Notes
USAID and State Department veterans of the USG missions
to Afghanistan and Iraq discussed challenges and methods
for “passing the baton”—transferring knowledge—from
one generation of assignees to the next in these crisis
posts. All panelists discussed steps they had taken, from
use of email collectives to on-the-ground pre-assignment
training, but cited gaps and thought the two agencies needed
to do much better. The discussion underscored important
impediments to knowledge transfer such as:
• Structural – inadequate information technology;
• Operational – rapid turnover, crushing workloads
and long hours;
• Cultural – classified (State) vs. unclassified
(USAID) work environments, unfamiliarity of personnel of
either agency with the U.S. military, and the different
orientation of personnel at various phases in the reconstruction
efforts.
The discussion highlighted that passing the baton must
entail a process, not an event, consisting of pre-deployment
preparation, knowledge-transfer during the assignment, and
a systematic effort to capture and communicate knowledge
afterwards. Both State and USAID need to improve information
technology to assure inter-operability with all elements
of the mission and to enable effective knowledge-sharing.
The panelists also pointed out the importance of “buying
knowledge” for emerging missions, which requires a
new framework for drawing on local hires, third-country
FSN’s and American citizen émigrés from
the country involved.
Bruce Burton, Senior Advisor, Office of eDiplomacy,
Bureau of Information Resource Management, U.S. Department
of State
Burton introduced the other panelists,
David Sedney and John Finney of State, and Jim Bever and
Ross Wherry of USAID. He said the panel topic was inspired
by two things. The first was an email from David Sedney
last winter, asking how to capture the knowledge of an officer
in a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) so his replacement
in three or four months’ time didn’t have to
reinvent the wheel all over again. The second was a “town
meeting” by State’s Near East and South Asia
bureaus to help recruit personnel for Iraq and Afghanistan.
The town meeting focused on the personal experiences, good
and bad, of people who served there—a good example
of knowledge transfer in action to serve a strategic purpose.
Burton said Afghanistan and Iraq have given rise to a new
term—“Emerging Missions”—although
the concept is not. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the subsequent effort to rapidly establish embassies
and then AID missions in the newly independent republics
and Eastern European countries, our two agencies have repeatedly
needed to staff entirely new missions. This requirement
continues–for example, an interest section in Tripoli
may emerge into a full embassy–but the efforts that
have rightly caught the most attention are the missions
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both efforts feature 1) dangerous
environments; 2) high turnover of permanent and TDY personnel;
and 3) the need for personnel to learn about and deal with
a complex mix of unfamiliar religious, ethnic, and cultural
groups, not least of them the U.S. military.
With this volume of people and activities, as institutions,
State and AID are acquiring a vast amount of knowledge.
We’re doubtless losing an immense portion of that,
too, as people are too overwhelmed by the daily workload
to record what they know, and then move on quickly at the
end of their tours. So, while the gains are impressive,
the losses are troubling. The panelists have given a lot
of thought to the problems.
Burton asked the panel to address the following questions:
1. What did you or your personnel need to know when you
arrived, what did you actually know, and how critical was
the gap, if any?
2. What did you learn during your tours and how were you
able to pass it along to your successors?
3. If you or they were to return for a new assignment, how
would you update yourselves?
James A. Bever, Former Director, USAID Mission
to Afghanistan
Bever has been with USAID for more
than 22 years and has been involved in nearly every area
of the world. He just returned as Mission Director in Kabul
and will move on to be Mission Director for the West Bank
and Gaza. In Kabul, he oversaw 100 U.S. Government (USG)
personnel, 1,000 contractors/grantees, and a $1.2 billion
assistance budget.
Bever underscored the difficulties of operating in an environment
that demanded rapid programming and intense effort, including
incredibly long work days often six or seven days The Panel
introduced by Joe Liebersona week. USAID Kabul experienced
a very high turnover rate, as there were only 12 direct
hires and most government personnel came only for temporary
duty (TDY), ranging from a few weeks to a few months. Few
Foreign Service personnel were trained to operate in high-risk
security zones.
