988-90, Zambia 1990-91, Madagascar 2001-02; Ukraine 2004), large-scale protest—even in the absence of a well-organized opposition—was critical to the removal of autocratic governments (even if its longer-term democratizing impact was open to question).

In general, however, opposition strength was less important in shaping competitive authoritarian regime outcomes, largely because most regimes confronted

⁷⁷See Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Collier (1999); Diamond (1999); Wood (2000); Thompson (2001); Howard (2003); and Howard and Roessler (2006).

weak opposition. Because they were poor, predominantly rural societies with tiny middle classes (Cambodia, Haiti, Nicaragua, much of sub-Saharan Africa), or because they had recently emerged from decades of Leninism and state socialism (Central Europe, former Soviet Union), most of the cases examined in this study lacked the raw materials for a strong opposition movement: private sectors were weak, civil society was small and narrowly based, and political parties lacked organization and any significant presence in the countryside (Howard 2003). In none of these cases did opposition forces possess the infrastructure or resources to challenge incumbent power over the long-term.

Even where mass protest played an important role in dislodging autocrats from power, transitions were often facilitated by incumbent weakness. In many seemingly protest-driven transitions, incumbents' inability to prevent large-scale elite defection (Ukraine in 2004, Zambia in 1990-1991) or use coercion to crack down on opposition protest (Benin in 1990, Georgia in 2003, Madagascar in 2002, Malawi in 1994) contributed directly to their fall from power. In effect, protesters knocked down a rotten door. By contrast, where coercive and/or governing party structures were strong (e.g., Armenia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe), incumbents often withstood even strong and sustained opposition challenges.

Indeed, in some (but obviously not all) cases, opposition strength is endogenous to incumbent capacity (Brownlee 2004; Greene forthcoming). For example, where incumbents possess powerful instruments of physical and/or economic coercion, they may use them to systematically undermine opposition organize. Thus, systematic coercion may weaken opposition movements by making civic political participation so risky that all but the most die hard activists exit the public sphere. In Zimbabwe, for example, the emergence of an independent labor movement and the well-organized Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) gave rise to a vibrant democracy movement during the late 1990s (Alexander 2000: 391; Raftopoulos 2001: 17). However, violent repression, restrictions on NGO activity and finance, and heavy pressure on the private sector undermined the movement's organizational bases (Raftopoulos 2002: 425). By 2002, the labor movement was a "penniless, drifting shambles" (Blair 2003: 281), and the MDC "barely functioned" in the countryside (Blair 2002: 246). Repression also weakened opposition forces in Armenia and Cambodia. In Malaysia, Belarus, and Russia, effective low intensity coercion helped deter strong opposition movements from emerging in the first place. Discretionary economic power may also be used to weaken or deter opposition movements. In Belarus, Gabon, and Russia, economic coercion and co-optation helped starve opposition movements nearly out of existence.

At the same time, incumbent weakness may contribute to opposition strength. In Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Ukraine, and Zambia, much of the financial and organizational muscle of successful opposition movements came not from society but from political, economic, and military actors who defected—in some cases, just weeks before the transition—from the governing coalition. In Ukraine, for example, much of the financial and organizational strength of the Orange Revolution was provided by business "oligarchs" who had only recently defected from the Kuchma government (Way 2005b). In Senegal, much of the opposition's electoral strength in 2000 was provided by political and religious leaders who had recently defected from the Socialist Party (Galvan 2001; Mozaffar and

Vengroff 2002). In these cases, it was ultimately incumbent weakness, rather than opposition strength *per se*, that drove transitions.

Synthesis of the Argument

Our theory synthesizes the international and domestic arguments presented above. We make a three step argument, which is summarized in Figure 1. First, where linkage is high, as most of Central Europe and the Americas, democratization is likely. Due to extensive penetration by international media, transnational human rights networks, and multilateral organizations, even minor abuses reverberate in the West and are likely to trigger responses from Western powers. Because so many domestic actors maintain ties to the West, the threat of international isolation (or even a tarnished international image) is likely to trigger strong opposition at home. The cost of abuse increases the likelihood that incumbents will tolerate, rather than repress, opposition challenges, and that they will cede power when they are defeated. Because opposition forces maintain close ties to the West (and often view Western support as critical to their success), and because they face the same external constraints that had toppled their predecessors, new governments should rule democratically. Linkage should have a democratizing effect *even where organizational power is high*. High linkage creates incentives for incumbents to under-utilize their coercive capacity and tolerate opposition challenges that they could otherwise suppress. Linkage thus wipes out the effects of domestic power balances: democratization should occur even where incumbent organizational power is high and oppositions are weak.

Linkage should also lead to democratization where leverage is low (e.g., Mexico, Taiwan), although in such cases the process may require a stronger domestic “push.” In such cases, governments face less direct external pressure to democratize. Nevertheless, linkage increases elite sensitivity to their country’s international standing, which creates incentives for incumbents to avoid egregious abuse and maintain themselves in power via credible political institutions. Such a strategy may succeed when oppositions are weak, but when strong opposition challenges emerge, governments may be trapped by their efforts to maintain international credibility. Unwilling to pay the external and domestic costs of repression, they may be forced to accept defeat and abandon power.

Where linkage is low, regime outcomes are driven largely by domestic factors. In the absence of extensive linkage, government abuse is less likely to gain international attention or trigger an external punitive response. Even where punitive action is taken, it is rarely sustained and—due to the paucity of domestic actors with close ties to the West—it is less likely to trigger substantial opposition at home. As long as incumbents avoid massive repression or fraud, then, they enjoy considerable room for maneuver.

The second step of the argument thus centers on the *organizational power of incumbents*. In low linkage cases, high organizational power should result in authoritarian stability. Where incumbents possess strong state and/or party organizations, they are well-equipped to contain elite conflict and thwart opposition challenges, both in the streets and at the ballot box. Governments are often able to pre-empt (or nip in the bud) serious opposition challenges, and when such challenges arise, they possess the

cohesion and the coercive power to withstand or repress them. Where organizational power is high, then, competitive authoritarian regimes should survive even where Western leverage is high.

Where organizational power is low, competitive authoritarian regimes will be less stable. Incumbents are more vulnerable to elite defection and ill-equipped to thwart even modest street protest or electoral challenges. Due to the weakness of incumbents and opposition forces, regime outcomes more open to contingency than in other cases. In this context, Western leverage may be decisive (step three). Where leverage is low, even relatively weak incumbents are likely to survive, as they will encounter virtually no democratizing pressure from (and may even be supported by) Western powers. Where leverage is high, by contrast, the probability of turnover is greatest. When incumbents lack organizational or repressive capacity and are highly dependent on the West, external pressure (or the failure of external powers to intervene on behalf of incumbents) leaves them highly vulnerable even to weak opposition challenges. In cases of high leverage and incumbent weakness, turnover creates opportunities for democratization. Where successor governments under-utilize their power or undertake reforms that level the playing field, democracies may emerge. However, in the absence of linkage, transitions characterized by weak states, parties, and civil societies also create numerous opportunities for incumbent abuse. Hence, turnover is more likely to give rise to a new competitive authoritarian government. More generally, given the difficulty of consolidating any form of rule—democratic or authoritarian—in context of party and state weakness, the most likely regime outcome is a pattern of *unstable authoritarianism*.

--Figure 1 about here

Evaluating the Theory's Performance

Table 3 summarizes how our theory performs in the 35 cases examined in this book. Scores on the independent variables are based on the initial competitive authoritarian government during the period under analysis (1990-95).⁷⁸ As the table shows, regime outcomes matched those predicted by our theory in 27 of 35 cases.⁷⁹ These results are fairly robust. Although modifications in our coding system produce some changes in the distribution of scores, these changes have little effect on the theory's overall performance.

--Table 3 about here—

Of the eight missed predictions, five cases may be characterized as “near misses,” in that regime outcomes are very close to those predicted our theory. In two cases of unexpected democratization, Peru and Serbia, linkage scores are close to the threshold for “high.” Indeed, linkage effects were evident in both cases. In Peru, opposition leader Alejandro Toledo was a U.S.-educated technocrat with extensive ties to the U.S., international organizations, and Western NGOs who, upon winning the presidency, filled

⁷⁸Cases in which scores on the independent variables changed significantly over time are discussed below.

⁷⁹Note that we include as correct predictions two cases (Cambodia and Kenya) in which predictions are indeterminate between stable and unstable authoritarianism, because neither regime democratized. We label as incorrect a similarly predicted case, Ghana, because the regime democratized.

his government with U.S.-oriented technocrats (McClintock and Vallas 2003: 161, 167). Toledo's victory in the 2001 election thus helps explain why the 2000 turnover led to democratization. In Serbia, close proximity to Western Europe was a major factor in triggering the West's assault on the Milosevic government in the late 1990s (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000: 13). Economic sanctions and the 1999 NATO invasion weakened the Serbian state and ruling party, which contributed directly to Milosevic's fall from power. Thus, despite its borderline linkage score, Serbia followed a trajectory that was very much in line with high linkage cases.⁸⁰

Three other unexpected democratizations (Benin, Mali, Ukraine) occurred in cases of low linkage, high leverage, and low organizational power, where we predict unstable competitive authoritarianism.⁸¹ Authoritarian incumbents fell, as predicted, in these cases, but turnover produced democratic governments.⁸² Nevertheless, these regime trajectories largely follow the lines of our theory. All three regimes were unstable competitive authoritarian for most of the period under study.⁸³ Moreover, as we noted earlier, the combination of low linkage, high leverage, and low organizational power tends to produce fluid—and contingent—regime outcomes. The weakness of incumbents and opposition creates an unstable environment in which short-term regime outcomes may be shaped by a variety of factors. This creates an opportunity for democratization. Moreover, because high leverage and low organizational power limits the prospects for authoritarian consolidation, the potential for turnover is high, which can mean multiple opportunities for democratization. Leadership may be decisive in such a context. Where successors under-utilize their power, as they did in Benin, Mali, and Ukraine, democracy may emerge. Similar developments could occur in other cases that combine high leverage and limited organizational power, such as Albania, Georgia, Madagascar, Senegal, and Zambia. Although these regimes were competitive authoritarian in 2007, they were less consolidated—and in most cases, less authoritarian—than other non-democratizers.⁸⁴ It should be noted, however, that the regimes in Benin, Mali, and Ukraine were among the most weakly institutionalized of our democratization cases, and they are almost certainly among the most prone to authoritarian regression.

