Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation

USAID-PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary 5

I. Introduction 7
Background 7
Objectives 7
Format/Agenda 8

II. The Importance of Linking Activities 9

III. What Enables and Constrains Good Programming 11
Principal Constraints 11
Language 11
Compartmentalization 12
Funding Availability and Flexibility 12
Competition and Disincentives to Sharing 13
Tyranny of Urgency 13
Insecurity 13
Principal Enablers 14
Coordination 14
Consortia 14
Shared Learning and Training 14
Internal Integration 15

IV. Issues Requiring Greater Attention 15
Connecting the Micro and Macro-Levels 15
Using a Developmental Relief Approach 16
Developing a Common Vocabulary and Guidelines 16
Developing a Common Operational Framework 17
Sharing Learning 17
Joint Visioning and Problem Solving 18

V. Approaches to Increased Collaboration 19
Action Research/Joint Learning 19
Pilot Joint Conflict Analysis 20
Overcoming Short-term Programming Mechanisms 21

Appendix A Participant List 23
Appendix B Agenda 26
Appendix C Description of Afternoon Working Groups 28
Appendix D Papers 30
Appendix E Bibliography 44

Executive Summary

On January 23 and 24, 2003, USAID and PVO representatives participated in a joint *USAID-PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict.* The purpose of the Dialogue was to help the U.S. humanitarian and development communities be more effective in working in conflict settings. To this end, the Dialogue brought together two key partners, USAID and PVO representatives, to discuss what enables and constrains good programming, identify priority issues requiring greater attention, and develop ways to promote increased collaboration.

The primary theme that emerged from the Dialogue was the need to link field activities in order to improve the effectiveness of conflict efforts. Dialogue presentations and working group discussions underscored the structural and individual factors inhibiting these linkages and the absolute value of collaboration. Between the USAID and PVO communities, stovepiping fragments programming, congressional requirements discourage long-range planning, and inflexible funding prevents adjustments to changing needs of conflict situations. Within USAID, internal constraints to working across bureaus and sectors thwart joint analysis, collaborative program design, and long-term funding. Likewise, within the PVO community, competition and secrecy keep organizations from sharing learning and methodologies. Together, these obstacles discourage more collaborative and holistic approaches to conflict programming.

The Dialogue also brought out many examples of intra and inter-community cooperation that boost the effectiveness of programming. These included PVO consortia, Mission-inspired collaborative strategy development, and USAID-mandated coordination. Joint USAID-PVO analysis, mutually agreed performance indicators, increased transparency, and shared learning repeatedly surfaced as critical components to working successfully in conflict.

The final phase of the Dialogue focused on how to increase these linkages, both within the two communities and between PVOs and USAID. Six items emerged as points where closer collaboration could enhance the effectiveness of work in conflict settings:

Connecting the Micro and Macro-Levels. With their respective competencies—e.g., USAID at the national and international levels and PVOs at the local and grassroots levels—USAID and PVOs can improve their effectiveness by linking their comparative strengths in conflict program design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Using a Developmental Relief Approach. Approaching aid in conflict-prone countries with a holistic view, including the ideas of preventive development and transitional peacebuilding, creates linkages across sectors and over time.

Developing A Common Vocabulary and Guidelines. Establishing common terms, principles, and methods of measurement for work in conflict-affected countries

could provide a single basis from which the USAID and PVO communities could operate. This could also aid in linking the development and emergency programming elements within both communities.

Developing a Common Operational Framework. Developing common elements of and approaches to analyzing conflict as part of a broader framework for strategic planning, program design and implementation, and evaluation.

Shared Learning. Interest in both communities for more and better information on analysis, methodologies, and tools for working in conflict inspires the potential for greater sharing within and across organizations. Conferences, workshops, case studies, committees, academic involvement, and action research can support such efforts.

Joint Visioning and Problem Solving. Informal mechanisms and relationship building between and within the USAID and PVO communities could greatly enhance their work in conflict settings. Potential aspects of this include discussions on roles, expectations, and ethics, as well as field-level cooperative problem solving and joint engagement of Congress and the military.

Drawing from these items, Dialogue participants identified three possibilities for joint follow-on action and set in motion a process for developing other options:

Action Research/Joint Learning. Establish a USAID-PVO initiative to examine jointly an issue related to working in conflict. Such an effort might include reviewing available information, defining existing gaps, setting objectives, and conducting field-based action research.

Pilot Joint Conflict Analysis. Undertake a collaborative USAID-PVO conflict analysis in the field as a means for learning about each other's needs and establishing a common operational framework. The process would entail establishing a joint working group to examine existing tools, define criteria, conduct a field analysis, and review the effectiveness of the effort.

Overcoming Short-term Programming Mechanisms. Jointly explore the reasons behind and ways to overcome the negative effects of short-term programming mechanisms and constraints to integrating conflict programming with longer-term development. This effort would entail DCHA and Agency-wide, as well as USAID-PVO, discussions on conflict's role in programming, standards for working in conflict, and program continuity in conflict environments.

I. Introduction

BACKGROUND

The growing recognition of the intrinsic relationship between conflict, development, and humanitarian assistance has spawned increased discussion over effective methods of working in conflict-affected countries. While members of the USAID and PVO communities have developed approaches and tools for working in conflict, little has been done to promote exchanges of such information between them. The interdependent relationship between the two communities demands greater programmatic synergy when working in such difficult and consequential environments.

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Accordingly, USAID's Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation (PVC) initiated the idea of holding a joint USAID-PVO dialogue on working in conflict to explore issues of mutual interest and develop better collaboration.[1] The design of the dialogue was a combined intra-bureau effort within USAID's Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Bureau and an inter-organizational effort with members of InterAction's Transition, Conflict and Peace (TCP) Working Group. The Dialogue was held January 23–24, 2003 at the Meridian International Center in Washington, DC. More than 80 participants—half from USAID, half from U.S. PVOs, plus a few outside experts—were present on the first day.[2] The second day involved 24 pre-designated participants—again, about half from USAID, half from PVOs—who had been part of the first day's discussion.

OBJECTIVES

PVC invited representatives of the TCP Working Group and offices in DCHA to form a planning committee, which outlined the critical issues, developed the agenda and format, selected the participants, invited individuals to write short discussion papers, and compiled a bibliography. The purpose of the Dialogue was to help the U.S. humanitarian and development communities be more effective in working in conflict settings. It brought together USAID and PVO representatives to discuss what enables and constrains good programming, identify priority issues requiring greater attention, and develop ways to promote increased collaboration.

The objectives were to:

- share knowledge and assess the work of the U.S. humanitarian and development communities in conflict settings, with specific attention on: strategies and approaches; practices, tools, and methods; and, issues and constraints. (first day)

[1] PVC wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Kim Maynard in organizing and facilitating the Conflict Dialogue and developing the initial draft of this report.

[2] See Participant List, Appendix A. The USAID and PVO participants were primarily headquarters office staff.

- identify priority issues from the first day's discussion and develop possible next steps for future collaboration and learning within and between the USAID and PVO communities. (second day)

FORMAT/AGENDA

The Dialogue was designed to maximize opportunities for exchanging information and ideas and thus had a minimal number of presentations and more than a dozen working group discussions. The Dialogue opened with a panel presentation that provided some initial insights on conflict from three speakers. Following the panel was a working group session that focused on the comparative advantages of USAID and PVOs in working in conflict settings, constraints to their work faced by each community, and factors that help and hinder USAID-PVO collaboration in conflict-prone countries.[3] The afternoon working groups discussed seven items USAID and PVOs typically encounter in implementing programs in conflict-affected countries:[4]

- Conflict analysis methodologies and application to programming;
- Tools and techniques in programming in conflict settings;
- Capacity building and training for working in conflict;
- Conflict setting monitoring, evaluation, and indicators;
- Integration of programming across sectors in conflict settings;
- Comparative considerations of working pre, during, and post-conflict; and
- Security, neutrality, and ethics in working in conflict.

On the second day, the agenda focused on: more detailed reporting on the previous day's working group discussions; small group scrutiny of key themes that emerged from these discussions; and dialogue on possible next steps to further collaboration between USAID and PVOs on conflict issues.[5]

In advance of the Dialogue, participants received two short papers—one written by a PVO representative, the other by a USAID representative—on each working group topic.[6] The papers provided the personal insights and views of the authors, all of whom are engaged in working on conflict issues. A bibliography offered further information on topics relating to working in conflict.[7]

[3] See January 23rd Agenda, Appendix B.
[4] See Description of Afternoon Working Groups, Appendix C.
[5] See January 24th Agenda, Appendix B.
[6] See Papers, Appendix D.
[7] See Bibliography, Appendix E.

II. The Importance of Linking Activities

… success… occurs when linkages are made between and among peacebuilding initiatives in a coordinated and strategic manner.

Following introductory remarks by USAID's Roger Winter[8] and InterAction's Jim Bishop,[9] an opening panel comprised of Mary Anderson, Nancy Lindborg, and John Tsagronis[10] set the stage for the Dialogue and laid the foundation for the subsequent discussion. Dr. Anderson provided an overview of the connections between effective conflict work and collaboration based on her organization's Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project. She launched her remarks by challenging the assumption that international peacebuilding efforts are effective. In truth, she asserted, "there are more mistakes than successes" in the field. She disputed the general dual presuppositions that "doing good work" is necessarily helpful in conflict settings and that more numerous such "good work" projects add up to greater prospects for peace. Indeed, the RPP Project reveals that successful peacebuilding does not stem from a compilation of various projects scattered across a country but, rather, occurs when linkages are made between and among peacebuilding initiatives in a coordinated and strategic manner.[11]

Further explaining her views, Dr. Anderson drew a four-quadrant matrix,[12] with horizontal and vertical linkages. One of the vertical columns represents working with small groups of key people, while the other represents working with large numbers of people. One horizontal row represents efforts to affect personal or individual change that influences attitudes, while the other represents work at a socio-political level that influences institutions.