According to Bever, knowledge transfer in Afghanistan was
not systematic. Incoming employees were expected to learn
their new jobs in one short TDY before the start of the
actual tour or else would overlap with their outgoing counterpart.
Major gaps in skills and substantive knowledge included
how to communicate and work with the American military,
and lack of understanding of Section 660 of the Foreign
Assistance Act dealing with cooperation on law and order.
Bever discussed the role of Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs)
and Afghan émigrés as a source of critical
knowledge. Due to the difficulty of finding Afghani nationals
to staff FSN positions, USAID Kabul recruited experienced
FSNs from missions in 20 countries. These third-country
FSNs helped recruit and train Afghanis. They were easier
to recruit than U.S. employees and were very effective in
many areas. They were paid at GS-12 rates (a very large
raise for them) in addition to receiving danger pay. After
they finished their one-year tours, it was difficult for
their original missions to re-employ them as they could
not match the pay in Kabul. Veteran FSNs would often find
higher offers in the private or other sectors.
Similarly, the Mission attempted to recruit professionals
from the Afghan diaspora to fill the FSN positions, but
it was difficult. The Agency thus needs to develop effective
incentives for recruitment. Bever also suggested a number
of initiatives that could support efforts to prepare for
and staff emerging missions, including stationing families
in a nearby, politically stable country, and pre-stocking
security and communications equipment.
Ross Wherry, Senior Reconstruction Advisor, ANE,
USAID and Former Office Director for Iraq
Ross Wherry
has been the Office Director and Desk Officer for Iraq and
will soon be Deputy Mission Director in Islamabad. Wherry
outlined several important problems in knowledge transfer.
First, he stressed the need for continuity that FSOs on
the ground can provide for incoming workers, especially
in situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan where we are
“parachuting them in and levitating them out”
in rapid succession.
Second, he discussed the expediency of synchronization
of interagency tours. Early on in the Iraq crisis, USAID
had longer tours than State. Since the opening of the Baghdad
Embassy, State and USAID personnel are now required to stay
for the same amount of time, strengthening the capacity
for knowledge transfer.
Third, Wherry pointed out that development workers are
often interested in advancing development goals without
first remembering the priority of foreign policy concerns.
According to Wherry, development is a tool of foreign policy;
therefore, USAID as a USG agency must put foreign policy
concerns first before considering long-term development
goals. Fourth, as the long-term managers for USG agencies,
workers are responsible for documenting the decisions, relationships,
and rationales of what they did This is important for accountability,
security and comprehension of the local situation. Nuances
matter for their successors, who are only as well prepared
as the incumbents make them. New people need to know basic
information before they hit the ground during fast changing
times.Baker, Sedney, Finney
Wherry said employees are expected to be technically competent
in their fields. For people assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan,
the real need is the ability to form, build and participate
in teams on the ground. They need to know how to relate
to State, the U.S. military, and whoever else is necessary.
They need to understand the medium- and long-term goals
and to realize that “can-do” outweighs pure
technical competence. The situations in countries like Iraq
and Afghanistan are too fast moving to achieve perfect solutions
and USAID personnel need to accept progress rather than
perfection.
Wherry pointed out a divide between State and USAID regarding
classified information. He said USAID is chatty by nature
and accustomed to dealing in an unclassified environment,
but this is dangerous in high-risk posts. USAID personnel
must get used to dealing in the classified environment–and
getting a SIPRNet account is a must (Note: SIPRNet is a
Department of Defense-owned secret-level interagency network.)
David Sedney, Former Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM),
Embassy Kabul
David Sedney was twice DCM in Kabul, worked in the Office
of eDiplomacy and the National Security Council, and is
now on his way to be the DCM in Beijing. He addressed the
moderator’s questions presented in the beginning of
the program.
What did you need to know when you arrived? Sedney examined
this question from two perspectives, first as DCM immediately
after the opening of the Embassy when TDYers only stayed
for 30 to 90 days and second, as DCM when the Embassy shifted
to one-year tours, but still had a lot of TDY traffic. In
both situations, he found critical gaps in the widely varied
information that he and his staff needed to know.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan work
under the supervision of the military to help with reconstruction
programs. The PRT mission is to promote peace, democracy,
and stability in the region. Personnel in Kabul seldom had
the benefit of the experience or knowledge of their predecessors.