Outcomes in Ghana, Macedonia, and Belarus are less easily explained through the lens of our theory. Ghana is a case of democratization despite low linkage and medium organizational power. Two factors that lie outside our framework seem to explain this outcome. The first is leadership. In effect, the Rawlings government

⁸⁰It is also worth noting that both Peru and Serbia remained unstable democracies in the mid-2000s. Serbia's new democracy was plagued by institutional crises and the persistent strength of ultra-nationalist forces. In Peru, Ollanta Humala, a populist former military officer with ties to Hugo Chavez, nearly won the presidency in 2006. Had he won, Peru might well have shifted back in a competitive authoritarian direction.

⁸¹Such an outcome occurred in Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, Senegal, and Zambia.

⁸²Elections in Ukraine (2005), Benin (2006), and Mali (2007) were widely considered clean, and the Yushchenko, Yayi, and Toure governments did not subsequently abuse the state in ways that seriously disadvantaged the opposition.

⁸³Benin was competitive authoritarian under Soglo (1991-96) and Kerekou (2001-06); Ukraine was competitive authoritarian under Kravchuk (1992-94) and Kuchma (1994-2004), and Mali was competitive authoritarian under Konare (1992-2002).

⁸⁴Indeed, some of them (e.g., Albania, Georgia, Senegal) were often described as democracies (during the mid-2000s).

behaved as if Ghana were a high linkage case. Heavily invested in its status as a model economic reformer, the government was highly sensitive to its status in the West during the 1990s. Like the PRI in Mexico, it strengthened electoral and judicial institutions and under-utilized his coercive power, and in 1992 and 1996, Rawlings was able to retain power in credible elections. However, the growth of a strong opposition—the second factor—eventually led to his party’s defeat. The NPP’s ability to penetrate the countryside enabled it to take advantage of relatively effective electoral institutions and capture the presidency in 2000. Unlike most African cases, then, opposition strength played an important role in Ghana.

Our theory also cannot account for Macedonia—the only high linkage case that failed to democratize through 2007. As our theory would predict, a large-scale Western presence and intense international scrutiny of elections undermined authoritarian stability in Macedonia. Indeed, the regime experienced no fewer than three turnovers between 1994 and 2007. Unlike other high linkage cases, however, authoritarian failure was not accompanied by democratization, as problems of electoral fraud and media abuse persisted through the mid-2000s.⁸⁵ This outcome may be attributed to a combination of underdevelopment, state weakness, and severe ethnic tension.⁸⁶

Finally, our theory fails to predict turnover in Belarus. Although organizational power in Belarus is relatively low, we predict authoritarian stability because—due to Russian black knight assistance—Western leverage was medium. However, Russia did not unequivocally support the incumbent in the 1994 election, but rather divided its support between President Kebich and leading opposition candidate Alyaksandr Lukashenka. This fact—together with Kebich’s own ineffectiveness—contributed to Lukashenka’s victory. More consistent Russian assistance, together with increased state control over the economy, led to greater regime stability under Lukashenka (1995-2007). A lesson from the Belarusian case, then, is that “black knight” support may be unreliable. Dependence on a regional power does not guarantee that incumbents will enjoy the full support of that power. Black knight governments may—for a variety reasons—choose to withhold support for incumbents.

In a few of our correctly predicted cases, case analyses reveal that complete explanation requires attention to factors that lie beyond our theoretical framework. For example, although linkage clearly contributed to democratization in Mexico and Taiwan, so, too, did the emergence of strong opposition parties and robust civil societies (which, in turn, were rooted in economic development). Given the strength of governing parties and the relative absence of Western leverage, opposition strength was arguably a necessary condition for democratization in these two cases.

Comparative Evidence: Comparison over Time and Across Region

The strength of our argument may be highlighted through two kinds of comparison: over time and across region. First, in five cases (Belarus, Cambodia, Moldova, Russia, and Serbia), scores on our independent variables changed over time in significant and

⁸⁵See Krause (2003); ODIHR (2004c: 15, 22); and Stravrova (2004b).

⁸⁶For example, many of the instances of electoral fraud occurred in Albanian-dominated areas that the central government could not control.

theoretically important ways, which should lead to changes in expected regime outcomes. Although limited time periods following changes in independent variables prevents us from treating these as stand alone cases, it is nevertheless instructive to examine how the changes affected regime trajectories.

In Belarus, Cambodia, Moldova, and Russia, organizational power increased significantly over time, and in all four cases, regime stability also increased. In Belarus, Lukashenka's reassertion of state authority and re-establishment of control over key sectors brought significant increase in organizational power (from medium-low to medium-high) during the mid-1990s. This fact, combined with continued black knight support from Russia, could be expected to lead to greater regime stability after the 1994 transition. Indeed, the regime stabilized (and grew increasingly closed) between 1995 and 2007. Thus, although our theory cannot explain the 1994 transition, it can explain the 13 years of regime stability that followed it. Cambodia followed a similar pattern. Due to the weakness of the Cambodian state in the early 1990s, organizational power was only medium at the time of the 1992-93 transition. Thus, the CPP barely survived the UN-administrated transition and nearly lost power after finishing second in the 1993 election. Over time, however, state and party-building enhanced organizational power, and in the aftermath of the 1997 coup, organizational power was high. As in Belarus, this leads to a prediction of greater authoritarian stability. Indeed, the CPP regime was increasingly stable after 1998. Moldova experienced a sharp increase in organizational power. Governing parties were very weak in the early 1990s, which generated a correct prediction of unstable authoritarianism. However, organizational power increased after 2000 with rise to power of a well-organized and cohesive Communist party. This change would lead us to predict stable competitive authoritarianism after 2000. The short time period between 2000 and 2007 limits our capacity to evaluate the impact of these changes. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the communists were re-elected in 2005, marking the first time since independence that a general election did *not* result in turnover. Finally, in Russia, organizational power was relatively low during the first half of the 1990s, when the state was in disarray and Yeltsin governed without a party. Although the regime survived, due in large part to low leverage, the government faced repeated crises and nearly fell in 1993 and 1999. After 1999, effective state and party-building under Putin brought an increase in organizational power, which leads us to expect greater regime stability. Although remains too early to evaluate the impact of Putin's changes, there exists clear evidence of increased regime stability. There were no serious regime crises after 1999, and Putin was easily re-elected in 2004.

Serbia experienced change on both the international and domestic dimensions. During the early 1990s, organizational power was high and—because Western powers needed Milosevic's cooperation to end the civil war in Bosnia—leverage was medium. This led us to predict authoritarian stability, which is in fact correct for the 1990s. After the 1995 settlement in Bosnia, however, Western leverage increased, and the 1999 NATO-led military assault on Serbia badly weakened the state's coercive apparatus, reducing overall organizational capacity to medium-low. These changes generate a prediction of unstable authoritarianism after 1999. Hence, our theory would correctly predict Milosevic's fall, even if it fails to predict the regime's subsequent democratization.

The utility of our theoretical framework may also be highlighted through cross-regional comparison. For example, the centrality of linkage can be seen in a comparison of three post-Cold War international settlement cases: Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua. All three are cases of poor, rural societies with weak civil societies and no democratic tradition. All three experienced civil wars during the 1980s, with Soviet-backed leftist governments confronting U.S.-backed insurgencies, and all three experienced externally-sponsored settlements that culminated in internationally-administered or supervised elections. At the time of the elections in each case, Western leverage was very high. In all three cases, incumbents possessed relatively strong and cohesive parties. Yet regime outcomes diverged considerably, and these differences can be plausibly traced to distinct international environments. In Nicaragua, where linkage was high, the FSLN was compelled to hold a strikingly clean election, which the U.S.-backed opposition won. Nicaragua experienced a peaceful transition and democratization, despite the fact that organizational power was higher than in either Cambodia or Mozambique. In Cambodia and Mozambique, where linkage was low, governing parties narrowly survived internationally supervised elections during the first half of the 1990s, but as international attention faded during the second half of the decade, both parties reconsolidated power.

The role of linkage is also seen in comparing Malaysia and Mexico. Two of the most developed countries in the sample, with similar levels of development during the 1990s, Malaysia and Mexico both possessed relatively favorable conditions for democratization. Both countries had been stable electoral authoritarian regimes for decades, but years of steady economic growth had produced relatively large, educated middle classes that served as a foundation for growing civil societies. Both countries faced severe economic crises (Mexico in 1994-95, Malaysia in 1997-98) that led to unprecedented electoral challenges. Although both the PRI and UMNO enjoyed high organizational power and faced divided oppositions, Mexico democratized while the Malaysian regime remained stable. Although the comparison is not a perfect one (Mexican opposition parties were stronger, and the Malaysian opposition was weakened by ethnic division), differences in linkage help explain these diverging regime paths. The PRI's technocratic leadership consistently under-utilized its coercive capacity during the 1990s, allowing opposition forces to grow to the point where they could compete seriously for power, while the Mahathir government, which was far less sensitive to Western criticism, engaged in periodic crackdowns that help keep opposition forces in check.