Effective peacebuilding occurs when organizations move beyond a single quadrant to link efforts in a different quadrant. The most important link, as the downward arrows indicate, is increasing the level of influence by moving from the personal to the socio-political within each target audience. Also important is the potential growth in effectiveness gained by expanding the target groups as indicated by the horizontal arrow at the bottom of the matrix. Less influential, but still potentially significant, is the movement from the socio-political to the personal level, particularly among key people, as represented by the upward arrows.

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[8] Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.

[9] Director of Humanitarian Policy and Practice.

[10] Mary Anderson is President of Collaborative for Development Action (CDA); Nancy Lindborg is the Executive Vice President of Mercy Corps; John Tsagronis is a Senior Policy Advisor in USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination.

[11] See Collaborative for Development Action, Reflection on Peace Pratice Project, ***http://www.cdainc.com/rpp/rpp-index.htm***

[12] From Anderson and Olson (with Doughty), *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners.* Boston, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, Forthcoming 2003

Dr. Anderson added that these linkages also depend on sound, comprehensive conflict analysis and the presence of a strategic view of the entire spectrum of peacebuilding initiatives in a given conflict setting. She noted that the latter is essentially absent from most international efforts, while current conflict analyses are wanting because they:

- often fail to examine the conditions of areas not in conflict;
- do not look adequately at what is perpetuating the conflict;
- often miss the possibility that key issues in local conflicts may have international aspects most appropriately addressed in forums outside the conflict-affected area; and
- do not adequately consider what has been tried already and has proved unsuccessful.

Sound conflict analysis, she suggested, will: consider what needs to be stopped and who might resist; examine what and who needs to be supported; and anticipate possible consequences.

Dr. Anderson concluded by warning about factors that can cause peacebuilding efforts to backfire. These include a failure to maintain complete neutrality, neglect of human rights abuses, focusing too much on attitudinal change and not enough on structural change, and ignoring national and regional peace networks. She also emphasized that it is essential to recognize divergences and disagreements between partners and, therefore, critical that organizations constantly renegotiate their partnerships.

From a PVO perspective, Ms. Lindborg suggested increasing initiatives to improve the horizontal and vertical linkages among groups at different levels. These included action research, PVO consortia, support for local partners' capacity building, and advocacy for national institutional change. Both she and Mr. Tsagronis mentioned the negative impact inflexible and short-term funding have had on the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives.

Mr. Tsagronis referred to the role all development actors can play when he said, "development is the solution to conflict." However, the differences in mandates between USAID and PVOs in this regard are notable; USAID's charge as a government entity is ultimately to serve the national interest, while PVOs' interests and concerns are typically broader. In light of its position as a government agency, Mr. Tsagronis said, USAID could be a better conduit within the U.S. Government and for other bilateral and multilateral actors to strengthen linkages between various types of initiatives in conflict-affected countries. USAID, he concluded, still is seeking clarity on how to integrate conflict work effectively into its overall development efforts.

III. What Enables and Constrains Good Programming

… working groups focused on conditions and elements USAID and PVOs typically encounter as they work in conflict settings …

The understandings that emerged out of the presentations and working groups underscored the institutional and individual factors that promote and inhibit linkages and collaboration. Building on this discussion, subsequent working groups focused on conditions and elements USAID and PVOs typically encounter as they work in conflict settings including, most notably, factors that constrain and enable effective programming.

PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINTS

Participants identified a number of factors that constrain USAID and PVOs' effectiveness in conflict settings and undermine their ability to collaborate in these settings. Included among these factors were language, compartmentalization, funding availability and flexibility, competition and disincentives to sharing, the tyranny of urgency, and insecurity.

Language

Throughout the Dialogue participants cited language difficulties—i.e., a lack of clarity in the use and mutual understanding of terms and concepts—as significant barriers to effective work and collaboration in conflict settings. A prime example is the distinction between working "in" and "on" conflict. Working *in* conflict connotes technical efforts, such as health or agricultural activities, in conflict-prone settings, while working *on* conflict has more of a peacebuilding focus, concentrating on programs that address conflict directly. Although not mutually exclusive, the two approaches use different methods and thus have different indicators of effectiveness.

Difficulties arise when practitioners try to distinguish between them operationally. The challenge is in linking technical programming to peacebuilding outcomes over an extended period of time. In humanitarian assistance, for example, one working group noted it is important to "look for early warnings of peace—understanding when it is possible to start working 'on' rather than just 'in' conflict." Participants also voiced concern that developing new peace-building competencies to work on conflict could transform relief or development organizations into peace agencies and add another layer of obligations onto already overwhelmed staff.

Another language difficulty participants raised centered on the terminology used in discussing conflict. Variations in the use and understanding of terms, such as pre-conflict, conflict-affected, post-conflict, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, were evident among the various groups and interests—e.g., development and humanitarian assistance organizations—represented at the Dialogue. Beyond raising awareness of the differences, the discussion emphasized the need for a common vocabulary that includes consensus on

the underlying concepts of conflict. Participants felt that if USAID and PVOs spoke the same language, or at least understood each other's terms, they could be more effective at communicating between themselves and with others, such as Congress.

Relatedly, several working groups called for more flexible definitions of terms to break down the barriers within both USAID and PVOs that reflect the differences in development and emergency programming. Rigid terminology and definitions, participants said, limit operational options. For example, the term "relief" tends to limit the type of progamming and funding in fluid situations where operational needs may include development or transitional programs. In addition, some terms are particularly sensitive in the field where local partners and populations may not be able to talk about reconciliation or governments do not want to concede the potential for conflict.

Compartmentalization

Participants pointed to structural divisions between and among PVO and USAID operational entities as one of the most serious inhibitors to working more effectively in conflict environments. The segmentation among separate parts of organizations working in pre, during, and post-conflict programming belies the more fluid reality of most situations. Stovepiping in both communities also occurs within sectors and between emergency and development programming. USAID's compartmentalization, in particular, limits flexibility in programming, funding, and capacity building for PVOs. This general lack of coordination and cooperation results in wasted resources and duplication and a lack of comprehensive approaches to addressing conflict in both humanitarian and development contexts.

Funding Availability and Flexibility

On the back of compartmentalization, multiple lines of appropriations within USAID, each with different sets of purposes and use limitations, result in funding availability and flexibility problems with PVOs. The conflict-specific strain of this is manifested in three impediments:

- Structural divisions limit *flexibility* for funding across sectors and throughout the progression of a conflict. For example, inflexibility in the use of resources in the transition phase limits programming and staffing which, in turn, adversely affects both USAID and PVOs' ability to address conflict-specific issues consistently over time and during crucial de-escalation periods.

- While over-funding of conflict initiatives can be a problem at times, long-term or transition programs more commonly receive *insufficient* funding that limits USAID and PVOs' ability to maintain programming and staff to address longer-term requirements. Equally problematic is the difficulty raising funds for "invisible crises"—conflicts that have fallen out of the limelight—and conflict prevention activities. Participants also suggested that funding shortfalls have a detrimental affect on reflection and strategic thinking among concerned individuals and organizations.

- Congressional requirements are another fiscal constraint. Most notably, requirements to produce immediate results have often stymied USAID and PVOs. In part, the comparative difficulty of measuring progress and showing results in conflict programs has hindered USAID from obtaining longer-term or more flexible funding. Interestingly, some participants pointed out that PVO advocacy efforts before Congress have sometimes also increased designated funding levels in USAID.

Competition and Disincentives to Sharing

Rivalry within USAID and PVOs has significantly inhibited more effective work in conflict and collaboration. Participants said both communities are adversely affected by internal turf battles, competition for resources, and philosophical differences. This has led to different understandings of and lack of strategic agreement on conflict, limiting the impact of activities in the field and learning between and within the two communities. Similarly, within both communities, competition across sectors—in part spurred by sector-based grant mechanisms—has created disincentives to innovative, integrated programming. USAID and PVOs have also struggled with sharing knowledge within their organizations, both across organizational divisions and their operational offices in the field. This insufficient sharing of knowledge wastes time and resources—because offices reinvent what others have already done—and has helped make it difficult to mainstream conflict into the organizations' operations. Lastly, existing USAID-PVO reporting mechanisms discourage information sharing because they tend to isolate individual PVO achievements, missing the sum of the parts or the collective impact of other conflict-related efforts.

Tyranny of Urgency

Many participants expressed concern that the need to respond to emergencies has undermined their ability to address conflict in a more sustained and effective manner. The rapid response programming USAID and PVOs are compelled to provide demands an immediate show of results and tends to be less flexible and participatory. Reacting constantly to the crisis of the moment can limit long-term commitments to conflicts[13] and create difficulties in retaining qualified staff to work for extended periods in such highly charged settings. Lastly, crisis-focused programming can obscure the more subtle and enduring processes of social reintegration and reconciliation associated with peacebuilding programs.

Insecurity

Although USAID and PVOs have substantially increased their attention to security matters over the last decade, the precarious conditions in which they operate can limit their knowledge of and access to the field. PVO staff travel, live, and work directly in communities affected by conflict, while USAID has more restrictive regulations that often limit staff to brief visits outside the capital. Some participants reported that this can

[13]The reverse may also occur, i.e., there may be mental blocks to switching from development to emergency programming when the situation requires.

undermine USAID's relationship with local groups, restrict its ability to monitor projects, limit the amount and quality of information it has for decision-making, and adversely affect its role within partnerships.

Further complicating the situation, to accommodate the need to visit the field, USAID staff may have military escorts when visiting PVO projects. This, in turn, can complicate how they are viewed by the local population and have undesirable consequences for the PVOs. The latter, for example, can become identified with the military, with attendant potential security risks for their own staff. In addition to this concern, PVOs stated that simply sharing information with the U.S. government can potentially compromise their impartiality and credibility. When the U.S. is a belligerent party in a conflict, these risks increase substantially.

