Notes
Dave Eckerson
Business Model Review (BMR)
can be interpreted in many different ways, so when Administrator
Natsios first suggested that a Business Model Review be
created, there were many lofty, albeit differing, expectations
within the Agency. One view was to completely revamp the
Agency, and create a new business model so the most effective
and efficient way of operating USAID would be achieved.
Another view was that the Agency, on the whole, was running
just fine. This view suggested that some refining of the
current method, with emphasis on USAID in-country presence,
would work to strengthen the Agency. The biggest challenge
to the later view was how to achieve recognition for the
work being done within the field, while also regaining some
control back from the State Department. The result was that
a BMR had to be created that would satisfy both views, and
improve the way in which the Agency conducts business. It
also had to be achieved in a timely fashion.
The first step in achieving a working BMR was to see what
could and could not be accomplished. In order to do this,
committees were set-up, the KfD Strategy CoP working groups’
help was enlisted, strategy-specific open forums were held,
and mass e-mails were sent to Agency employees who had taken
part in senior leadership training courses. In addition,
the Administrator set out to see what was working within
the Agency. He concluded that the main concern was the proliferation
of strategic objectives (SOs), and that common indicators
needed to be limited. In an attempt to further see where
the Agencies strengths lay, 10 regional hub countries’
business models were looked at. The inevitable conclusion
was that in the field, USAID was not standard across the
board, but rather decentralized. One need only look to the
LAC Bureau’s business model (the first) for direction.
When looking at all other hubs, it appears as though some
areas are heavily vested with contractors for employees,
while other hubs were overseeing many countries at once.
The main conclusion is that USAID must institute standardization
across the Agency. In doing so, there are three main areas
that must be addressed: strategies and strategic management,
the improvement of operational efficiencies, and field operations
One route used to approach the BMR was in terms of strategies
and strategic management. From this sprang the idea that
the use of Automated Directive Systems (ADS) would be a
great way in which to streamline the way in which the Agency
was run, by replacing the handbooks. However, as time progressed
the ADS kept growing. Once again the Agency was split between
those who thought ADS was good and efficient, and those
who thought that change was necessary.
The BMR concluded that overall, the Agency spends too much
time and money on creating strategies, which are inevitably
futile. In addition, the BMR found that there is a need
to standardize and in effect downsize the number of strategic
objectives. The premise was that the same needs exist everywhere,
with common work being done everywhere, and that having
too many SOs makes it difficult to “tell our story.”
The BMR also found that strategic management needed to
be reassessed. There were an increasing number of coordinator
positions sprouting up throughout the Agency, leading to
further decentralization. USAID must find another way in
which to do business, one in which standardization and efficiency
exists across the board.
The outcome of the BMR was that a hard look was taken at
the way in which strategies are developed. A move towards
strategic management was reassessed, and the number of SOs
was greatly reduced. In addition, a set of common indicators
was created. While all this change was seen as necessary,
the sentiments were not felt throughout the Agency, especially
amongst the staunch ADS supporters.
The BMR also took a look at management. Using Latin America
as a model, the BMR took into account all the staff in a
mission. Then they compared this to missions worldwide.
It was found that was a great disparity among management
units. It was decided that the Counselor, along with PPC
are going to improve the way in which bureaus implement
mission program management assessment. It is hoped that
15 to 20 mission program management assessments will take
place a year. After the assessments conclude, their findings
will be shared across the Agency. Hopefully the first of
the assessments will occur before year’s end.
In addition, it was found that no alignment, or synergy,
exists between the bilateral, regional, and pillar bureau
programs. The first portfolio review found that there was
a shift where regional programs, concentrated on technology,
were being moved to pillar bureaus, and many regional programs
were moved out to the field. The second portfolio review
looked to see how the bureaus did once there was a shift,
and their regional programs were taken away. It looked to
see whether or not they began crafting new programs. The
third portfolio review said that there should be a focus
on the pillar bureaus and their functions. The pillar bureaus
should primarily be doing field support, exerting technical
leadership for the Agency, and also doing research and development.
It was concluded that the pillar bureaus require greater
understanding throughout the Agency.
BMR also discovered that as body, USAID have lost the ability
to design its own programs. Control over program design
has been contracted out. Emphasis on training is necessary
to rebuild the program design concept. The BMR also concluded
that development criteria must be initiated for placement
of contracts officers. What is most necessary is training
on a standardized communications program.
Joseph Lombardo
The Business model review
is another stage in the evolution of the Agency. There has
been a sense that there has been a proliferation of projects,
with no overarching bridge to unite. The view was that the
Agency was burdensome, time consuming and costly. This was
the view held in the mid 90s. Today it is quite different.