Paired comparison may also be used to highlight the role of state coercive capacity. Take Armenia and Madagascar. Both were high leverage/low linkage cases with relatively weak civil societies. In both countries, incumbents faced major crises (Armenia in 1996, Madagascar in 2002) after stolen elections triggered large-scale protest. Yet whereas the coercive apparatus in Madagascar was low in both scope and cohesion, Armenia's coercive apparatus had recently emerged strengthened out of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. In Madagascar, the security forces disintegrated in the face of mass protest, allowing opposition forces to overrun the capital and eventually forcing President Ratsiraka to flee into exile. In Armenia, war veterans provided the bases for a cohesive and skilled security force that rapidly put down mass demonstrations.

The importance of party strength is seen in a comparison of five cases: Cambodia (1991-93), Nicaragua (1989-90), Ukraine (2004), Zambia (1990-1991), and Zimbabwe (2000-2002). In all five cases, unpopular incumbents faced the prospect of imminent defeat, creating incentives for government officials to strategically defect to the opposition. In Ukraine and Zambia, where governing parties lacked any source of cohesion beyond patronage, this is exactly what occurred. Large-scale elite defection weakened incumbents and provided oppositions with the resources they needed to remove them from power. In Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, governing parties—all of which were characterized by high cohesion rooted in military struggle—remained intact. Notwithstanding economic crisis, international isolation, and electoral defeat (Cambodia, Nicaragua) or near-defeat (Zimbabwe), no top-level CPP, FSLN, or ZANU leaders defected. In Cambodia and Zimbabwe, elite cohesion enabled governments to crack down and reconsolidate power. In Nicaragua, the FSLN ceded power, but this outcome was rooted in linkage, not low cohesion; the FSLN leadership remained intact throughout the 1990 transition.

Alternative Explanations

Our theory of linkage and organizational power arguably provides a more compelling explanation of competitive regime outcomes than do major alternatives, including approaches that focus on economic development, economic crisis, opposition protest, leadership, and institutional design.

Economic Development

One potential explanation for competitive authoritarian regime outcomes is socioeconomic modernization.⁸⁷ Modernization is said to contribute to stable democratization by both increasing the cost of suppression and decreasing the cost of toleration (Dahl 1971: 15, 48; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005: 79).⁸⁸ Economic development increases the costs of suppression by strengthening civic and popular sector organizations and thus creating a “countervailing force against unrestrained and autonomous state power” (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 297; Lipset 1960; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005: 32). Development is said to lower the cost of toleration by creating a more equal distribution of wealth, thereby reducing the potential costs of popular demands for redistribution (Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005: 37).⁸⁹

Although economic development clearly contributed to democratization in two of our cases, Mexico and Taiwan, the overall utility of modernization theory in this study is limited, for several reasons. First, scholars generally agree that the relationship between

⁸⁷For various interpretations of the relationship between economic development and democracy, see Lipset (1960); Rueschemeyer et al. (1992); Przeworski and Limongi (1997); and Boix and Stokes (2003).

⁸⁸We thank David Waldner for suggesting drawing our attention to the link between modernization theory and Dahl’s dimensions of toleration and suppression.

⁸⁹As Boix and Stokes put it, “As countries develop, incomes become more equally distributed. Income equality means that the redistributive scheme that would win democratic support (the one supported by the median voter) would deprive the rich of less income than the one the median voter would support if income distribution were highly unequal. Hence the rich find a democratic tax structure to be less expensive for them as their country gets wealthier, and they are more willing to countenance democratization” (2004: 549-560).

development and democracy is clearest at high levels of development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Wealthy industrialized countries are highly likely to become—and remain—democratic. However, all but one of our cases—Taiwan—was classified by the World Bank as either low or middle income countries in 1991. In none of these cases would level of development lead scholars to confidently predict the installation and/or survival of democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Geddes 1999: 118-119). Regime outcomes varied considerably among these cases. Indeed, where linkage was high, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized in seven of eight low and middle income countries (see Table 4). Where linkage was medium or low, only six of 26 lower/middle income countries democratized. Similarly, there is very little apparent correlation between levels of equality and democratization (Table 5).

More importantly, if changes in the cost of suppression and toleration contributed to democratization in Central Europe and the Americas, these developments tended to be rooted more in the international environment than in domestic socioeconomic change. Oppositions were weak and fragmented in all but a few competitive authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. Indeed, even in relatively developed countries such as Croatia, Malaysia, and Slovakia, governments faced relatively weak pressure from below. Thus, the heightened cost of suppression was rooted in the international arena. More than anything else, it was the heightened cost (exclusion from the EU, sanctions, loss of investment or tourism) associated with violating regional and international norms that reshaped the calculus of governing elites. Similarly, if the cost of toleration was reduced, it was the perceived gains (and protections) afforded by integration with the West, and not higher levels of domestic equality, that made democracy more acceptable to economic elites (Pevehouse 2005).

--Tables 4 and 5 about here--

Economic Crisis

Another set of alternative hypotheses centers on the role of exogenous shocks, particularly economic crises, in undermining authoritarian regimes (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Severe economic downturn clearly contributed to authoritarian failure in several of our cases.⁹⁰ To a considerable degree, however, the impact of economic crisis hinges on organizational power. Incumbents with strong state and party organizations—for example, those that emerged out of wars, revolutions, or liberation struggles—can often prevent elite defection, put down protest, and win or steal elections even in a context of declining resources and/or public support.

Table 6 illustrates the mediating effect of organizational power. We examined the fate of competitive authoritarian incumbents during 50 cases of economic crisis (measured as a country year in which GDP contracted by at least 5 percent) between 1989 and 2005.⁹¹ Among regimes with low organizational power, incumbents fell during

⁹⁰This was the case, for example, in Belarus, Georgia, Malawi, Moldova, and Ukraine in the early 1990s.

⁹¹Cases are scored as turnover if incumbent lost power during the year of the crisis or the subsequent year. We do not count as instances of turnover those cases in which there is evidence that the incumbent fell prior to the crisis, or that the transition contributed to the crisis (e.g., Madagascar 2002).

nine of 28 economic crises; among regimes with medium organizational power, incumbents fell during one of 9 economic crises; where organizational power was high, incumbents survived all thirteen instances of economic crisis. Though hardly definitive, this evidence suggests that the destabilizing impact of economic crisis is far greater where organizational power is already low.⁹²

--Table 6 about here--

Opposition Protest and Stolen Elections

Our focus on incumbent power runs counter to recent studies that highlight the role of opposition strategies and protest—often in response to stolen elections—in bringing down authoritarian regimes.⁹³ This focus has been particularly pronounced in recent work on the post-communist “colored revolutions” (Beissinger 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Kuzio 2006; Tucker forthcoming). Opposition mobilization helped trigger the collapse of several competitive authoritarian regimes, including those in Georgia (2003), Madagascar (1992-93, 2002), Serbia (2000), and Ukraine (2004). Again, however, the success of opposition mobilization hinged on the organizational power of incumbents. Opposition protest—in some cases, *more extensive* protest—failed to reverse flawed elections in the Dominican Republic (1990), Gabon (1993), Armenia (1996, 2003, 2004), Cambodia (1998), Peru (2000), Ethiopia (2005), and Belarus (2006); massive strikes and protest failed to dislodge autocrats in Gabon (1990) and Cameroon (1991), and emerging pro-democracy movements were beaten down by repression in Malaysia (1998-99), Zimbabwe (2000-05), and Belarus (2006).

Table 7 examines the fate of significant anti-regime protests between 1990 and 2005.⁹⁴ Where organizational power was low, a striking seven out of nine anti-regime mobilizations succeeded in bringing down governments. By contrast, only three of 10 opposition mobilizations succeeded in cases of medium organizational power. Where

⁹²A similar argument can be made regarding a second type of exogenous shock: the death or retirement of authoritarian rulers. Succession challenges have long been linked to authoritarian regime instability, and recent studies have pointed to the death or retirement of an autocratic leader as a major cause of either instability (Hale 2005b) or liberalization (Howard and Roessler 2006) in hybrid regimes. When longstanding authoritarian leaders retire, struggles over succession and uncertainty over the distribution of patronage resources often triggers elite conflict and defection, which can undermine regime stability (Hale 2005b; Howard and Roessler 2006). Like economic crises, however, the impact of succession is mediated by organizational power. Where governing parties either lacked organization or were organized strictly around patronage (e.g., Kenya, Peru, Russia, Ukraine), succession issues did frequently destabilize competitive authoritarian regimes. In Kenya, for example, President Moi’s retirement triggered internal conflict and massive elite defection, which contributed in an important way to KANU’s defeat in the 2002 election (Odhiambo-Mbai 2003). Where governing parties were strong and cohesive, however, regimes generally survived one or more succession without serious crisis. In Guyana (1985), Tanzania (1985), Taiwan (1988), Malaysia (2003), and Mozambique (2004), for example, regimes survived the death or retirement of longstanding leaders, as cohesive governing parties managed the succession process without falling into crisis. Hence, although succession posed a challenge for competitive authoritarian regimes, it only appears to have undermined regimes where organizational power was already low.

⁹³See Thompson and Kuntz (2004); Beissinger (2005); Bunce and Wolchik (2006); and Howard and Roessler (2006); and Tucker (forthcoming)

⁹⁴We include all protests of 10,000 or more people that seek to reverse fraudulent election results or remove the incumbent government.

organizational power was high, *all 13 anti-regime mobilizations failed*, despite the fact that some of them (e.g., Serbia in the early 1990s; Armenia in 1996) were massive.

--Table 7 about here--

Taking the argument a step further, opposition mobilization may, in some cases, be endogenous to organizational capacity. Where governing parties were weak, opposition strength was often rooted in elite defection, as recent regime defectors provided critical resources, leadership, and organizational to opposition movements. In Ukraine, for example, virtually the entire leadership of the Orange Revolution had defected from the government just a few years (and in some cases, just several months) earlier. By contrast, where state and governing party organizations were strong, effective repression frequently nipped opposition protest in the bud (e.g., Malaysia, Zimbabwe) or prevented it from emerging in the first place (e.g., Russia under Putin).