PRINCIPAL ENABLERS

The Dialogue discussion surfaced a number of conditions and actions that promote effective work in conflict settings and collaboration. Following the morning discussion's theme, these tended to be factors that create linkages between and among conflict programs and activities.

Coordination

Participants said USAID's "conflict consciousness" and desire to dialogue with PVOs on conflict issues has helped both communities to work more effectively in conflict settings. In particular, they noted that where USAID Missions have invited PVOs and local NGOs to participate in their strategic planning processes, coordination among all concerned has improved. This effect is magnified when those involved have also included the U.S. Embassy and other donors. In such cases of field-based coordination, the comparative advantages of both communities emerge. PVOs bring a depth and breadth of on-the-ground experience that USAID complements with a broader perspective and funding. The mutual respect in this regard, especially when accompanied by transparent funding mechanisms, was an acknowledged boost to more effective programming, according to participants.

Consortia

Whether USAID-inspired or self-initiated, field-based PVO consortia were widely hailed by participants as providing a positive basis for better conflict programming. PVO consortia have provided a foundation for strategic agreement and joint planning. They have also served as an important mechanism for sharing experiences and increasing collaboration within the PVO community prior to opening funding negotiations with USAID.

Shared Learning and Training

Shared learning and information exchanges have been important contributors to more effective programming and the mainstreaming of conflict within organizations. Mechanisms that have helped bring this about include consortia, inter-sectoral conflict analyses, common reviews of evaluations and case studies, agreement on performance indicators, and skilled monitoring and evaluation. This type of mutual commitment to learning and

better analysis has helped increase transparency and collaboration and decrease competitiveness between and among PVOs. Similarly, joint training—e.g., in security issues—among PVOs and local NGOs has promoted sharing between and among organizations.[14]

Internal Integration

Participants reported that when structural or sectoral boundaries were crossed within their organizations, USAID and PVOs experienced increased effectiveness in their conflict efforts. For example, when staff capacity was sufficient enough to make the shift from emergency to development programming, the organizational competence for working in conflict expanded. Likewise, multi-sectoral approaches that eliminated internal stovepiping produced similarly positive results. These approaches evolved from intra-organizational working groups, advocacy efforts, and crosscutting themes (e.g., gender, HIV/AIDS, and household livelihoods). USAID regional offices have also been able to program for cross-border conflicts using a multi-sectoral approach.

IV. Issues Requiring Greater Attention

… a better understanding [is needed] of the nature of conflict and the link between conflict and development …

Building on the discussion of factors that constrain and enable work in conflict settings, participants suggested areas that need further development to improve the effectiveness of USAID and PVOs' efforts. Six possibilities emerged from this discussion: connecting the micro and macro levels; using a developmental relief approach; developing standards and guidelines; developing a common operational framework; sharing learning; and, joint visioning and problem solving.

Connecting the Micro and Macro-Levels

Throughout the Dialogue participants referred to USAID's macro-level comparative advantage in having access to information from a wide variety of political, military, institutional, and other sources. This enables USAID to see specific conflicts from a broader national and regional perspective. In contrast, PVOs' micro-level comparative advantage lies in their grassroots view of conflicts and being able to take the pulse of local communities. However, despite their complementary nature, the two competencies do not necessarily connect adequately to be mutually beneficial and thereby increase their organizations' overall effectiveness in the conflict context.

Participants emphasized this need to improve the interplay between the macro and micro-levels. Many conflict analysis tools focus on one or the other and few make connections between them. Analyzing conflict at the local level can produce findings that suggest a sense of progress that is negated by events at the national or regional

[14]"Non-tagged" pots of money have supported PVOs in such efforts, as exemplified in USAID matching grants that require PVOs to collaborate with other entities to obtain required matching contributions.

levels. Macro-level analysis provides a framework upon which conflict at the community level can be evaluated. Similarly, monitoring needs to be conducted at both levels. Practitioners need to be mindful of various indicators of impact on the conflict and understand the macro-level analysis before evaluating a micro-level activity.

"Conflict diamonds" was cited as a good example of working at the macro and micro-levels. Understanding the international implications and systems that went into supporting the diamond trade eventually laid the groundwork for affecting international institutions and global markets, as well as specific mining and trade mechanisms in the diamond areas themselves.

Using a Developmental Relief Approach

Finding ways to connect development and humanitarian assistance more effectively throughout the life of a conflict was another theme that surfaced in the Dialogue. Participants concluded that the distinctions between pre, during and post-conflict are too limiting and do not reflect the reality of conflict situations. Aspects of each type of conflict may exist simultaneously within a country, requiring many different forms of assistance at once.

In a quickly evolving conflict, for example, rapid response programming takes precedence and the political imperative of the moment dictates the response. Typically, there is a spike in funding and new actors to the scene, which bring added resources that often result in "truck and chuck" emergency programming—i.e., distributing commodities without considering their social, political, or economic impact. Understanding that aid becomes part of a conflict as it amplifies or mitigates violence, the question then becomes how the additional resources are applied to affect the ongoing situation. In this sense, a holistic approach to the conflict-affected country and strategic coordination become essential.

Several working groups used the concept of developmental relief to address this larger conflict context issue. The concept includes the ideas of preventive development and transitional peacebuilding; i.e., development efforts that proactively address potential underlying sources of conflict and peacebuilding programs that take place during the transition from emergency programming to development. Recognizing that many PVOs and USAID are functionally organized around a chronological model of conflict and aid, participants suggested the need to reframe the present emergency-development paradigm to conform to this more comprehensive approach.[15] The organizational change that could result from such a reframing exercise might promote more appropriate interventions, more flexible funding and program mechanisms, and improved peacebuilding.

Developing a Common Vocabulary and Guidelines

Participants repeatedly called for the development of a common vocabulary and guidelines for agencies working in countries affected by conflict. A discussion of vocabulary alone might elicit perceptual and operational commonalities and differences and provide

[15]Broad-based conflict analysis can also potentially provide the link between emergency programming and development.

a basis for establishing common terms and collective parameters. The development of guidelines could provide a single base from which USAID and PVOs could operate on conflict program design, training, and monitoring and evaluation. It could also aid in linking the development and emergency programming elements within both communities.

Participants suggested that collecting best practices from across the foreign aid community and using them to frame operational principles could begin the process of developing the guidelines. Also suggested was reviewing existing precepts and approaches, such as livelihood strategies or community mobilization, for applicable guidelines that would work in both communities. In addition, several working groups suggested the idea of seeking input from the academic community.

Developing a Common Operational Framework

Conflict analysis as a foundation for effective planning and implementation received a great deal of attention in the working groups.[16] Indeed, several working groups suggested that Missions develop a framework for conflict analysis and joint planning. This in-country construct could include the U.S. Embassy, other bilateral donors, and partners and PVOs funded or not funded by USAID. Participants also mentioned the potential use of Indefinite Quantity Contracts as a mechanism to provide such conflict analysis support and training to the field. Existing collaborative PVO strategy design mechanisms that center on broad-based, multi-sectoral analysis, such as those found in RFAs, can also serve this purpose.

Working groups offered the following suggestions on how to make conflict analyses more complete, thorough, and flexible by:

- considering the local, regional, and international context;
- involving local NGOs and institutions, all PVOs and donors, academics, community leaders, and local government and military officials;
- building in a feedback mechanism to insure that the program design and implementation are appropriate;
- having an agenda and being interactive, ongoing, incremental, and cyclical; and
- identifying barriers, threats to process, sociological issues, economic needs, and areas not engaged in conflict.

Sharing Learning

Virtually all participants in the Dialogue were eager to learn more about analysis, methodologies, and tools for working in conflict-affected countries. There was widespread agreement that individual and shared learning through studies, conferences, staff exchanges, and other such mechanisms are highly desirable. For example, it was pointed out that a better understanding of the nature of conflict and the link between conflict and development might help alleviate some negative aspects of the tyranny of urgency and drive for quick fixes.

[16]The Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department within Britain's Department for International Development requires PVOs to examine the conflict context thoroughly before funding programs.

However, while affirming the desirability of individual and shared learning activities, participants also acknowledged that they are difficult to do and infrequent. They said the biggest constraints in this regard are time and resources, although competition and compartmentalization can be inhibiting factors as well.

Participants offered numerous idea on how to increase shared learning:

- Hold more conferences and workshops and conduct more case studies;
- Mandate shared learning proposal requirements;
- Cooperate with outside organizations, such as the U.S. Institute of Peace, in support of research and practitioner fellowships for USAID and PVO staff;
- Provide training on the role and impact of conflict and conflict-sensitive programming to inform and raise awareness;
- Include a conflict and/or political development specialist on disaster assistance response teams to help mitigate the effects of conflict in emergency situations;
- Have USAID incorporate relevant PVO tools, such as Local Capacities for Peace (Do No Harm), conflict mapping, and actors analysis, into its programming;
- Conduct joint USAID-PVO capacity building in conflict mitigation, negotiation, problem solving, resolution, and peacebuilding;[17]
- Disseminate common stories, using the Internet and global information technology, and conduct staff exchanges; and
- Conduct a long-term forum in the field similar to this USAID-PVO Dialogue to improve operational competence and humanitarian and development assistance in conflict-affected countries. Establish coordinating committees in Washington and the field similar to the Great Lakes forum to bring together actors working in conflict on a regular basis.

Joint Visioning and Problem Solving

Along with the structural approaches to improving collaboration and the effectiveness of their organizations' conflict programs, participants recognized the need for less formal mechanisms. Building good relationships between USAID and PVO personnel, as well as among staff within the two communities, could be as helpful in improving operations as more tangible structural suggestions. For example, because personalities are a primary factor in the success or failure of collaborative efforts at any level, discussions of roles and expectations can be particularly important in security, neutrality, and ethics issues, as well as mutual efforts to engage local government and NGO representatives.