This gap is magnified in crisis and post-conflict situations
where there is not much institutional knowledge and a dearth
of local FSNs.
The learning curve for these types of missions is very
steep. The first people on the ground are often very good
at gathering information, while their successors are often
better at implementing programs than collecting information.
He cited an example where there was a failure to pass along
to a replacement officer in a PRT that the deputy provincial
police chief was the “go-to guy” for conducting
operations in the area. As a consequence, a reconstruction
mission had to be aborted when the team was blocked from
entering the target area because it did not have the deputy
police chief’s go-ahead.
Because crisis personnel work fast and long, there is an
absence of incentive and time to write down the lessons
learned from each day. Sedney mentioned several of the techniques
the Embassy used to capture key knowledge that people generate
in their day-to-day work. Email provided one important means
– the Embassy set up an email account for every incoming
staff member, and an email collective so messages would
reach a wider audience. He also had expected that techniques
such as chat rooms would help current, incoming and departed
staff communicate; however, this had not proved very effective;
for example, once people had been gone for a year, they
would forget key information.
He said Kabul also tried two techniques for in-country
orientation for new assignees. The first was to bring them
to post for a TDY where they worked side-by-side with the
incumbent. The second involved overlap at the end of the
incumbent’s tour. The first worked better because
the incumbent was still solidly in his or her tour, not
thinking of the next job. However, pulling incoming personnel
away from their current jobs is difficult and expensive.
Ultimately, Sedney concluded, effective methods for knowledge
transfer were not very clear.
Sedney said that bringing in experienced FSNs was very
important because they could start their jobs immediately.
However, in forming a multinational FSN force, the government
must get the right combination of nationalities, as there
can sometimes be ethnic tension between groups. Further,
employing émigrés from the host country poses
a problem with local FSNs, who see them getting paid considerably
more for similar work. This diminishes incentive and creates
resentment among local FSNs.Baker, Sedney, Bever, and Finney.
John Finney, State Department, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs
John Finney’s office recruits, assigns, and supports
senior State officers assigned to 18 military commands around
the world. The office helps military commanders with the
political, diplomatic, and interagency dimensions of their
military responsibilities. A central part of this is to
promote unity of effort between military and civilians in
places like Afghanistan. Finney has served in political
military assignments from the Vietnam War to the present;
has been a political advisor (Polad) to the Chief of Naval
Operations and other senior military commanders; and served
as Polad to the U.S. military commander at Bagram, Afghanistan.
Because knowledge transfer in the military can mean the
difference between life and death, the military spends large
amounts of resources gathering and analyzing the lessons
learned from situations. Finney described the following
key points of the U.S. military’s knowledge sharing
program:
1. Military personnel know one year in advance where they
will go.
2. Officers conduct reconnaissance tours three to four times
and use these visits to update pre-deployment training for
their units.
3. They participate in exercises and undergo professional
development to help them understand the goals and functioning
of the mission.
4. The Center for Army Lessons Learned institutionalizes
the knowledge learned from the field and distributes it
to the necessary people, holds briefings, etc.
Finney also pointed out a historical reference for knowledge
sharing and used an example of the State Department during
Vietnam. Diplomats went to the Foreign Service Institute
(FSI), Vietnam Training Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
for one year to study the language and culture of Vietnam.
A most critical aspect of this training was that there were
military officers among their classmates. Finney insisted
that there is a need to set up a training center for Iraq
and Afghanistan in order to understand these countries and
gain the experience of working with military colleagues.
Our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan should not be business
as usual: we are at war. This undertaking requires extraordinary
steps, and we need to prepare civilians like we prepare
the military.
There are military personnel on the ground that do nothing
but record lessons learned. If no one in the organization
focuses on the lessons learned, knowledge and experience
evaporates, making it much harder to achieve goals.