A similar argument can be made regarding the role of stolen elections. Several recent studies have linked authoritarian breakdown to stolen elections (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 2005; Tucker 2005). For example, Mark Thompson and Philipp Kuntz argue that stolen elections “create conditions favorable for the outbreak of democratic revolutions,” by raising (and then dashing) popular expectations, providing a focal point for opposition to the regime, serving as a trigger for mass protest, and generating splits within the governing elite (2004: 160-3). Thus, where incumbents steal elections, competitive authoritarian regimes should be “vulnerable to democratic revolution” (2004: 171).

There are at least two problems with such an argument, however. First, empirical evidence suggests that even during the post-Cold War era, autocrats get away with stolen elections more often than not. After 1989, failed efforts to cancel or steal elections resulted in autocratic breakdown in at least five cases: Dominican Republic in 1994; Serbia in 2000; Madagascar in 2001-02; Georgia in 2003; and Ukraine in 2004. However, governments *succeeded* in stealing or reversing the outcome of elections in Cameroon (1992), Gabon (1990, 1993), Russia (1993), Armenia (1996), Kenya (1997), Serbia (1997), Haiti (2000), Zambia (2001), Zimbabwe (2002), Belarus (2004), Malawi (2004), and possibly the Dominican Republic (1990).⁹⁵ Again, this variation appears to be rooted in organizational power. Where organizational power was low (as in Georgia in 2003 or Madagascar in 2002), stolen elections triggered authoritarian breakdown in five of seven regimes. However, where organizational power was medium or high, incumbents almost invariably survived contested stolen elections.⁹⁶

In many cases, stolen elections are more a *product* of authoritarian breakdown than a cause of it. Where authoritarian regimes are well-entrenched, as in Egypt, Malaysia,

⁹⁵A presidential, parliamentary or constitutional referendum election is considered stolen if manipulation of the voting or vote-counting process is deemed—by credible scholars and international observers—to have likely altered the outcome of the election. This includes cases in which there is credible evidence that fraud enabled the governing party to win a parliamentary majority, as well as cases in which fraud enabled incumbent presidential candidates to avoid a second round runoff.

⁹⁶The only exception is the Dominican Republic, a high linkage cases in which U.S. pressure, not opposition protest, forced Balaguer’s early resignation.

Singapore, Mexico prior to the 1980s, or Russia under Putin, incumbents' control over the electoral process—and the opposition—is usually so extensive that they can “win” elections without having to resort to outright election day fraud. Elections are “won” in the weeks and months prior to the actual vote, as opposition forces are debilitated by repression, denial of resources, co-optation, and a variety of other legal and illegal machinations. In other words, events on election-day are the final link in a longer chain of processes. Whether or not incumbents are forced to engage in high risk fraud on election-day is mainly a product of how capable they were of dealing with opposition challenges *prior to the election*. In general, only regimes that are weak or vulnerable from the outset have to turn—often in desperation—to tactics like canceling or stealing elections.

The Role of Leadership

Another alternative approach to explaining competitive authoritarian regime outcomes centers on contingency and leadership. During the 1980s and 1990s, democratization in countries with seemingly formidable structural obstacles triggered a paradigm shift in regime studies. Following the influential work of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, scholars began to treat transitions as periods of “extraordinary uncertainty” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 3), in which contingent events and the choices of political elites could be decisive in shaping regime outcomes. Many of these scholars highlighted the role of leadership in “crafting” successful transitions (Di Palma 1990; Fish 1998). Along similar lines, scholars attributed non-democratic outcomes to either “poor elite decisions” (Moser 2001: 10; McFaul 2001) or contingent events (Tanaka 2005). Other scholars stressed the importance of political leaders' commitment to democracy and compromise (Fish 1998; Gros 1998: 4-7; McFaul 2002).

Leadership obviously contributes to regime outcomes, particularly in the short run. It is difficult to understand the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in post-Cold War Serbia, Slovakia, and Venezuela, for example, without reference to the committed, risk-taking leadership of Milosevic, Meciar, and Chavez. At the same time, surprising levels of pluralism in Russia during the 1990s and Ukraine after 2004 were rooted, in part, in the unusual tolerance of incumbents. Leaders also vary considerably in their will to face down—violently, if necessary—mass protest. In this sense, Hun Sen in Cambodia and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe differed markedly from Julius Nyerere in Tanzania or Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia.

However, evidence suggests that over time, leadership is less important than international and domestic structural variables in shaping competitive authoritarian regime trajectories. The distribution of regime outcomes during the post-Cold War period was in fact much more patterned or “structured” than the early transitions literature would lead us to expect.⁹⁷ Widespread democratization in the Americas and Central Europe, and considerably less democratization in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union suggest that—unless we are prepared to believe that leaders in the former regions were exceptionally skilled democrats—regime outcomes were *not* particularly open to contingency and leadership choice.

⁹⁷The fact that all eight Latin American countries covered in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* democratized suggests that outcomes were far less contingent than initially expected.

Even where leaders' behavior had important short-term effects, these effects frequently did not endure much beyond that leader's tenure in office. Thus, Boris Yeltsin's tolerance of opposition and media pluralism during the 1990s did little to prevent Putin's subsequent authoritarian crackdown. Similarly, the relatively benign rule of Viacheslau Kebich in Belarus (1992-1994) quickly gave way to Lukashenka's autocratic regime. Likewise, abuse of democratic procedure by Tudjman (Croatia), Balaguer (Dominican Republic) and Meciar (Slovakia) during the mid-1990s did little to prevent their successors from consolidating democratic rule immediately after coming to power. Hence, with a few exceptions, leadership has generally had only a marginal impact on longer-term competitive authoritarian regime outcomes.

It is more useful, therefore, to assume that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to maintain themselves (or, in some cases, their successors) in power, using both democratic and—when available—non-democratic means. What determines whether these leaders behave democratically is thus less their beliefs than the opportunities and constraints that confront them. Where leaders possess effective coercive apparatuses and few international constraints, as in Belarus, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, they will generally use those instruments to govern autocratically—especially when their power is at stake. By contrast, where leaders lack a strong coercive apparatus (Benin, Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, Ukraine under Kravchuk) and/or face heavy international constraints (Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, Taiwan), their behavior is more likely to be consistent with democratic norms.

Once we have identified the opportunities for (and constraints on) autocratic behavior, the impact of leadership may be more fruitfully analyzed. For example, because external incentives for democratic behavior were stronger in Serbia and Slovakia than in Armenia and Belarus, the leadership of Meciar and Milosevic was likely important in shaping the competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged in the 1990s. Similarly, the fact that external incentives for democratic behavior were relatively low in Mali and Ghana (compared to, say, the Dominican Republic) suggests that leadership may have been important in these cases. In short, although leadership always “matters,” identifying, *ex ante*, the structural opportunities and constraints in which leaders operate permits a more systematic of *when* and *how* it matters.

The Role of Political Institutions

A final alternative approach focuses on institutional design. Over the past two decades, a vast body of literature has examined how constitutional and other formal institutional arrangements shape post-Cold War regime outcomes. For example, drawing on earlier work by Linz (1990) and others,⁹⁸ scholars of post-Cold War hybrid regimes have linked presidentialism—and in particular, powerful presidencies—to non-democratic outcomes (Reynolds 1999; Fish 2001, 2005, 2006). According to Fish, “superpresidentialism”—defined as a “constitutional arrangement that invests greater power in the presidency and much less power in the legislature”—has “inhibited democratization” in Russia and other post-Communist countries by undermining accountability and inhibiting the emergence of strong institutions, parties, and

⁹⁸See, for example, Stepan and Skach (1993) and Linz and Valenzuela (1994).

experienced political elites (2005: 248-250). Along somewhat different lines, Colton and Skach (2005) point to *semi-presidentialism* as a cause of Russia's slide into authoritarianism. In their view, semi-presidential systems are prone to inter-branch conflict and immobilism, which create incentives for presidents to "dominate the political process and rule by decree," placing regimes on a "slippery slope to dictatorship" (2005: 116-117). Finally, several studies have highlighted the role of constitutional courts, electoral commissions and other institutions in deterring or blocking autocratic abuse (Ganev 2001: 194-196; Erklit and Reynolds 2002; Horowitz 2006).

We find institutional design to be of limited utility in explaining post-Cold War regime outcomes. From an empirical standpoint, constitutional design also had no notable impact on competitive regime outcomes. As Table 8 shows, competitive authoritarian regimes with parliamentary systems were no more likely to democratize (and in fact, were *less* likely to democratize) than those with presidential or semi-presidential systems. Indeed, among high linkage cases, only case of presidentialism (Macedonia) failed to democratize.

--Table 8 about here--

More generally, there is reason to be skeptical about the impact of the institutional design in competitive authoritarian regimes. Institutional analyses hinge on the assumption that formal institutions are: (1) regularly enforced; and (2) minimally stable (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). In other words, they take for granted that the rules that are written on parchment actually constrain actors in practice. Indeed, it is only under these conditions that institutional design can be expected to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Although these assumptions hold up relatively well in the advanced industrialized democracies, they travel less well to other parts of the world. As Huntington (1968) observed, polities vary considerably on the dimension of institutional strength. Indeed, a striking characteristic of many competitive authoritarian regimes is the extent of sheer institutional *weakness*.