Other helpful actions to improve USAID-PVO collaboration could include sharing scenario-based approaches to conflict programming. With the aid of USAID conflict synopses, PVOs could develop proposals and associated monitoring and evaluation systems specific to the scenarios, rather than listing prospective outcomes in uncertain settings for which they will be held accountable. USAID and PVOs might also collaborate on advocating before Congress to recast conflict as a development problem and

[17]This could be done in three parts, beginning with conflict analysis for disintegrating conditions, followed by handling issues in the midst of conflict, and then mitigation techniques for countries recovering from conflict.

thereby create more interest in and funding for their conflict programs. Another area of collaboration could be furthering the dialogue between civilian and military entities in a way that meaningfully includes PVO and foreign aid community concerns. Finally, collaboration could be added to annual performance work objectives, raising the stakes for employees and their supervisors.

V. Approaches to Increased Collaboration

… the key theme woven throughout the Dialogue clearly laid the premise for increasing USAID-PVO collaboration …

The goal of the Dialogue was to help the U.S. humanitarian assistance and development communities be more effective in their work in conflict-affected countries. To this end, it first examined what enables and constrains good programming and then prioritized issues that need greater attention. Finally, participants were tasked with establishing mechanisms and approaches to improving effectiveness through greater USAID-PVO collaboration.

Regarding this final task, the key theme woven throughout the Dialogue clearly laid the premise for increasing USAID-PVO collaboration in all work conducted in countries affected by conflict. Generating greater understanding and transparency, developing common approaches, working together on specific projects, and learning from each other were cited repeatedly as linkages both communities desired. Drawing from the prioritized issues, three prospective collaborative actions were identified by Dialogue participants: an action research/joint learning project; a pilot joint conflict analysis; and an effort to develop ways to overcome the limitations of short-term programming mechanisms. In discussing these potential joint actions, participants took into account field involvement, capacity building, local partnership, and policy dictates.

Action Research/Joint Learning

Problem statement: While much information on working in conflict exists, neither USAID nor PVOs are adequately familiar with its content or application. Consequently, there is a substantial gap between available resources and practitioners. A direct result of this gap is a missing link, both across sectors and within the organizations, between research and its application to field programming. Specific issues in this regard include the need to:

- Define and differentiate variances in programming in and on conflict and in pre, ongoing, and post-conflict areas;
- Involve local NGOs and indigenous populations more effectively;
- Take into account the fact that much of the information on conflict has been developed by academics and others not connected with the development and humanitarian assistance communities;

- Increase self-analysis in the U.S. foreign aid community, including data collection and reflection by staff involved in conflict programming;
- Look into the issue of intellectual property and U.S. government classification of information; and
- Examine differing values, assumptions, and motivators of action.

Objectives: The objectives of this prospective action research/joint learning exercise are to:

- Ascertain what currently exists and determine what is missing.
- Assess the implications for policy and programs of: conflict methods, theories, and systems; indicators used in monitoring and evaluation; field techniques and tools; and case studies.
- Conduct joint USAID-PVO research and analysis that reflect their organizational values and assumptions, take into account the multiplicity of needs, and recognize the risks in generalizing findings.
- Improve decision-maker and practitioner access, sharing, and dissemination of information by: setting up a web-based library on conflict;[18] building a network and/or secretariat to share information via regular meetings and links with other organizations;[19] and establishing an on-going conflict forum for continued discussion.[20]

Next steps: Build analysis and action-learning options, such as peace and conflict impact assessments, into USAID funding mechanisms. Collaboratively develop a more complete strategy by:

- Setting up a USAID-PVO working group to develop a concept paper and budget;
- Developing short, medium, and long-term objectives;
- Requiring contributions from all involved to ensure buy-in and demonstrate true collaboration;
- Establishing a fund to support action research; and
- Allocating funds and time for field-based practitioner participation.

Pilot Joint Conflict Analysis

Problem Statement: The potential for joint USAID-PVO learning has not been realized and as a result conflict program effectiveness has suffered.

Objective: Conduct a collaborative USAID-PVO conflict analysis in the field as a means for learning about each other's needs and establishing a common operational framework.

Next Steps: Establish a USAID-PVO joint conflict analysis working group to gather information on conflict analysis tools and methodologies, share comments and concerns, develop a plan for a pilot, and arrange for the pilot to be conducted.

[18] USAID's Microenterprise Innovation Project (MIP), which supports technical and financial assistance, research, and training on best practices in microenterprise development and finance, is an example.

[19] The Small Enterprise Education and Promotion (SEEP) Network, which exists to advance the work of its 56 PVO members engaged in small and microenterprise development, has done this.

[20] The Great Lakes Forum, which meets regularly in Washington, D.C. to discuss issues pertinent to the Great Lakes region of Africa, is an example.

Overcoming Short-term Programming Mechanisms

Problem Statement: PVOs and USAID are stymied by the lack of funding to support programs throughout the life of a conflict. Planning and funding for emergency and development programming are hindered by current paradigms and organizational structures.

Objectives: The objectives of this prospective undertaking are to:

- Increase awareness of and change mindsets on the need for program continuity and integration in conflict settings;
- Improve the breadth of understanding about conflict and its impact; and
- Raise the consciousness of practitioners and decision-makers about the importance of incorporating conflict-sensitive approaches to all humanitarian and development work.

Next Steps: Efforts should be made to develop minimum standards[21] for conflict and development by: having a bureau-wide discussion in DCHA on expectations for standards and potential training on standards; initiating a DCHA-led discussion on standards among USAID staff working in conflict; and holding a similar joint USAID-PVO discussion on standards.

* * *

Dialogue participants agreed to establish a working group to guide these prospective actions forward. The working group is comprised of individuals from the Dialogue Planning Committee's DCHA Bureau representatives and InterAction's Transition, Conflict, and Peace Working Group. Understanding that the Dialogue was conducted among headquarters staff of both communities, there was general agreement that:

- DCHA and InterAction TCP members will hold a follow-up meeting no later than February 7, 2003, in which they will establish priorities;
- USAID and PVOs will consider conducting a joint field-based action within three months; and
- Both communities will obtain input from their field-based counterparts on these proposed actions.

[21] Such standards might be based on the Local Capacities for Peace (Do No Harm) principles that encourage agencies to be aware of and reduce potential negative impacts of aid.

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Appendix B Agenda

Thursday, January 23, 2003
Meridian House, Washington, DC

Purpose: To help the US humanitarian and development community be more effective in working in conflict settings. To this end, the dialogue brings together two key partners, USAID and the US PVO community, to share what enables and constrains good programming, to identify jointly priority issues requiring greater attention, and to establish approaches towards collaboration.

First Day Objective: To share and assess the work and knowledge within the US humanitarian and development community in conflict settings through specific attention to: strategies and approaches; practices, tools, and methods; and issues and constraints.

8:30 Registration, continental breakfast
Foyer/Loggia

9:00 Welcome and opening remarks
Drawing Room
- Roger Winter, Assistant Administrator, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
- Jim Bishop, Director, Disaster Response Committee, InterAction

9:15 Morning: Characteristics of Effective Cooperation
Drawing Room
Plenary Conflict Analysis Panel
- Mary Anderson, President, Collaborative for Development Action
- Nancy Lindborg, Executive Vice President, Mercy Corps International
- John Tsagronis, Senior Policy Advisor, USAID

10:30 Break

11:00 Working Groups
(Refer to chart with assigned rooms)

12:30 Lunch
Foyer/Loggia

1:30 Plenary
Drawing Room
- Report back from recorders

2:00 Afternoon: Programmatic Elements of Working in Conflict
(Refer to chart with assigned rooms)

Working Groups:
1. Conflict analysis methodologies and application to programming
2. Tools and techniques in programming in conflict settings
3. Capacity building and training for working in conflict
4. Conflict setting monitoring, evaluation, and indicators
5. Integration of programming across sectors in conflict settings
6. Comparative considerations of working pre, during, and post conflict
7. Security, neutrality and ethics in working in conflict

3:15 Break

3:45 Working Groups continued

4:30 Conclusion: Moving Cooperation Forward

Gallery walk of flip charts
Drawing Room/Foyer

Final Comments
Drawing Room

- Bruce Wilkinson, Senior Vice President, International Programs, World Vision—US
- Judy Gilmore, Director, Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation, USAID

Wrap up and closure

5:30 Reception co-hosted by InterAction's Transition, Conflict and Peace Working Group and USAID's Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation
Dining Room

Friday, January 24, 2003
Meridian House, Washington, DC

Purpose: To help the US humanitarian and development community be more effective in working in conflict settings. To this end, the dialogue brings together two key partners, USAID and the US PVO community, to share what enables and constrains good programming, to identify jointly priority issues requiring greater attention, and to establish approaches towards collaboration.

Second Day Objective: To identify priority issues from the previous day's discussion and develop next steps for future collaboration and learning within the USAID and PVO communities.

9:00 Continental breakfast

9:15 Welcome and introductions
Discussion of objectives and format for the day

9:30 More detailed presentation by notetakers on previous day's working groups
General discussion of issues
Prioritization of issues to be addressed

10:45 Break

11:15 Small group discussions of directions and
ideas for next steps

1:00 Lunch

2:00 Regroup into plenary
Break small group discussions down into action items
Specification of individual roles and responsibilities
Next steps

4:00 Adjourn

Appendix C Description of Afternoon Working Groups

The following is a description of each working group with several discussion questions. The questions are meant to provoke dialogue and are not intended to be comprehensive or limit the range of discussion within the group.