The question is how do we create a system that provides
broad strategic objectives. The challenge is to design and
streamline programs to suit the individual country. We are
looking to the future with working groups that are creating
interim guidance for laying out a broad framework of how
we are to proceed in the coming years. This guidance will
utilize existing supplementary guidance, such as the White
paper. Within the framework created, the strategic vision
will be broad and outlined. Under the strategic vision,
the missions will be putting together the operational plan,
which will be a work in progress, updating as needs change.
Question and Answer Session
Too much focus is being placed on the reduction,
and standardization of indicators. What needs to be reached
is an understanding of the indicators already in use.
Development
is not a scientific pursuit. It’s both science and
politics. When it comes to politics the indicators must
exist. If the indicators must exist due to politics, then
they better mean something.
I am struck by the way in which the Agency has
finally decided to standardize. Why haven’t they been
standardizing all along? Now they must come up with doctrine,
and standards, and a way in which to make the Agency more
efficient.
We must be careful, because the current
Administrator comes from a military background as well.
He is well aware of the need for standardization, and its
importance. There is a dichotomy within the Agency on how
to accomplish and approach the Business Review Model, since
there are those who seek a uniform approach, while there
are others who are still more relaxed about the way in which
things are done.
Did the group conducting the Business Model review,
delve into previous reasons why efforts to standardize didn’t
work? If so, then did they formulate a BMR that would rectify
past mistakes?
We did not look to past efforts to
standardize. We did, however, look at 25 different studies
done within the Agency on realignment and business practices.
Every one of the studies was never implemented. Back then
we did not have a centralized form of management. When a
lot of stuff is coming from the center, what do you do?
We hold the people in the field, along with their knowledge,
as our highest asset. So we look to those in the field for
guidance, because we still have no centralized management
system. Now we are so earmarked that we are moving into
the new world with the White Paper, the fragile states strategy,
and MCA. There are many changes occurring, producing challenges,
and fears as well. Fear that the Agency will become a finishing
school for MCA countries.
I am concerned that the Agency has become broken,
with all the problems that decentralization has caused.
Were there any redeeming aspects of USAID that emerged from
the study, which can be trumpeted, and built upon? I am
concerned that the Agency is so vulnerable that the movement
to break it and start over again is strengthened.
We
went to 10 countries. Stones can be cast at the Agency.
You can go to any country in which we have a presence and
see the work that we have done. We are at the forefront
of the development world. The battle is in the perception
of USAID. There is one side in which there is the movement
to standardize. On the other side is side in which we need
to train our leaders to maximize our efficiency in the field.
Is the Business Model Review available to view?
Who else has seen it?
The Hill. The Administrator.
The problem is really easy to fix. It is not a one size
fits all type of solution. We just have to do get it done
by taking all the little systems we have and making them
cohesive. The Business Model review is posted to the web
site.
Can you explain the “well-trained cadre”
of FSNs to be used in other countries to provide us with
our search capacity? There is a lot of turnover in the missions,
because they feel that life on a contract basis is not appealing
in terms on longevity? Is this to be due to the fact that
no incentive is given to make them stay with USAID? Can
you explain this?
Point well taken. There is no
OE money to provide incentives. When the FSNs were initially
hired it was through the use of OE money. Now the funding
has been moved to program side. Most of the technical people
were moved to the program side. The plus is that much of
the money was used for training. In the inevitably we ended
up becoming a development finishing school. The problem
is that we can’t provide the training consistently,
leaving us with an inability to retain our best and brightest.
The notion of our recommendation is that we mobilize our
best and retain them on a consistent basis. How are we going
to do it? We need a FS coordinator, however no one wants
to do the job. Regardless everyone in the agency believes
in FSNs. In the meantime, the FSNs are mobilizing themselves,
for instance the FSN chief accounts in Egypt have created
a worldwide network.
Did you look at all of the practice of management
for results? Specifically, I have found that the missions
manufacture results that do not really have country ownership.
It
depends on the mission. Some missions place many issues
under one blanket SO. To answer your question, yes, missions
often manufacture results.
Will country ownership become a bigger issue as
the Agency moves to standardization of Sops, resulting in
less country ownership?
The standard SO does not
mean there won’t be country ownership.
What happens to new strategies?
We put
out the word that until we get some interim guidance, all
strategies should be put on hold. If there are strategies
that are complete, then they should proceed with review.
The bureaus will create abbreviated reviews. We are also
looking to develop a crosswalk for the objectives, in order
to capture the essence of what people are trying to do.
We are developing a series of joint strategic objectives,
in addition to program objectives. In the end we are trying
to maintain has much freedom as possible for the missions
to tailor the programs to the needs of the mission, while
still showing Congress that we have some cohesion in how
we develop Agency goals.
So are we actually renaming the SOps in order to
facilitate standardization, or are we actually reducing
the existing Sops?
The SOps will be substituted by the program objectives.
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