In most competitive authoritarian regimes, formal institutions are highly unstable. The Russian constitution was changed nearly 400 times between 1992 and 1993 (Filatov 2001: 180). In Madagascar, constitutional arrangements have been "tampered with so much...as to be unrecognizable" (Marcus 2004: 2), and as a result, constitutional rules have "functioned less as a constraint on the behavior of elites than as the object of elite manipulation" (Marcus 2005: 156). In Malaysia, the governing UMNO can "change the constitution at will" (Crouch 1996b: 115), and even ex-Prime Minister Mahathir complained that the "frequency and trivial reasons for altering the constitution" had reduced it to a "useless scrap of paper."⁹⁹

Competitive authoritarian regimes are also characterized by weak enforcement of formal rules. For example, although Mexico's 1917 constitution was formally "an advanced liberal democratic charter" (Whitehead 1995: 250) that prescribed a weak executive, a strong legislature, and an independent Supreme Court (Weldon 1997), in

⁹⁹Quoted in Lee (1995: 109).

practice, PRI presidents enjoyed vast “metaconstitutional” powers (Garrido 1989: 425; Weldon 1997) that reduced Congress to a “rubber stamp” (Eisenstadt 2004: 40). Democratic provisions in Peru’s 1993 constitution “were transformed into facades” (Degregori 2000: 377); in Cambodia, many constitutional provisions remained “dead letters” (Jennar 1995: 2); and in Romania, politics was characterized by the “non-observance of the Constitution, its letter, its spirit, and its guarantees” (Weber 2001: 213). Such constitutions routinely fail to constrain powerful executives. Thus, in Croatia, “the problem [was] not that the president has strong constitutional powers but that [President] Tudjman is going beyond them” (*Uncaptive Minds* 1994: 41). In Haiti, “no head of state has felt constrained by constitutions, even his own” (Weinstein and Segal 1992: 62).

In most competitive authoritarian regimes, formal rules and agencies designed to constrain governments were frequently circumvented, manipulated, or trampled upon by those governments. In Gabon, the nominally independent electoral commission created during the 1990s “proved neither autonomous nor competent” (Freedom House 2004: 1), and in 1998, many of its functions were unconstitutionally transferred back to the Interior Ministry (Gardinier 2000: 236). In Malawi, when Electoral Commission Chair Anastazia Msosa asserted her independence in 1998, the Muluzi government “promptly removed her” (Patel 2002: 157). In Russia, when the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Yeltsin’s 1993 decree disbanding parliament, Yeltsin responded by cutting off the Court’s phone lines and withdrawing all security forces before eventually disbanding it. Finally, after Peru’s newly created Constitutional Tribunal (TC) ruled against President Fujimori’s bid for a third term in 1997, Congress sacked three TC members, leaving the country’s highest constitutional authority dormant for three years.

The failure of formal institutions to constrain executives is also seen in the case of presidential term limits. Although term limits were imposed throughout much of Africa during the first half of the 1990s, Bruce Baker observed in 2002 that “in political circles across the continent the talk is of altering constitutions to allow [Presidents] to stay on for a longer term, another term or for an unlimited number of terms” (2002: 286). In Chad, Gabon, Namibia, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, Presidents modified or eliminated constitutional term limits to extend their stay in office (Baker 2002; Brown 2004: 329). Term limits were similarly overturned in Belarus, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Peru (where Fujimori first eliminated the ban on re-election and then violated his own constitution’s two term limit), and Venezuela.

Where formal rules do not effectively constrain powerful actors, they are unlikely to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Rather, other factors—such as the organizational power of incumbents—are often more important. Thus, in Moldova, due to the strength of the Communist Party, the post-2000 transition from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism resulted in greater authoritarianism rather than democracy (Way 2002). In Russia, Yeltsin’s partisan weakness permitted a serious legislative challenge despite a super-presidentialist constitution (Troxel 2003), whereas Putin—operating within the same constitutional framework—used a more disciplined party to emasculate parliament (Remington 2001).

Indeed, the causal story linking formal rules and regimes is often reversed: rather than shaping regime outcomes, formal institutional arrangements are frequently *endogenous* to those outcomes (Easter 1997). For example, although presidentialism may contribute to democratic breakdown in some cases, it has frequently been imposed by regimes that were *already authoritarian*. In post-colonial Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the consolidation of autocratic power preceded—and surely facilitated—shifts from parliamentary to presidential constitutions. In Zimbabwe, for example, Westminster parliamentarism was replaced by presidentialism *after* violent repression of opposition had created a “de facto one party state” (Nordlund 1996: 153-154), and Guyana underwent a similar change only *after* the Burnham government had “ruthlessly suppressed” (Premdas 1994: 48).

Similarly, many contemporary “super-presidentialist” constitutions were products, rather than causes, of authoritarianism. For example, Peru’s 1993 constitution, which greatly expanded presidential power (Conaghan 2005: 57-8), was drawn up after Fujimori’s 1992 coup had dissolved the previous constitution, closed Congress, and exiled the most important opposition leader. Throughout much of post-communist Eurasia, autocratic governments similarly imposed highly presidentialist systems *after* they had concentrated power (Easter 1997). Russia’s super-presidentialist 1993 constitution was drawn up only after Yeltsin had closed the legislature in a presidential coup; Belarus’ highly presidentialist constitution was imposed after Alyaksandr Lukashenka had emasculated the legislature and constitutional court; and Romania’s strong presidency was created after the National Salvation Front had consolidated power and violently put down opposition protest (Sellin 2004: 122-4). At the same time, stronger parliaments have often been a product, rather than a cause, of democratization. In Croatia, for example, parliament was strengthened after opposition forces had removed the autocratic HDZ from power.¹⁰⁰

We are not making a general argument that formal institutions do not matter. Rather, the impact of institutions—the degree to which formal rules actually shape expectations and constrain behavior—varies across cases. Where formal institutions are regularly enforced and minimally stable, the causal power of institutional design may be considerable. In much of the developing world, however, formal institutions are weak: rather than constraining political elites, they are routinely circumvented and manipulated by them; rather than structuring the political game and determining winners and losers, they are repeatedly restructured by the winners at the expense of the losers. In such cases, the independent causal power of formal institutions will be limited.

Conclusion: Theoretical Implications

This study makes several contributions to our understanding of post-Cold War regime dynamics. First, it provides a corrective to a literature that continues to be marked by a pervasive democratizing bias. As noted above, most studies of post-Cold

¹⁰⁰RFE/RL Newline November 10, 2000. Observers have often noted that all eight of the Central European countries admitted to the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and Lithuania) had either parliamentary systems or presidential systems with weak presidencies (Stepan 2005; Colton and Skach 2005: 123). Yet seven of the eight countries established full democracies immediately following the collapse of Soviet rule.

War transitions assume that hybrid regimes are—or should be—in transition to democracy. Yet most competitive authoritarian regimes did not democratize between 1990 and 2007. To characterize these regimes as cases of “prolonged,” “flawed,” or “stalled” democratization is teleology. In fact, there is little evidence that governing elites in competitive authoritarian regimes were trying to build or consolidate democracy. Most were trying to consolidate power. From this perspective, non-democratic outcomes in countries Armenia, Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Russia were less instances of “failed democratization” than of successful authoritarianism. And transitions in Benin, Georgia, Madagascar, Malawi, Ukraine, and Zambia are more accurately described as instances of failed authoritarianism than as cases of successful democratization.

The study also highlights the need for greater scholarly attention to post-Cold War authoritarianism.¹⁰¹ Most regimes in the world remain hybrid or authoritarian. Nevertheless, issues of contemporary authoritarianism have received little scholarly attention (Linz 2000: 32-38; Snyder 2006). Because the democratizing bias that pervaded the regimes literature during the 1990s led scholars to treat hybrid regimes as “transitional” or “unconsolidated” democracies, analyses of these regimes were biased in important ways. Scholars paid disproportionate attention to factors that shape the performance and stability of *democracy*, such as constitutional design, executive-legislative relations, electoral and party systems, and voting behavior. Left under-explored were the factors—sources of elite cohesion, mechanisms of coercion and co-optation—that contribute to building and sustaining authoritarian rule (Way 2005a: 238).¹⁰² Particularly little attention was paid to the informal mechanisms of control—organized corruption, surveillance and blackmail, thug violence, and various forms of electoral manipulation—that help sustain authoritarianism in a context of formally democratic rule.¹⁰³ Also under-explored were issues—such as executive succession—that, while relatively unimportant in democracies, are of central importance in many authoritarian regimes, as well as political strategies—such as electoral boycotts, anti-regime protest, and alliances with governments that already enjoy large legislative majorities—that lie outside the realm of democratic politics. In short, abandoning the democratizing assumptions that predominated during the 1990s will allow scholars to explore a broader range of factors shaping political behavior and outcomes, which should generate fruitful advances in regime studies.

Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change

Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on the international dimension of regime change. The widespread collapse of dictatorships and (to a lesser extent) spread of democracy during the 1980s and 1990s defied nearly all dominant domestic-centered theories of democratization. Framed in terms of Dahl’s cost of toleration versus cost of suppression (1971: 15), most dominant theories expect stable democracy to emerge either (1) when increased societal wealth or equality reduces the cost of toleration (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005) or (2) when a strengthening of civil society or opposition

¹⁰¹Here, we echo the calls of Linz (2000); Brown (2005); Schedler (2006b); and Snyder (2006).

¹⁰²Exceptions include Brownlee (2002, 2004); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004); Waldner (2005); Darden (forthcoming); and Greene (forthcoming).