1. **Conflict analysis methodologies and application to programming**

   This working group will address the latest thinking in and systematic approaches to analyzing the conflict context as well as the interpretation and application of analysis findings to programming. Some of the issues raised might include:

   a. How can we take an aspect of the analysis and address one part of the conflict without losing site of the bigger picture?
   b. How do we translate the analysis into program design? What are the biggest challenges?
   c. How do we modify our programs to conform with continual (or periodic) analysis? How can US PVOs and USAID facilitate such programmatic flexibility while retaining accountability and cost effectiveness?
   d. How can PVOs and USAID better integrate their approaches?

2. **Tools and techniques in programming in conflict settings**

   This group will explore specific programmatic activities and approaches to working in conflict situations. Some points of discussion might include:

   a. Where is the greatest demand for tools and techniques? What do we have currently and where are the gaps?
   b. What is the transferability of tools used in development, relief, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding?
   c. How do we satisfy the field hunger for tools yet prevent rote application and encourage individual situation-specific thinking and innovation?
   d. How can we better share our techniques so that USAID and PVOs are not reinventing the wheel?

3. **Capacity building and training for working in conflict**

   This working group will examine the determination and acquisition of skills for working in conflict within our organizations as well as our partners. Some specific issues might include:

   a. What skills are needed for work in conflict settings?
   b. As a primary capacity building tool, what kinds of training have been effective? Where are the biggest training gaps?
   c. What approaches do we use to transfer learning throughout the organization? How do we share learning across sectors and between technical and non-technical units? How can we improve our knowledge management?
   d. What can USAID and US PVOs do together to build better capacity to work in conflict settings?

4. **Conflict setting monitoring, evaluation, and indicators**

   This working group will examine methodologies used to measure progress and failure while working in conflict environments. Some considerations might include:

   a. Are there particular considerations critical to working in conflict in either the methodologies used or the criteria for success?
   b. What kind of standards and indicators are we using? How do we measure qualitative change? How do we measure both process and outcomes?
   c. What kinds of measurements of success would benefit both the PVOs' operations and USAID's need for results? How can we share learning across agencies more effectively?

5. **Integration of programming across sectors in conflict settings**

   This group will look at conflict as a crosscutting issue across programs in different sectors (e.g. health, agriculture and food security, water/sanitation) by examining common conflict-induced challenges and opportunities between programs. Some aspects of this might include:

   a. What are the critical linkages between sectoral programs in a conflict environment?
   b. What methods do we have to integrate technical fields that generally work "in" conflict, and approaches for working "on" conflict? How do we connect tangible programs and community relationships with conflict reduction goals?
   c. What can be done in the relationship between PVOs and USAID to improve the integration between sectors?

6. **Comparative considerations of working pre, during, and post conflict**

   This group will examine the factors and programming considerations that are unique to the various stages of conflict as well as the linkages between them. Discussion might include:

   a. What are the most determining influences on the conflict in each phase? Where are the critical points of intervention?
   b. How can we better leverage conflict prevention?
   c. What organizational approaches do we have for linking our work through the lifecycle of conflict?
   d. What can PVOs and USAID do to develop an earlier and more seamless approach to working across the spectrum of conflict conditions? How can we smooth out the bell curve and allocate more attention and resources to pre and post-conflict programming?

7. **Security, neutrality and ethics in working in conflict**

   This working group will look at the inherent security concerns and ethical dilemmas of working in conflict environments and the various principles and practices of engagement. Some points of discussion might include:

   a. What security concerns most impact our ability to work effectively (both PVOs and USAID)? What can PVOs and USAID do within the context of their relationship to improve the security of all staff?
   b. What methodologies do we have to work remotely?
   c. How does our view of neutrality impact our US PVO–USAID relationship in a conflict setting?
   d. What are the critical ethical concerns about US PVO–USAID relationships (e.g. links to US government's role in the conflict through funding, information sharing and concerns over intelligence leakage and gathering, role of US and other militaries)?

Appendix D Papers

PVO PAPER: 1†
Conflict Analysis, Methodologies and Application to Programming[1]

Prepared by Abikök C. Riak, World Vision U.S.

World Vision International (WVI) has chosen the *Do No Harm (DNH)/Local Capacities for Peace (LCP)* methodology as the main conflict analysis tool because it is flexible, simple to understand and use. In addition to the DNH/LCP tool, programmers have been introduced to a wide range of other tools including the conflict tree, conflict mapping, the ABC (Attitude, Behavior, Context) Triangle, and the Onion. Many of these tools are complementary to the DNH analysis as a way of exploring in detail some of the issues highlighted in a DNH/LCP analysis.

Not surprisingly, most of the lessons learned in the LCP Project that led to the development of the analytical framework were based on experiential learning in a relief context. Thus, in a training exercise, it was not difficult for relief practitioners to appreciate the relevance and applicability of the analytical framework. This was not the case when training development practitioners. The examples used of large convoys of food being stolen to feed armies or sold to buy weapons was very foreign to many development workers attending LCP trainings. Most development practitioners are familiar with how agencies can create conflict in communities but the concept of *impacting conflict* seems to be a new one in development circles. Even a literature review reveals that there are few examples in the field outlining the relationship between long-term development programming and conflict.[2]

Fortunately, these challenges were identified early in the mainstreaming phase. It was evident that if LCP was to be mainstreamed into the core functions of WVI, then it needed to be repackaged for development practitioners. This involved identifying common core development concepts and assessment methodologies where LCP could be relevant. It also involved writing teaching case studies that were based on the experiences of development practitioners.

In response to the general gap in LCP knowledge around development programs, the WV Asia Pacific Regional Office launched an initiative to investigate the links between conflict and development programming. Two LCP Centers of Learning (COL) were established in 2001, one in the Philippines, the other in Indonesia. The two ultimate goals of the COLs involve change at two levels. First in the way WV (agency and staff) think about and interpret the work that is done in conflict areas and how this way of thinking transfers to project design and implementation. The second (more difficult to measure) impact that is sought, is genuine improvement in community relations leading to decreased risk of violent ethno-political identity conflicts. Some of the key lessons that have emerged about applying LCP in a development context include:

Relevance: LCP has significant relevance and applicability in a development context. In fact, what is emerging from the COL is that development projects that feed into conflict negatively can potentially have a much greater negative impact on a community's ability to respond effectively to conflict. As most development aid does not involve large capital investments, as one would see in a relief program, the impacts (both positive and negative) are sometimes harder to see. They are subtler. The negative impacts seem more insidious as they are more linked to the symbolic dimensions of aid rather than the material ones. In contrast, development work that has positive impacts on the context of conflict could have great potential for creating a catalyst in communities plagued by conflict to engage positively and find alternatives to violence.

Organizational culture can impact an organization's readiness to engage in peacebuilding programming. Operating as a federation with no "headquarters" WVI demonstrates several "cultures" within a larger corporate one. What has emerged in the mainstreaming of LCP is that those offices that exhibit organizational cultures that demonstrate sound conflict management principles, and are open to change are infinitely more inclined to be receptive to exploring the relevance and applicability of the LCP framework and analysis in their particular context. Those offices that tend to resist change and are risk averse have tended to be less keen to use the framework. Often the programming recommendations (e.g. changes in operational procedures, diversification of the beneficiary population) that can come out of a DNH analysis can be threatening to the status quo.

Program context ambiguity: Field practitioners still struggle with the decision-making process that needs to take place after a conflict analysis is finalized. In the end, the process is very fluid and the same analysis can lead to different programming choices. Whereas many of the positive results of decisions taken in a relief setting can be seen relatively quickly, it is generally not the same for development arenas. Programmers are left wondering if the changes that they are making are actually having positive impacts on the context of conflict. And before they get a good sense of this, something changes in the conflict environment and they feel as if they have failed and they need to start over from scratch. In addition, most field staff are most comfortable using conflict analysis tools at the design or evaluation stage. They struggle with how to make changes in a project that has already started.

[1] Adapted from a paper written for the 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention, March 24-27, 2002.

[2] Peter Uvin's Aiding Violence and Carolyn Nordstrom's *A Different Kind of War Story* are two of the few examples available. (Uvin, Peter. 1998. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda.* West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press and Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1997. *A Different Kind of War Story.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.) More recently, Muscat, Robert J. 2002. *Investing in Peace: How Development Aid Can Prevent or Promote Conflict.* M.E. Sharpe.

†All papers in this appendix were prepared expressly for the USAID-PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict. They reflect the thoughts and ideas of the authors only and do not necessarily represent organizational positions.

USAID PAPER: 1
Conflict Analysis, Methodologies and Application to Programming

Prepared by Sharon Morris
USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

The quality and effectiveness of our work in high-risk environments ultimately depends on the depth and richness of our analysis. All too often, analysis tends to focus on only one or two obvious dimensions of violence—for example, the politicization of ethnic or religious identity—and this has limited the range of programs we tend to consider.

To illustrate, a recent conflict assessment in Southern Sudan focused primarily on politicized ethnicity and proposed community dialogue as the solution. Another assessment focused on a lack of information about the peace process and proposed media programs. Both of these assessments appear to be driven more by available programs and funding streams than underlying causes. So, for example, if ethnicity is indeed being polarized in parts of Southern Sudan, who is doing it and for what reasons? What constituency base are these actors tapping into and what types of grievances are they using to mobilize support. If the underlying source of tension between communities is about access to land, as the analysis suggested in passing, then shouldn't programs focus on land rights? If the main constituency base for violence is young people, then shouldn't attention focus as much on finding ways to engage young people as on community dialogue?

This example is not meant to suggest that media programs and community dialogue aren't important. Of course they are. But conflict is complex. It doesn't occur just because ethnic groups have a history of tension or because people lack information. It happens when causes at multiple levels come together and reinforce one another. It is ultimately the product of deep grievance, vulnerable demographic groups, zero-sum political and economic competition, irresponsible political leadership, and weak or predatory institutions. And conflict analysis needs to take account of causes at all these levels.