Finally, Finney pointed out the destructive impact that
a harsh environment can play on information technology (IT)
equipment. For example, the efficacy of computers and telephones
are compromised. He called for IT engineers to address environmental
and cross-communication (in terms of military and diplomatic
core) problems. He also described the military’s huge
transformations in terms of doctrine, training, and equipment
and cited a need for a similar expeditionary spirit by our
civilian forces. State and USAID must find a way to transform
military victory into strategic success, effectively changing
the political, economic, and social structure of the country.
To do this, the agencies need to support their staff and
prepare them so that they can be as effective as possible.
Knowledge sharing is absolutely pivotal.
Wrap-up
Burton wrapped up the session by pointing out that
the discussion had made clear that knowledge transfer should
be seen as a process not an event:
The preparatory stage includes efforts to find out what
we know, to know our partners in the mission, and to prepare
for the operating environment, not just the substantive
skills inherent in the job.
During the assignment, personnel need better means to communicate
and to record their knowledge as they go along.
After the assignment, both agencies need a systematic approach
to capturing and communicating lessons learned.
Burton thanked the panelists for participating in the discussion
and for their hard work in difficult and dangerous assignments
to advance American interests.
Question and Answer Session
You talked about the lessons learned when people
arrived. What were their gaps in knowledge?)
People
did not understand the day-to-day activities that someone
on the ground would have to undergo. For example, the initially
cramped living conditions were such that there was no way
that one could prepare for them. Other unexpected obstacles
included knowing how to plan for being in a high security
area and understanding how the coalition functions. An audience
member asks a question
The Mission did use many FSNs. How smooth was it
to use FSNs from other missions, who already had the knowledge?
It
was the smartest thing we did. They hit the ground running
as they knew the inner-workings of AID, government, accounting,
and how to work in the Embassies. We started using them
to train the Afghans. We could start to rely on them as
crutches—they won’t want to leave and we won’t
want to let them go.
You mentioned the nationalities—were the
nationalities of the FSNs within the region?
We
had FSNs from India, Nepal, and Pakistan. The other lesson
we learned was to work with our legislative branch to make
sure we can move quickly administratively. We have found
it important to have exemptions from section 660, which
deals with international police training.
Your staff had 12 direct hires with hundreds of
TDYers in and out of the country—so why can’t
AID staff up with more direct hires from around the world?
It’s
a footprint issue. I’m not in the right position in
the agency to answer. TDY folks currently come in only when
it’s acceptable to have them there due to the high
security area.
Knowledge management—when reacting to a difficult
situation, your predecessors didn’t have time to establish
baselines in many instances, how was your ability to monitor
the projects against some of the social indicators; for
example, attitudinal change. Are you able now to establish
some sort of baseline to monitor your progress?
We
did an analysis about two years ago on perceptions of food
security. We used it as a base for another analysis this
year. It’s hard when you’re working outside
your normal system.
How successful were people in the Iraq Mission
in sharing knowledge in passing along information? Did they
have the communication means to do it? What were your techniques?
When
we started, everyone had access to email. Anyone who had
an email address could get all the unclassified information
that they wanted. When they came in with a technical perspective
on the program, it was generally good. The same was true
for Afghanistan. The nuances—how to do work and live
in close proximity to one another—were not as well
communicated over email.
How helpful has IT support, such as collaboration
software, secure messaging been in building teams and sharing
information appropriately?
IT is handy for moving
information around quickly and compactly. It’s only
a tool. Unless I can develop a relationship with a person
on the other end of wire, then I may be uncertain if I can
trust the information that is being given to me, especially
if a big decision hangs on that information. If you don’t
know who you’re talking to, it is hard to establish
that link over the wires. It is good for moving executive
office material, where the probity of each person is already
established.
In changing the culture of AID to work in a crisis
situation, how did you create a “can-do” attitude
within your team to move differently than AID has traditionally
moved?
You’re not looking for a stellar technical
person. You want to ask, “Can this person get along?”
and “Can this person keep standards?” You want
them to get job done rather than be perfect.
AID usually works in an unclassified mode. How
hard is it to bridge the gap between classified and unclassified
information? What kinds of problems do you run into? How
can we bridge this gap in terms of technology, etc.?