¹⁰³Exceptions include Collins (2002, 2003); Schedler (2002b, 2006); Ottaway (2003); Roeder (2005); Schaffer (2007); and Darden (forthcoming).

forces—often a product of socioeconomic modernization—increases the cost of suppression (Dahl 1971; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Neither of these phenomena occurred on a large scale prior to the transitions in Latin America, Africa, or communist Eurasia. What *did* change was the international environment. Changes in the post-Cold War international environment dramatically raised the cost of suppression in much of the developing world. Thus, it was an externally-driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, which contributed most centrally to the demise of full-scale autocracies during the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁰⁴

This study presents a new framework for analyzing the international influences on regime change. The recent literature has highlighted a dizzying array of international influences, including diffusion, demonstration effects, conditionality, transnational civil society, and new information technologies. We organize these various mechanisms into two dimensions: Western *leverage* and *linkage* to the West. This framework allows us to capture cross-national variation in the nature and degree of external democratizing pressure. We find that the weight of the international environment varied considerably across cases and regions, and that this variation was rooted, to a large degree, in the extent of countries' ties to the West. Where linkage was high (Central Europe, the Americas), regimes often democratized even in the absence of favorable domestic conditions; where it was low (Africa, former Soviet Union), domestic factors predominated. Thus, although much of the recent literature has focused on mechanisms of leverage-based pressure (i.e., political conditionality), linkage was a more potent democratizing force during the post-Cold War period. Indeed, leverage only translated into effective conditionality in countries—such as those in Central Europe and the Americas—with relatively high levels of linkage to the West.

The Role of Incumbent Power

The book also highlights the role of incumbent organizational power in shaping regime outcomes. Recent studies of regime change have paid considerable attention to societal or opposition-centered factors, highlighting the role of civil society,¹⁰⁵ organized labor,¹⁰⁶ mass protest,¹⁰⁷ and opposition cohesion¹⁰⁸ in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy. However, in much of Africa, Asia, and post-communist Eurasia, civil societies and opposition parties are weak and fragmented, and as a result, the societal “push” for democratization has been meager (Howard 2003). In many of these cases, regime outcomes are rooted less in the character or behavior of opposition movements than in incumbents' capacity to thwart them. Where incumbents possess a powerful coercive apparatus and/or party organization, even relatively well-organized and cohesive opposition challenges often fail. By contrast, where incumbents lack the minimum organizational tools needed to steal elections, co-opt opponents, or crack down on protest, transitions may occur even where oppositions are weak. Indeed, the book shows that successful opposition movements are often rooted in state and party weakness.

¹⁰⁴We thank David Waldner for suggesting this point.

¹⁰⁵See Fish (1995); Diamond (1999); and Howard (2003).

¹⁰⁶See Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Collier (1999); and Bellin (2000).

¹⁰⁷See Bunce and Wolchik 2006); Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Beissinger (2002, 2005); Thompson and Kuntz (2004, 2005); and Tucker (2005).

¹⁰⁸Howard and Roessler (2006).

Much of the financial and organizational muscle behind successful opposition challenges in Zambia (1990-1991), Kenya (2002), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and elsewhere was provided by government officials who had defection only weeks or months earlier.

Two implications are worth noting. First, although strong parties and effective states are widely—and correctly—viewed as critical to democratic stability, they are also critical to stable authoritarianism.¹⁰⁹ Where incumbents lacked strong state and party organizations, they rarely survived during the post-Cold War period. In a competitive authoritarian context, then, successful state and party-building efforts (e.g., Zimbabwe in the 1980s, Armenia and Cambodia during the 1990s, Russia in the 2000s) are likely to contribute not to democratization, but to more robust authoritarian regimes.

Second, many post-Cold War transitions are rooted more in the weakness of incumbents than in the strength, strategies, or mobilization of opposition forces. Such transitions are marked by an important paradox: the weakness of state and governing party organizations makes it more likely that an autocrat will be forced from power but *less* likely that the result of this transition will be democracy. Transitions by collapse generally occur in a context of weak states, parties, and civil societies—conditions that are hardly propitious for democratization. Moreover, such transitions are often accompanied by little institutional change. Because both institutional and societal checks on successor governments tend to be weak, transitions often give rise to new authoritarian incumbents.¹¹⁰

In sum, this study is more structuralist than most analyses of contemporary regimes. Whereas research on nineteenth century and postwar regime patterns routinely focused on structural variables,¹¹¹ most explanations of third and fourth wave regime outcomes centered on contingency, elite choice, and institutional design.¹¹² Although our study focuses on post-Cold War regimes, it assigns less causal weight to contingency and leadership. Instead, our argument centers on factors that are rooted in long-term historical processes—and which are not easily changed by individual leaders. At the international level, linkage to the West is (with the partial exception of EU-led integration) less the product of elite decisions than of geography, economic development, colonialism, and longstanding geo-strategic alliances. Similarly, at the domestic level, strong coercive and party organizations are rarely the product of short-term crafting or institutional design. Post-Cold War regime outcomes are far more patterned than contingency, choice-centered, and institutional design approaches would suggest. Two structural factors—linkage to the West and incumbent organizational power—go a long way toward explaining variation in the trajectory of post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regimes.

¹⁰⁹This, of course, is a point made in earlier work by Huntington (1968, 1970).

¹¹⁰Examples include Albania, Belarus, Benin, Georgia, Madagascar, Malawi, and Ukraine during the 1990s.

¹¹¹See Lipset (1960); Moore (1966); O'Donnell (1973); Skocpol (1979); Collier and Collier (1991); Luebbert (1991); Przeworski et al 2000; Boix and Stokes (2003); Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)

¹¹²See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) Di Palma (1990); Fish (1998, 2005); McFaul (2001, 2002); Howard and Roessler (2006). A notable exception is the recent literature on oil-based regimes (cf. Ross 2001, Bellin 2004).

Table 1 Comparing Democratic, Competitive Authoritarian, and Closed Regimes

	Democracy	Competitive Authoritarianism	Closed Regime
Status of Core Democratic Institutions (Elections, Civil Liberties)	Systematically respected Widely viewed as only route to power	Exist and are meaningful, but systematically violated in favor of incumbent Widely viewed as only route to power	Non-existent or reduced to façade status Not viewed as a viable route to power
Status of Opposition	Competes on more or less equal footing with incumbent	Major opposition is legal and can compete openly, but is disadvantaged by incumbent abuse	Major opposition banned, or largely underground or in exile
Level of Uncertainty	High	Usually lower than democracy, but can be relatively high	Low

Table 2: Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories, 1990-2007

Democratization	Unstable Authoritarianism	Stable Authoritarianism
Benin Croatia Dominican Republic Ghana Guyana Mali Mexico Nicaragua Peru Romania Serbia Slovakia Taiwan Ukraine	Albania Belarus Georgia Haiti Kenya Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Moldova Senegal Zambia	Armenia Cambodia Cameroon Ethiopia Gabon Malaysia Mozambique Russia Tanzania Zimbabwe

Figure 1: Linkage, Organizational Power, and Regime Outcomes




Table 3: Predicted and Actual Outcomes¹¹³

Case	Linkage	Leverage	Organizational Power	Predicted Outcome	Actual Outcome
Albania	Medium	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Armenia	Low	High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Belarus	Low	Medium	Medium-Low	Stable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Benin	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Democracy
Cambodia	Low	High	Medium-High	Stable or unstable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Cameroon	Low	Medium	Medium	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Croatia	High	Medium	Medium-Low	Democracy	Democracy
Dominican Republic	High	High	Medium	Democracy	Democracy
Ethiopia	Low	High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Gabon	Medium	Medium	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Georgia	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Ghana	Low	High	Medium	Stable or unstable authoritarianism	Democracy
Guyana	High	High	High	Democracy	Democracy
Haiti	Medium	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Kenya	Low	High	Medium	Stable or unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Macedonia	High	High	Low	Democracy	Unstable authoritarianism
Madagascar	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Malawi	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Malaysia	Medium	Medium	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Mali	Low	High	Medium-Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Democracy
Mexico	High	Low	High	Democracy	Democracy
Moldova	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism

¹¹³Scores on the independent variables are based on the initial competitive authoritarian government. Scores on the dependent variable are from 2007.

Mozambique	Low	High	Medium-High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Nicaragua	High	High	High	Democracy	Democracy
Peru	Medium	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Democracy
Romania	High	High	High	Democracy	Democracy
Russia	Medium	Low	Low	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism
Senegal	Low	High	Medium-Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Serbia	Medium	Medium	High	Stable authoritarianism	Democracy
Slovakia	High	High	Medium-High	Democracy	Democracy
Taiwan	High	Low	High	Democracy	Democracy
Tanzania	Low	High	Medium-High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable Authoritarianism
Ukraine	Low	High	Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Democracy
Zambia	Low	High	Medium-Low	Unstable authoritarianism	Unstable authoritarianism
Zimbabwe	Low	High	High	Stable authoritarianism	Stable authoritarianism

Outcomes that do not match predictions are in bold.

Table 4: Linkage, Economic Development, and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Outcomes

(World Bank Classifications, Based on Per Capita GDP in 1991)

	High Linkage	Medium/Low Linkage
Low Income Countries	<p>Democratization (2) Guyana Nicaragua</p> <p>Non-democratization (0)</p>	<p>Democratization (3) Benin Ghana Mali</p> <p>Non-Democratization (10) Cambodia Ethiopia Haiti Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe</p>
Middle Income Countries	<p>Democratization (5) Croatia Dom. Republic Mexico Romania Slovakia</p> <p>Non-democratization (1) Macedonia</p>	<p>Democratization (3) Peru Serbia Ukraine</p> <p>Non-democratization (10) Albania Armenia Belarus Cameroon Gabon Georgia Malaysia Moldova Russia Senegal</p>
Upper Income Countries	<p>Democratization (1) Taiwan</p> <p>Non-democratization (0)</p>	

Table 5: Inequality and Democratization

Inequality and Democratization (average gini coefficient for years available 1990-1998 (WDI))		
<i>Gini</i>	<i>Democratization</i>	<i>No democratization</i>
.20-.29	Croatia Romania Slovakia Ukraine	Albania Belarus
.30-39	Benin Ghana Serbia	Georgia Malawi Tanzania
.40-49	Peru	Armenia Cambodia Cameroon Madagascar Malaysia Mozambique Russia
.50-	Dominican Republic Guyana Mali Mexico Nicaragua	Haiti Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe

Table 6: Economic Crisis, Organizational Power, and Turnover, 1990-2007¹¹⁴

Organizational Power	Incumbent Turnover	Incumbent Survival
High		Armenia 1992, 1993 Gabon 1999 Guyana 1989 Malaysia 1998 Mexico 1994 Romania 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 Zimbabwe 2000, 2003, 2005
Medium	Serbia 1999	Belarus 1992, 1994, 1995 Dominican Republic 1990 Russia 1994 Ukraine 1994, 1995, 1996
Low	Albania 1991, 1997 Belarus 1993 Georgia 1990 Macedonia 2001 Madagascar 1991 Malawi 1994 Ukraine 1993 Zambia 1994	Albania 1992 Croatia 1991, 1993, 1993 Georgia 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 Macedonia 1992, 1993 Madagascar 2002 Malawi 2001 Moldova 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 Ukraine 1992 Russia 1992, 1993

¹¹⁴Sample includes all country years in which GDP declined by at least five percent. Cases are scored as turnover if incumbent lost power during the year of the crisis or the subsequent year. We do not count as instances of turnover those cases in which there is evidence that the incumbent fell prior to the crisis, or that the transition contributed to the crisis (e.g., Madagascar 2002).