Because conflict is multi-faceted, every major area in foreign assistance—from economic growth, to agriculture, to democracy and governance—has at least some bearing on the underlying causes. And because of this, conflict analysis is pointing toward: 1) the need for integrated packages of assistance in high-risk areas; and 2) for conflict considerations to be woven into every program in a high-risk environment, not just those explicitly geared to conflict.

The first objective is going to require close collaboration between individual partners and between partners and Missions. Currently, most Missions have no reliable way to track the geographic location of different programs or to determine whether the right mix of programs is in place. Because the criteria that each partner uses for selecting sites are different, in some high-risk areas there may be programs that encourage dialogue but none that emphasize job creation. In others, irrigation projects may be underway, but no processes in place that can mediate ethnic tensions.

The second objective is again closely tied to good analysis. While some partners track conflict data, very few of our traditional development partners do. And even among those that are sensitive to conflict considerations, the rapidly changing nature of conflict requires frequent readjustment. For example, for nearly twenty years the central fault line in Sri Lanka has been between Tamils and Sinhalese. But with peace, a new fault line is emerging between Muslims and Tamils in the east. Staff in international and local NGOs have been focused on bridging Tamil/Sinhalese divisions for so long, that they pay scant attention to emerging lines of division, and the consequences for programs and peace are potentially disastrous for peace in that country.

PVO PAPER: 2
Tools and Techniques for Programming in Conflict Settings

Prepared by Lisa Smith & Jock M. Baker, CARE–USA

Over the past few years, CARE has tried to more explicitly address underlying causes of poverty both in conflict-affected environments and in its development programming. While making use of Local Capacity for Peace ("Do No Harm") tools in a number of country programs, CARE also used these tools in East Africa as the basis for development of an advocacy tool ("Benefit Harms"). CARE is also placing increasing institutional emphasis on a **Rights Based Approach (RBA),** which deliberately and explicitly focuses on people achieving the minimum conditions for living with dignity (i.e. achieving their human rights). RBA recognizes poor, displaced, and war-affected people as having inherent rights essential to livelihood security—rights that are validated by international law. Some operational guidelines for RBA include:

- Ensuring that assessment, analysis, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation are participatory and sensitive to inequalities;
- Widening the analytical framework to include human rights;
- Broadening the assessment to include institutions and their relations to rights in relation to the full range of actors at all levels.

The application of these approaches is progressively shifting CARE's programming vision from an emphasis on needs, to one of rights, responsibility and accountability, and is changing how programs are designed and implemented.

CARE experience in a number of conflict settings has demonstrated the utility of an appropriate mix of both long term and emergency programming techniques, including:

- Program design based on sound analysis and consistent with the longer-term strategic focus of the Country Office. Such a program tends to be medium to long-term in nature and aims at enhancing the capacity of partners and target communities, so that when confronted by a crisis, a) their vulnerability to external shocks is reduced and, b) difficulties of access by external humanitarian agencies due to insecurity becomes less critical.
- Use of multiple "probable" scenarios during program and project design to allow for flexible and responsive use of project and program resources, appropriate training for staff and partners, and plan for collection of conflict indicators during routine project implementation and monitoring. Such "preparedness" also makes it more feasible to take advantages of any "windows of opportunity" which may appear.
- In contrast to development contexts, programs in conflict settings need to be subject to rapid review and revision processes at regular intervals or following any major event that may have a significant potential impact on the program. It is often useful for senior management and relevant technical staff to participate in such reviews to promote a common understanding and facilitate appropriate and timely support.
- A consortium approach with partners should be used where feasible to promote a) consistency of approach ("Do No Harm"), b) transparency, and c) effective advocacy.

USAID PAPER: 2
Tools and Techniques for Programming in Conflict Settings

Prepared by Dayton Maxwell
USAID Office of Conflict, Management and Mitigation
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

A major wave of conflict "tool" development has occurred during the last decade. Tools range from a specific intervention technique to a total capacity-building program. A "toolkit" was developed for the USAID Greater Horn program in 1997, but just sat on the shelf. The challenge is how to identify what is needed for the specific circumstances encountered. This paper will be limited to just one area of tools—those useful to a public-private partnership.

John Paul Lederach's book on conflict transformation stresses the need to work at all levels. What tools are complementary when working at different levels? Can we work together more systematically at developing such tools? Note that strengthening civil society seems to be a common element for many tools. Here are some areas:

Post-Conflict Recovery: The critical path to stable peace goes through the security/rule-of-law sector, thus systematic dialog and confidence-building measures between police/military and the population is critical. Government officials working at top levels need to know how society can contribute to better security, anti-corruption, criminal prosecution and government accountability measures. Tools for dialog, organized advocacy, use of media, information management, political party participation, formation of election issues, can be effective. Also, participatory political-economic planning toward stability can be an important tool at the community and national levels. The market economics simulation (SENSE) program could be part of that planning process as well.

Conflict Vulnerability Assessments (CVAs): A CVA is a tool. Perhaps the most valuable achievement for all of us in conflict settings is to assist conflict country officials and populations develop the capacity to assess their own vulnerability to conflict and take appropriate action to prevent it. Today most CVAs are conducted by external teams to assure credibility. Our goal should be to create local institutions and expertise to do this. In Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe today civil society institutions are being taught the techniques of monitoring conflict-warning signs and bring them to the attention of authorities. In Nigeria a government institution conducted an extensive CVA with civil society participation.

Civil Society Participation in Peace Agreement Efforts: A range of dialog, consultation, problem-solving, media, program implementation, and monitoring tools can be used to strengthen peace agreements if civil society were more engaged in the official peace process. In Guatemala, a comprehensive peace agreement was created with civil society participation that took years to complete, yet formed the basis for creating a long-term stability process. Civil society representatives were present at the Sierra Leone peace talks and were integrated into the peace monitoring committees. The UN brought civil society representatives to Bonn during the Afghanistan government formation deliberations, and follow-up activities continue. The trend is to do this more. We all need to work together effectively to create more durable peace processes.

Reduce Violence Around Elections: USAID has developed a whole list of actions that can help do this, which it can share with those interested. Most of these tools are for specialized elections and political party NGOs. But increasingly the specialized NGOs realize that working with civil society on getting out the vote, educating the population on voting procedures and issues, and minority rights is important in containing violence. Thus programs designed to strengthen civil society that are of interest to all NGOs can also include training on election responsibilities, important issues, advocacy on campaign issues, and assisting with security around elections.

PVO PAPER: 3
Capacity-Building and Training for Working in Conflict

Prepared by Ron Waldman
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University

What is the purpose of capacity-building (or learning)?

Are we building the capacity of individuals, agencies or the relief sector as a whole?

Or, are we building a local capacity to obviate the need for external responders?

One may distinguish several purposes of learning (or capacity-building) which correspond to different levels of action:

- **Participatory learning** in the field, the purpose of which should be to give the beneficiaries information and insight that can benefit their own self-development and instigate positive social and economic change;
- **Project-based learning,** within and across comparable projects and programs to identify good, best or innovative practice;
- **Policy-related learning** is an interesting, but also problematic level because policy formulation implies generalizing. Transferring experiences from one context to another is fraught with risk. Building policy on averages may obscure meaningful divergences and differences. In reality, policy may be more influenced by the configuration of values, coalition politics and prevailing ideas than by systematic analysis.
- **Policy-influencing learning** (advocacy) may mean formulating a general position that dangerously simplifies a complexity or suppresses discordant ideas. Yet, advocacy has been shown to be a valuable tool in creating positive change.
- A fifth, emergent, purpose of capacity-building might be **accountability.** The understanding of 'accountability' is expanding from a narrow financial-administrative interpretation to a broad one that looks at performance as a whole and even, tentatively, at impact. The control and audit functions of a supervisory body need to be complemented with evaluation. In that broader sense, accountability is about demonstrating that an agency or the system showed the best possible performance in a given context, and incorporated past lessons in that performance.

It is instructive to examine the organizational, structural and physical environments in which both the successes and failures of relief efforts have been achieved and that may facilitate or inhibit learning.

There are significant dilemmas facing humanitarian responders. How can they decide between:

- the ability to negotiate v. the ability to act quickly
- cultural competence v. technical skill
- lessons from other situations v. every situation is unique
- wisdom & experience of age v. strength & agility of youth
- interdependent consultative processes v. independent get-it-done actions.

Humanitarian crises have been referred to as the "emergency rooms of public health." It is therefore not surprising that the organizational culture of relief agencies values rapid, independent decision-making and action. Does this culture ***de-value*** deliberation, reflection (an opportunity for lesson-learning) and consultation as a waste of valuable time? The answer is not clear. While relief organizations' missions and donor identities are often tied to the notion of "emergency," the facts show that the "emergencies" are often long since past, and, that agencies and staff have had to learn and adapt to long-term situations.

To improve practice through the use of evidence requires time as does institutional learning. Yet relief work tends to be short-term in nature. Rapid staff turnover is tied both to short-term funding cycles and to the action orientation of many relief workers whose style is to work intensely in acute situations.

The loss of essential services that characterizes emergency situations tests efforts to collect data as well as efforts to link local actors with distant technical resources and institutional foci of reflection and learning whether in their own agency or another.

What do relief workers/agencies need to be able to do? ... and how best can they learn?

One may pose five major cross-cutting issues: skills training, communication with the population, operational research to overcome identifiable existing constraints, monitoring and evaluation, and management.

USAID PAPER: 3
Capacity Building and Training for Working in Conflict

Prepared by Stacia George
USAID Bureau Europe and Eurasia Bureau

Working in conflict settings is not new to USAID. But conflict management theories and principles still remain abstract for most USAID staff, including how to apply skills and principles needed for effective work in conflict settings. Proper capacity building and training to work in a conflict setting is essential for avoiding "cookie-cutter" approaches to programming that could end up exacerbating existing or latent conflict tendencies.