A
large gap between AID and State is that AID doesn’t
deal in a lot of national security matters, so workers tend
to be very chatty. AID doesn’t like keeping matters
under wraps. In this age, there is a need for some AID workers
to carry out classified goals. That is just something that
we will have to get used to.
On compartmentalization of information in Iraq,
how well does information flow back to USAID to be analyze?
Mission
Directors hate it when Washington tells them what to do
because there is no way for them to understand the situation
on the ground. On the Washington side, there are external,
like Congress, and internal pressures. For unclassified
matters, USAID is absolutely abysmal in telling the field
useful things and getting the field to tell Washington what
they are doing. The Mission is reluctant to share information
because they’re afraid that Washington will put their
hands in it. USAID was able to communicate when it came
to maintaining our website because Mission didn’t
want Washington to post anything that they couldn’t
deliver; so they would have to communicate with us. Oftentimes,
AID talks to AID, but no one else.
Why haven’t you implemented an Iraq or Afghanistan
training center for employees preparing to serve in those
places?
- We did not have the larger vision. We
don’t have a culture of doing lessons learned—we
are blind-sighted. It is one of our weaknesses. We often
have a very clear picture of the problem, but not a very
clear picture of the solution.
- It does come from the vision. We are in a new national
security environment. We need to think about transforming
our policy in communication, personnel, etc. so that we
can adjust to the new environment. Congress doesn’t
equate development and diplomacy yet. They are prepared
to allocate money for immediate national security threats,
which mainly means pouring money into the military. They
have a hard time justifying a large bill for diplomacy and
development, which require a large financial commitment.
In addition, we have outdated legislation for dealing with
national security matters. For example, the National Security
Act of 1947 is the legal framework that we use to deal with
the crisis of the Cold War. We need a new law and flexible
personnel policies.
Why don’t State and USAID set up a crisis
center in general if a country specific center requires
too many resources?
The State Department with the
approval of the NSC has opened an office that reports directly
to the Secretary called the Office for Coordination, Reconstruction,
and Stability (CRS). It is headed by a USAID officer/ambassador.
It’s the first step forward for State/USAID to establish
an office to do planning for post-conflict situations.
Is there a program set up for USAID or State to
share knowledge in Kabul? If not, is it due to classification
reasons?
No, we don’t have such a program.
What about knowledge sharing between USAID and
NGO/contracting partners?
- That’s a great
idea. NGOs are a great source of knowledge.
- State and USAID are now looking at collaborative technology.
We’re doing a pilot program with an application that
is being used very widely by the U.S. military in Iraq.
For now, it will be used for communication between State
and USAID, but has the potential to be used between the
government and NGOs.
How is this a different time from other historical
crises encountered by civilian government personnel?
Look
at the kind of military and civilian organization and collaboration
that occurred during the crisis in the Balkans. NATO made
a serious long-term commitment to the reconstruction efforts
in the region. That kind of investment addressed a very
serious security problem that was of great interest to the
United States and we’ve been relatively successful.
Just as in war, winning a single battle does not guarantee
that you will win the war. And even if you win the war,
you can still lose the peace. So, you need a comprehensive
vision of what you are about and a coordinated, major commitment
on the civilian side so that we leave something behind that
is stable and lasting.
Isn’t the business of USAID being in a crisis
spot for the long term in order to provide sustainable change?
So, I’m a little bit confused about your
approach. I’m concerned because I hear the call for
sustainability in connection with military activity and
the goal of the military is stabilization. I’d like
to hear a similarly strong statement recognizing the role
of development in this stabilization.
- No one wants to come home sooner than does the military.
No one wants to turn the job over to development sooner.
Military officers agree that security is essential but insufficient.
At the end of the day, you have to have development. The
military effort is only an enabling effort to serve the
larger goal: development.
- Afghanistan and Iraq are special situations because
the war has not yet been concluded. Therefore, the military
and civilians must work together to reconstruct these countries.
We have found it very difficult to convince some NGOs to
work with the military. Some have outright refused.
Back
to USAID 