Table 7: Outcomes of Significant Anti-Regime Protest, 1989-2007¹¹⁵

Organizational Power	Turnover	Incumbent Survival
High		Armenia 1993, 1996 Ethiopia 2005 Gabon 1990 Gabon 1993-94 Malaysia 1998 Mexico 1994 Moldova 2002 Serbia 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996-97 Zimbabwe 2003
Medium	Serbia 2000 Ukraine 2004 Zambia 1990-91	Armenia 2003, 2004 Belarus 2006 Cambodia 1998 Cameroon 1991 Dominican Rep. 1990 Kenya 1997
Low	Benin 1989-90 Albania 1991-1992, 1997 Georgia 2003 Madagascar 1992, 2002 Ukraine 1993-94	Peru 2000 Russia 1993

¹¹⁵We include all protests of 10,000 people or more, as well as general strikes with at least moderate levels of participation, which are aimed at reversing flawed election results and/or removing the national-level incumbent

Table 8: Constitutional Structure and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Outcomes¹¹⁶

	Democracy	Unstable CA	Stable CA
Presidential/Semi-presidential	Benin Croatia Dominican Republic Ghana Guyana Mali Mexico Nicaragua Peru Romania Serbia Taiwan Ukraine	Georgia Haiti Kenya Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Moldova Senegal Zambia	Armenia Cameroon Gabon Mozambique Russia Tanzania Zimbabwe
Parliamentary	Slovakia	Albania Belarus	Cambodia Ethiopia Malaysia

¹¹⁶Scores reflect institutional design in the first half of the 1990s

Appendix I: Operationalizing Competitive Authoritarianism

I. Closed Authoritarianism

Cases are scored as *closed authoritarian* if:

(1) National-level multiparty elections do not exist

Or

(2) At least one of the following indicators exist

a) Major opposition parties are regularly barred from competing in elections

b) Large-scale falsification of vote makes voting essentially meaningless

c) Repression is so severe that major civic and opposition groups cannot operate in a public manner; thus, much of the opposition is underground, in prison, or in exile.

II. Competitive Authoritarianism

Cases are scored as *competitive authoritarian* if:

(1) The criteria for closed authoritarianism are not met;

(2) There exists (near) universal adult suffrage;

(3) The authority of elected governments is not seriously restricted by unelected “tutelary” powers;

and

(4) *At least one* of the following criteria is met:

(1) Unfair elections

Evidence of any one of the following indicators is sufficient to score elections as unfair

1. Major candidates occasionally barred from competing

2. Centrally coordinated or tolerated electoral abuse is asserted by credible sources other than domestic opposition (scholars and/or non-partisan observers). Indicators include:

a) Large-scale voter intimidation or disruption of voting; or

b) Manipulation of voter rolls; or

c) Ballot stuffing/tampering; or

d) Some falsification of results; or

3. Significant formal and/or informal impediments prevent the opposition from campaigning on equal footing. Indicators include:

a) Violence against opposition activists, candidates, infrastructure; or

b) Abuse of laws on public meetings hinders opposition’s ability to campaign; or

c) Opposition prevented from campaigning in parts of country (“no go” areas)

4. Uneven electoral playing field. Indicators include:
- a) Politicization of, and severe partisan abuse via, electoral authorities; or
 - b) Highly uneven access to media; harassment of independent media; or
 - b) Highly uneven access to public and private resources

(2) Violation of Civil Liberties

Evidence of *any one* of the following indicators is sufficient for civil liberties to be violated:

1. Independent media exist but are frequently harassed. Indicators include:
- a) Legal harassment (libel and tax laws, debt); or
 - b) Threats and physical attacks on persons and property; or
 - c) Suspension/closure of media outlets; or
 - d) Confiscation of newspapers media equipment; or
 - e) Formal or informal censorship; or
 - f) Government pressure to fire journalists/cancel programs
2. Civic and opposition groups are able to operate in public, but the government engages in/tolerates frequent harassment and/or at least some restrictions on association and speech; state abuses are rarely investigated. Indicators include:
- a) Surveillance of government critics; or
 - b) Police raids on opposition, civic offices; or
 - c) Enforcement of repressive laws that inhibit speech, association (sedition laws, preventive detention laws, laws requiring “registration” of civic groups, etc.); or
 - d) Political detentions/political prisoners; or
 - e) Abuse of legal, tax systems to harass critics; or
 - f) Physical attacks on government critics
 - 1. Threats and physical attacks on individuals; or
 - 2. Attacks on offices, infrastructure; or
 - 3. Police or thug repression of protests, public meetings

(3) Uneven Playing Field:

Evidence of any one of the following indicators is sufficient to score the playing field as uneven:

1. State institutions are widely politicized and deployed systematically by incumbents against opposition in a way that seriously inhibits the opposition’s ability to compete
2. Uneven media access
- a) State-owned media dominates market and is heavily biased in favor of incumbent; or
 - b) Private media “stacked” in favor of incumbent:
 - 1. Ownership by proxies linked to incumbent; or
 - 2. Manipulation of taxes, debts, state advertising to extort private media; or
 - 3. Systematic bribery of media
3. Uneven access to resources
- a) Widespread use of public employees (including teachers, health workers, bureaucrats) and resources/infrastructure (vehicles, offices, money) by incumbent party; or

- b) Government uses discretionary state powers to punish businesses that finance opposition, thereby starving opposition of resources; or
- c) Government uses discretionary state power to gain illicit access to resources to a degree that opposition is seriously disadvantaged

III. Democracy

Cases are scored as *democratic* if:

- (1) The criteria for closed authoritarianism are not met;
- (2) The criteria for competitive authoritarianism are not met.
- (3) There exists (near) universal adult suffrage;
- (4) The authority of elected governments is not seriously restricted by unelected “tutelary” powers.

Regime Scores, 1990-1995

Case	Elections Vote	Elections Campaign	Elections Playing Field	Civil Liberties Media	Civil Liberties Opposition	Playing Field Media	Playing Field Resources	Regime Score
Albania 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Armenia 1992-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Belarus 1992-	X	X	X	X		X	X	CA
Benin 1990-				X	X	X		CA
Cambodia 1993-		X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Cameroon 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Croatia 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Dom. Republic 1990-	X		X					CA
Ethiopia 1994-		X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Gabon 1990-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Georgia 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Ghana 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Guyana 1990-			X			X	X	CA
Haiti 1994-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Kenya 1991-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Macedonia 1992-	X	X	X	X		X	X	CA
Madagascar 1990-	X		X	X	X	X	X	CA
Malawi 1993-		X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Malaysia		X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Mali 1991-				X		X	X	CA
Mexico 1990-			X	X	X	X	X	CA
Moldova 1992-	X	X				X	X	CA
Mozambique 1992-						X	X	CA
Nicaragua 1990-			X	X	X	X	X	CA
Peru 1992-	X		X	X	X		X	CA
Romania 1990-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Russia 1992-	X	X	X	X		X	X	CA
Senegal 1990-	X		X	X	X	X	X	CA
Serbia 1990-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Slovakia 1993-				X	X	X		CA
Taiwan 1990-						X	X	CA
Tanzania 1992-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Ukraine 1992-		X	X	X		X	X	CA
Zambia 1990-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	CA
Zimbabwe 1990-		X	X	X	X	X	X	CA

Regime Scores in 2007

Case	Elections Vote	Elections Campaign	Elections Playing Field	Civil Liberties Media	Civil Liberties Opposition	Playing Field Media	Playing Field Resources	Regime Score
Albania			X	X				Competitive Authoritarian
Armenia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Belarus	XX	X	X	X	X	X	X	Full Authoritarian
Benin								Democracy
Cambodia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Cameroon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Croatia								Democracy
Dominican Republic								Democracy
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Gabon	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Georgia	X		X	X		X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Ghana								Democracy
Guyana								Democracy
Haiti					X			Competitive Authoritarian
Kenya			X	X	X			Competitive Authoritarian
Macedonia	X	X	X	X				Competitive Authoritarian
Madagascar			X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Malawi	X			X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Malaysia		X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Mali								Democracy
Mexico								Democracy
Moldova	X	X	X	X		X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Mozambique	X		X	X		X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Nicaragua								Democracy
Peru								Democracy

Romania								Democracy
Russia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Senegal			X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Serbia								Democracy
Slovakia								Democracy
Taiwan								Democracy
Tanzania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Ukraine								Democracy
Zambia	X	X	X	X		X	X	Competitive Authoritarian
Zimbabwe	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Competitive Authoritarian

Appendix II: Measuring Leverage

Low Leverage: cases that meet at least one of the following criteria

1. Large economy: Total GDP of more than \$100 billion (average 1990-1995) (Source: World Bank World Development Indicators)
2. Major energy producer: Annual energy production of one million barrels of crude oil per day average 1990-1995 (Source: *International Energy Annual 2004*)
3. Possession of/capacity to use nuclear weapons 1990-1995

Medium Leverage: cases that meet none of the criteria for low leverage but meet at least one of the following criteria:

1. Medium-sized economy: Total GDP of between \$50 billion and \$100 billion (1990-1995).¹¹⁷ (Source: World Bank World Development Indicators)
2. Secondary oil producer: Annual energy production of 200,000-999,999 barrels of crude oil per day average 1990-1995 (Source: *International Energy Annual 2004*)
3. Competing security issues: country where there exists a major, security-related foreign policy issue for the U.S. and/or EU: civil or regional wars with potential spillover effects and (beginning in 2001) existence of domestic Islamic political groups deemed to pose a potential terrorist threat.
4. Beneficiary of “black knight” assistance from a counter-hegemonic power: country that is a significant beneficiary of external assistance (more than 1 percent of GDP) and more than 50 percent of bilateral aid comes from China, France, Japan, or Russia (1990-1995) (Source: OECD Development Co-operation Directorate)

High leverage: cases that meet none of the criteria for low or medium leverage.