Why is there still a lack of capacity for working in conflict settings in both USAID and PVOs? The biggest obstacle we have faced here when facilitating training events for staff is an inability to attract participants. Most people's participation is constrained by low staffing levels and rigid staffing patterns that hinder the flexibility of office coverage and leave few opportunities for workers to be away from their work. Because many managers still expect the workers to still complete their jobs while in training, if the training is offered close to their office, workers tend to run up to their offices on breaks and return late or skip parts of the training to attend meetings. Other offices just do not have the financing to fund their staff's participation in these opportunities. Furthermore, it is difficult to get people interested in participating in training unless they feel is not geared specifically towards work in their sector. Of the few opportunities that exist that relate to working in conflict settings, most people do not see the training as relating directly to their particular work. In addition to the staff with the "that is nice, but how does this pertain to me?" mentality, other staff assume that since they have worked in conflict settings for x number of years, what more do they need to know? It is difficult to change people's mindset to see their own gaps in capacity and to place a priority on filling in those gaps.

Another problem is that capacity-building efforts tend not to extend across entire agencies and include all sectors; this is exacerbated by agency compartmentalization. Training and efforts to examine conflict management tend to focus on democracy and governance-related issues, instead of reaching out to the staff that also work in the conflict setting but in other sectors. The result is that the staff left behind do not obtain the skills needed for working in conflict settings and are then unable to see the conflict setting beyond their sector and, ultimately, how their programs drives or mitigates existent or latent conflicts. This also leaves a whole section of the organization that lacks the capacity to be effective in a conflict setting.

How do we create an environment and staff that facilitates working in conflict settings?

- Flexible staffing both in terms of availability and skills (technical, regional expertise, languages useful) that enable quick and effective deployment and program implementation. Staff will then be able to regularly get out into the field to learn the nuances of the conflict that can only be determined by a physical experience and encounters with the various people affected by or involved in the conflict.
- Capacity-building efforts should provide staff with the basic skills needed to work well in a conflict setting. These necessary skills include the analytical skills to view the conflict situation from multiple viewpoints (regional, national, government, ethnic, religious, individual, etc.) and then to analyze how programming decisions relate to the conflict situation on each of these levels and to adjust program implementation accordingly. Capacity-building should also encourage management skills, flexibility, interpersonal and intercultural skills, teamwork, and an ability to make reasoned decisions quickly and decisively. To make this happen, management must make training opportunities and staffing needs a priority.
- Close relationships between USAID and PVOs before the need to react to a conflict and then while on the ground are essential for improving efficiency by building contacts, creating greater understanding of each other's organizations, and sharing knowledge of the conflict setting.
- Informal discussions with fellow USAID and PVO colleagues resulted in a recommendation for a training with three components. The first would provide training in some of the basic skills needed to work in a conflict setting such as interpersonal and intercultural skills, teamwork, etc. The second part would cover conflict analysis and how to incorporate this analysis into programming decisions. The third part would have detailed case studies of how to incorporate conflict analysis into the type of program development and implementation specific to the participants' line of work. The ultimate objective would be to provide both USAID and PVO workers in all aspects of work within a conflict setting with the capacity to help assure that their programming decisions become a conflict mitigation tool or at least do not exacerbate the conflict.

PVO PAPER: 4
Conflict Setting Monitoring, Evaluation, and Indicators

Prepared by Hugh Brown, ACDI-VOCA

The five countries of Central Asia are considered some of the most vulnerable to violent conflict erupting and taking root due to the growing percentage of inhabitants facing economic hardship and poverty, including a general deterioration in the quality of social well-being.

An important facet of community development activities involves community members and local government representatives taking the lead role in co-identifying, prioritizing and implementing the community demand-driven project and also collaboratively monitoring and evaluating the project with representatives of the (local or international) development organization staff. Once community members and their representative body, the democratically-elected Community Investment Council (CIC) for the CAIP Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan program, have been educated about the primary objective(s) of the respective development program and trained in community mobilization activities, the main responsibility of the development organization should be to act as facilitator and 'shadow leader' for all subsequent community project activities. The community, and local government representatives, must take ownership of a community project from the beginning if there is to be success realized not only in the identification, prioritization and implementation stages, but also the maintenance of the respective project. The latter stage is considered to be the most important stage by many development practitioners, since it demonstrates not only the willingness, but also the ability to maintain a project. However, a project's overall success is contingent upon all components being properly addressed.

As facilitator and 'shadow leader,' development practitioner(s), especially in conflict settings, must work with community members and local governmental representatives to create an enabling environment, sometimes bridging the gap (chasm of distrust) between community members and local officials who are perceived to be doing little, if anything, toward improving the livelihoods of community members, for development of broad-based dialogues between community members and local officials to take place. For a community development program to be successful, it is important that community members and local officials be knowledgeable about and supportive of each parties' (community, local government, development organization) role and responsibility. Having this general knowledge and mutual support will aid in project implementation, monitoring and evaluation and maintenance activities, building trust among the parties, and addressing, in a timely manner, issues that will inevitably arise.

In conflict settings, it is important for local stakeholders to be actively involved in all facets of project implementation, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises. M&E exercises provide stakeholders with an opportunity to give feedback to the implementing organization, et al. in terms of what went well, what did not, and what changes can/should be made to improve the quality orientation of the (community development) program.

In conflict settings, where opportunities to publicly critically evaluate ideas and work of others without fear of reprimand, imprisonment, or worse, tends to be rather limited. Subsequently, interactive M&E activities provide stakeholders with an alternative, hopefully non-threatening, way of giving feedback (evaluation) to governmental representatives about their performance as leaders.

Indicators, while directly correlated with the objective(s) of the respective development program, should also be reality-based, i.e. appropriate for the environment in which the program is being implemented, and measurable, i.e. quantifiable. Indicators, especially in conflict settings where there are additional program implementation complexities—including identifying the most appropriate communities in which to work, i.e. communities with potential for conflict, communities currently experiencing conflict, and/or communities with a history of conflict, should be straightforward and their purpose understood. Likewise, there should be appropriate tools developed for gathering pre- and post-project information from target individuals (groups) to understand the impact of the project. Indicators should be collaboratively developed by both program funding and implementing organizations and open to revision, as necessary and appropriate, as mutually agreed upon by both funding and implementing organizations. This activity will most likely be time-consuming but ultimately worthwhile.

Because of the complex relations, i.e. economic, cultural, social, and political, within any 'developed' (or even developing) economy, the CAIP project in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan works with community members and local governmental representatives not only in implementing community demand-driven projects, but also through taking a more holistic approach to community development by engaging women and youth, who tend to be marginalized because of cultural practices, through community mobilization, public education, and workforce skills development activities.

In order for community development programs to be successful, there should be a diverse representation of community members, including women and youth—to the extent possible and practical, involved in all decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation components.

USAID Paper: 4
Conflict Setting Monitoring, Evaluation, and Indicators

Prepared by Cressida Slote
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

The late 1980s and early 1990s was a period of dramatic change. Countries all over the globe underwent transitions: transitions from autocratic to democratic rule, transitions from war to peace, and transitions away from democracy and from peace to war. These transitions not only necessitated a new set of responses to quickly and flexibly target the most critical transition needs, but also required a modification of traditional monitoring and evaluation methods. In order to carry out effective monitoring and evaluation in these volatile settings, USAID and PVOs must consider a number of factors.

Working within short timeframes: While most development programs have upwards of five years in which to show results, transition and conflict programs, which commonly operate within short timeframes, do not. These types of programs must be quickly initiated in order to capitalize on fragile, short-lived windows of opportunity. As a result of the focus on quick response, these programs often emphasize the need for action and program implementation over the need for careful planning and program design. Successful monitoring and evaluation in these environments requires that organizations strike a balance between reflection and response, and set clear expectations for the amount of time staff spend on each.

Recognizing the difficulties of post-conflict environments: In post-conflict environments, on-going security threats often limits the reach of PVO and USAID staff outside the capital. There is often a dearth of available information, from government statistical records to newspapers and objective TV programs. To meet these challenges, monitoring plans should incorporate innovative approaches that are sensitive to change over time, can be quickly carried out in fast-paced environments, require minimal staff time and resources, and can provide timely information to aid in re-targeting. Against the backdrop of an unstable political environment where activities are focused on responding to immediate needs, it is often difficult to establish a baseline during the launch of a new program. Without a baseline, however, organizations will be unable to demonstrate that they have effected change over time.

Building the capacity of local partners: In post-conflict environments, civil society is often too fragile to partner with USAID and the PVO community on issues related to monitoring and evaluation. There are often few firms which have the research and quantitative skills necessary to undertake rigorous surveys, focus groups, or baseline studies. In such environments, USAID and PVOs have an opportunity to share their experiences, best practices, and methodologies and to build the monitoring capacity of local organizations.

Identifying output, impact, and process indicators: To measure changes in attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors, both output and impact indicators should be developed early in a program's lifecycle. While it may be relatively straightforward to compile outputs that reflect the immediate result of an intervention, it is considerably more difficult to identify impact indicators and process indicators that gauge the progress of conflict management or transition programming. In addition, given the short-term focus, impact results are difficult to gauge, changes in attitudes are difficult to capture, and it is almost impossible to measure and attribute to any program a "non-event", i.e., the absence of renewed violence. To remedy this, USAID and PVOs are challenged to develop and share indicators that have proved successful in defining the impact of transition and conflict programs.

Utilizing data gathered during monitoring and evaluation: Even in programs which have developed sophisticated monitoring and evaluation plans and have the capacity to track a variety of indicators, it is often a challenge to feed data gleaned through monitoring back into the decision-making process. At times there even seems to be a disconnect between data gathered through routine monitoring and evaluation and the programmatic decisions that are taken. USAID and PVOs must ensure that monitoring is not done in a vacuum, but is instead a key decision-making tool. Similarly, recommendations and lessons learned gathered from mid-term and final evaluations must be fed back into on-going, or new programs, in a manner that adds to our knowledge of conflict and transition programming. The use of such feedback can be hampered by competition among organizations and by the time it takes to integrate these results.