¹¹⁷We exclude from this category middle income economies in severe crisis, or those in which total GDP declined between 1990 and 1995 (e.g., Ukraine).

Leverage Scores (1990-1995)

Case	Major Economy	Nuclear Power	Major Oil Producer	Medium Economy	Medium Oil Producer	Competing Security Issues	Black Knight Support	Leverage Score
Albania								High
Armenia								High
Belarus							X	Medium
Benin								High
Cambodia								High
Cameroon							X	Medium
Croatia						X		Medium
Dom Rep								High
Ethiopia								High
Gabon					X		X	Medium
Georgia								High
Ghana								High
Guyana								High
Haiti								High
Kenya								High
Macedonia								High
Madagascar								High
Malawi								High
Malaysia				X	X			Medium
Mali								High
Mexico	X		X					Low
Moldova								High
Mozambique								High
Nicaragua								High
Peru								High
Romania								High
Russia	X	X	X					Low
Senegal								High
Serbia						X		Medium
Slovakia								High
Taiwan	X					X		Low
Tanzania								High
Ukraine								High
Zambia								High
Zimbabwe								High

Appendix III: Measuring Linkage

Linkage is measured by six components:

- (1) *Economic ties*: measured by the extent of trade with the US and 15 EU member countries (exports and imports over GDP) (source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics) 1990-1995
- (2) *Social ties*: measured by the log of the yearly average travel 1990-1995 (for all purposes, including education, business, tourism, and permanent immigration) by country residents to the US and EU 1990-2000 as a share of total country population (sources: Department of Homeland Security, New Cronos)
- (3) *Communication ties*: measured by per capita internet and cable access 1990-2000 (source: World Bank World Development Indicators)
- (4) *Intergovernmental ties*: measured by membership in the OAS or potential membership in the EU

Each of these components is organized into a 5 point scale relative to data for all non-Western countries in the world and then summed into a total score

Linkage Scores

High Linkage	
Guyana	.94
Slovakia	.91
Croatia	.88
Mexico	.84
Dominican Republic	.84
Macedonia	.75
Romania	.72
Nicaragua	.72
Taiwan	.69
Medium Linkage	
Serbia	.66
Haiti	.66
Albania	.63
Peru	.59
Malaysia	.56
Gabon	.50
Russia	.38
Low Linkage	
Senegal	.31
Ghana	.31
Armenia	.31
Moldova	.28
Belarus	.28
Ukraine	.25
Zimbabwe	.22
Kenya	.22
Georgia	.22
Cameroon	.22
Malawi	.16
Zambia	.13
Madagascar	.13
Benin	.09
Mozambique	.06
Mali	.06
Cambodia	.06
Tanzania	.03
Ethiopia	.00

Appendix IV: Measuring Organizational Power

State Coercive Capacity

Scope

High: Large and well-trained, funded, and equipped internal security apparatus with clear presence throughout national territory. Existence of specialized intelligence or internal security agencies with demonstrated capacity to monitor and repress opposition activities in all areas of the country.

Medium: Criteria for high scope not met, but security forces maintain at least some presence across the national territory; no evidence of severe deficiencies in resources and equipment.

Low: Abnormally small/underdeveloped security apparatus; evidence of a lack of state presence in significant parts of the national territory or severe problems of under-funding, non-payment of salaries, and/or lack of supplies.

Cohesion

High: Recent history of military conflict (leading security officials must be drawn from the generation that participated in the conflict), including

- (1) External war (without defeat)
- (2) Intense military competition and threat
- (3) Large-scale and successful counter-insurgency campaign
- (4) Successful revolutionary or anti-colonial struggle.

Or

Pervasive ethnic, kinship, institutionalized party, or other ties between incumbent and coercive apparatus

Or

Evidence of successful high intensity coercion in recent past (pre-1990),

Medium: No recent history of serious military conflict or evidence of extensive ethnic, kinship, or party ties

and

No evidence of previous insubordination or military defeat (pre-1990).

Low: Previous evidence of serious insubordination by state security officials, including attempted coups, open rebellion, large-scale desertion, and major episodes of refusal to carry out executive orders (Pre-1990).

Party Strength

Scope

High: Large organization that penetrates virtually all population centers, including the countryside. Evidence of significant grassroots activity—during and between elections—throughout the national territory.

Medium: Party does not meet criteria for high scope, but possesses a national organization that penetrates most of the national territory, especially major population centers, and is capable of organizing nationwide electoral campaigns.

Low: Little or no party organization outside of the capital.

Cohesion

High: Single party with highly institutionalized system of patronage, established party label and demonstrated capacity to win multiparty elections prior to 1990.

Or

Evidence of alternative source of cohesion, including:

- (1) history of shared struggle in revolutionary, liberation, or underground resistance movements;
- (2) highly salient ideology in polarized political context;
- (3) shared ethnicity in context of politicized ethnicity;

Medium: single party organization with known party label and established system of patronage, but no long history of winning competitive elections or evidence of alternative source of cohesion.

Low: new party or multiple/shifting incumbent parties without any organized system of patronage or any evidence of alternative source of cohesion.

Discretionary State Control of the Economy

1) State-controlled mineral sector accounts for more than 50 percent of export revenue, 1990-1995

Or

2) Centrally planned economy that does not undergo large-scale privatization

If yes, then, OP is increased by one level (i.e., from low to medium or medium to high)

Total Score for Organizational Power

Scores for party scope and cohesion and state scope and cohesion (Low=0; Medium=1; High=2) are summed into a single composite score (0-8).

6-8: High

5: Medium-High

4: Medium

3: Medium-Low

0-2: Low

State discretionary control increases the score by one full level—i.e., from low to medium or medium to high.

Organizational Power Scores

Case	Party Scope	Party Cohesion	State Scope	State Cohesion	State Resources	Total	Category
Albania	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Armenia 1992-98	1	1	2	2	0	6	High
Armenia 1998-2005	1	0	1	2	0	5	Medium-High
Belarus 1992-1994	0	1	2	0	0	3	Medium-Low
Belarus 1995-2005	0	0	2	1	2	5	Medium-High
Benin	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Cambodia 1992-97	1	2	1	0	0	4	Medium
Cambodia 1998-2005	2	2	1	1	0	6	High
Cameroon	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Croatia 1990-95	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Croatia 1996-2000	1	1	1	2	0	5	Medium-High
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Ethiopia	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Gabon	1	1	1	1	2	6	High
Georgia 1990-91	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Georgia 1995-2001	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Georgia 2001-03	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Georgia 2003-05	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Ghana	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Guyana	1	2	2	2	0	7	High
Haiti	1	0	0	0	0	1	Low
Kenya 1991-2002	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Kenya 2002-2005	1	0	1	1	0	4	Medium-Low
Macedonia 1992-98	2	0	0	0	0	2	Low
Macedonia 1998-2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Macedonia 2002-05	2	1	0	0	0	3	Medium-Low
Madagascar 1990-93	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Madagascar 1993-96	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Madagascar 1997-02	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Madagascar 2002-05	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Malawi 1993-94	1	1	0	0	2	2	Low
Malawi 1994-2004	1	1	0	0	2	2	Low
Malawi 2004-05	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
Malaysia	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Mali 1992-2002	1	0	1	1	0	3	Medium-Low
Mali 2002-05	0	0	1	1	0	2	Low
Mexico	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Moldova 1992-2000	1	1	0	0	0	2	Low
Moldova 2000-05	2	2	1	1	0	6	High
Mozambique	1	2	1	1	0	5	Medium-High
Nicaragua	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Peru	0	0	1	1	0	2	Low
Romania	2	1	2	1	0	6	High
Russia 1992-93	0	0	2	0	0	2	Low
Russia 1994-99	0	0	2	1	0	3	Medium-Low
Russia 2000-04	1	1	2	2	2	8	High

Senegal 1990-2000	0	1	1	1	0	3	Medium-Low
Senegal 2000-05	0	1	1	1	0	3	Medium-Low
Serbia 1989-97	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Serbia 1998-2000	2	1	0	0	0	3	Medium-Low
Slovakia	1	1	2	1	0	5	Medium-High
Tanzania	2	1	1	1	0	5	Medium-High
Ukraine 1992-95	0	0	2	0	0	2	Low
Ukraine 1995-2005	0	0	2	1	0	3	Medium-Low
Taiwan	2	2	2	2	0	8	High
Zambia 1990-91	1	1	1	0	0	3	Medium-Low
Zambia 1991-95	0	0	1	1	0	2	Low
Zambia 1996-2005	1	1	1	1	0	4	Medium
Zimbabwe	2	2	2	2	0	8	High