Despite the challenges outlined above, there are many rewards of monitoring and evaluation. Disciplined monitoring and evaluation aids in the hand over of short-term, conflict-related programming to other actors who can shepherd these programs into the sphere of long term development. Successful monitoring also enables program managers to fine-tune objectives and select geographic areas, sectors, target populations, and/or activities based on the evolving needs of the post-conflict environment. Finally, better monitoring and evaluation provides a basis from to make decisions about which programs to support, what kind of expertise is needed in staff, and how to distribute financial resources.

PVO PAPER: 5‡
Integration of Programming Across Sectors

Prepared by Mike Wessells
Christian Children's Fund (CCF)

Although war-affected populations face holistic needs, the international humanitarian response is not integrated since it is excessively sectoral, vertically organized, and poorly coordinated. Each sector acts as its own kingdom, competes with others for scarce resources, and pays little attention to other sectors, much less the whole situation and needs. Rigidly sectoral programming thwarts comprehensive assistance, creates asymmetries, and fails to protect basic rights.

Programming needs to be guided by a causal framework that recognizes interactions across sectors. One cannot promote health, for example, by attending to medical issues while ignoring issues of water, sanitation, shelter, and household income. Yet, it is not uncommon to find war-affected villages that have multiple, unmet needs, but receive shelter assistance and not health or economic assistance. Even where multiple needs are met, assistance is not integrated under the guidance of a framework that identifies the key points of leverage and causal pathways for positive change and sustainable development.

Excessively sectoral approaches squander scarce resources by missing important opportunities to build inter-sectoral synergies that boost program quality, enable capacity building, and support development and peace. For example, infrastructure reconstruction is typically a high priority following conflict, but it is often done in a manner that misses opportunities for peacebuilding through means such as, having former rivals cooperate on the repair of roads and bridges. Similarly, child survival may be threatened by problems such as mother's depression following traumatic experiences or by lack of appropriate care-seeking behavior. Health programming may be augmented by integrated approaches that address emotional and behavioral aspects of health, yet such integration seldom occurs. Further, all conflict programs would benefit from the integration of psychosocial components that help to restore dignity, the loss of which is often regarded by war-affected people, as being as devastating as the loss of home and property.

Constraints on integrated programming arise mainly from the hegemony of specialized expertise and the structural divisions that pervade the humanitarian community. These reflect the technical organization and mindsets of highly industrialized, scientific, secular societies. They create a variety of barriers and disincentives regarding integration across sectors. The structure of the humanitarian enterprise embodies vertically organized sectors that have distinctive management, technical, and logistic domains and use their own specialized set of tools, vocabulary, approaches, and lessons learned. Sectoral divisions are present at multiple levels, from intergovernmental agencies to government ministries to individual NGOs, which may specialize in particular sectors or create specialized teams to work within a sector. Further, donors organize grants by sector, creating strong incentives for sectorally specialized programs. The net result is that each sector operates as a separate world having its own norms, values, and culture. Due to specialized training, the organization of the enterprise, and the prevailing reward structure, practitioners are reluctant to work across sectors to create integrated programs.

A high priority, then, is to create better integrated programs in situations of armed conflict. To move forward, numerous questions need to be addressed. For example, what innovative structural, managerial, and coordination arrangements will enable integration across sectors? How can donors and other agencies provide incentives that support integrated programming? What training supports and approaches are needed to advance integrated programs? What venues can be used to share effective practice and lessons learned regarding program integration? We stand at a fork in the road, and the choices we make will determine whether we achieve the integration needed to more effectively support and build the capacity of war-affected populations.

‡No USAID paper was prepared on integration of programming across sectors.

PVO Paper: 6
Comparative Considerations of Working Pre, During and Post Conflict

Hugh Brown, ACDI-VOCA

Following September 11th events, the world has become especially aware of the Central Asian region, placing greater focus on the USAID cross-cutting objective of mitigating potential for conflict, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Through implementation of a number of community development programs, potential for conflict is to be lessened, or at least addressed, at the grass-roots level through the joint efforts of community members, government officials, and the non-governmental sector, and utilizing process(es) facilitated by USAID-funded programs[1], via community driven social infrastructure, economic, and training projects. Challenges of meeting the cross-cutting objective in southern Kyrgyzstan lay in: 1) identification of target communities at different stages of 'conflict,' and realistically knowing where positive impact may be realized through project implementation; and 2) appropriateness of starting community development programs during and/or 'immediately' after critical conflict situations occur.[2]

Targeting communities in southern Kyrgyzstan involves understanding the past history and current perceptions of conflict. The two most recognized conflicts, i.e. events in Osh in 1990 and Aksy of March 2002, make this sub-region 'post conflict.' However, many from the international community believe that what is perceived as rapidly deteriorating employment opportunities, particularly for (educated) youth, lack of equal access to natural and political resources, particularly for non-ethnic Kyrgyz—mainly Uzbeks, lack of a national identity accepted by the majority of the population, among other factors, qualify southern Kyrgyzstan as 'pre-conflict.' Yet, ironically enough, there is no consensus among the international community, including embassy personnel, development practitioners and prominent international conflict research institutions, regarding identifying and recommending specific communities with potential for conflict that may be targeted by community development programs such as CAIP for mitigating conflict.

Non-existence of comprehensive and timely conflict monitoring by independent, non-biased, and credible research institution(s) during the past decade might be to blame. But then, there is an organizational question of incorporating such findings into an ongoing conflict prevention strategy and community development program, hence balancing the long-term objective(s) of community development with pressures of urgent response, similar to a fire department, for addressing conflict 'hotspots.'

Establishing a community development program in respective geographical areas during and/or immediately after conflict has occurred is a tremendous challenge. Just how effective a community development program is in mitigating conflict following a violent civil unrest, such as in Aksy, or immediately after social conflict (triggered by alcohol abuse) between two ethnic groups with a longstanding tension between them, is questionable. Should there be an intervention during or immediately after conflict situations while the memories of perceived injustice(s) are still fresh? Should there be a 'cooling off' period first? The experience in southern Kyrgyzstan reveals grassroots,' i.e. individuals at the community/village level, acceptance of and participation in community development programs parallel to the communities' fight(s) against perceived government injustices, including the government's improper dealing with democratically-orchestrated demonstrations by the public, and government-facilitated unequal land distributions, among others, when such development programs commence activities during or immediately after the respective conflict. Furthermore, what type of intervention, i.e. social infrastructure projects, income-generating projects, etc., is most desirable and appropriate (and who should determine what is "appropriate") to augment the community mobilization activities at each stage of the 'conflict lifecycle' when implementing community development programs?

There is no doubt about the importance of a community development program during pre, during, and/or post conflict. However, effective and efficient targeting of resources at the most crucial stages (depending on the type of conflict) of intervention is very important. Additional factors to consider in meeting the cross-cutting objective of mitigating potential for conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan include: 1) prompt identification of communities at the 'most appropriate stage(s)' (for intervention) of the conflict lifecycle; 2) clear pronouncement, and maintaining of a neutral position, by the development organization that they are not working either for or against the host country governmental system through implementation of the community development program; and 3) continuous announcements that the community program's purpose is not to supplant but complement the local governmental structure.

[1] This includes Peaceful Communities' Initiative (PCI), implemented by Mercy Corps; Community Action Investment Program (CAIP), implemented by a number of USAID partners in the five Central Asian countries.

[2] Here it is meant internal state conflicts due to mistrust of local government officials. Specifically, implementing a community development program in so-called 'opposition' communities of Aksy, Kyrgyzstan, post March 2002 events.

USAID Paper: 6
Comparative Considerations Of Working Pre, During and Post Conflict

Prepared by Tjip Walker, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

Though an obvious simplification, thinking of violent conflicts in terms of stages (see Figure 1) is a useful way to differentiate the environment in which to address conflict, the appropriate response and the most effective types of partnerships. Thinking in terms of stages is also a useful way to chart the evolution of USAID's growing involvement in conflict management and mitigation.

Stage 4: Post Conflict Transitions to Peace. USAID's first systematic efforts to address conflict began in the early 1990s with the creation of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and have since concentrated on supporting the implementation of peace agreements and promoting community-level reconciliation. Eight years of experience have confirmed that these transitions are chaotic and fluid periods. What was has been destroyed or discredited. What will be has yet to be determined. In this environment elites jostle with one another to put their own stamp on the post-conflict polity and economy, while everyone else focuses on trying to ensure their own security and eking out an existence in these uncertain times. In other words, post-conflict transitions lack the conditions of stability and certainty necessary to initiate sustainable development. Yet the same unsettled conditions provide rare opportunities to reconstitute a society-if donors can engage with local partners to take advantage of the opportunities as they arise. Doing so requires the timely, flexible and inherently political (though not partisan) support that OTI has pioneered. OTI's most successful collaborations in post-conflict transitions have been with local NGOs with a US contractor serving as a logistical and financial intermediary.

Stage 5: Return to Normalcy. If a post-conflict transition is successful, political uncertainty will give way to political processes and institutions that are widely accepted as legitimate, economic chaos will give way to investment opportunities, and a preoccupation with survival will give way to making a life and dreams of a future. As these conditions emerge, it is time for short-term transition assistance to give way to long-term development aid. For donors the programmatic challenge is to ensure a smooth segue between two rather different types of support. The organizational challenge is an effective handover from OTI to USAID Missions and their development partners, including PVOs. Experience has taught that an effective handover is not a given. It requires care and planning. Greater focus on handovers has improved the success rate in last few years, but there is still room for improvement, perhaps beginning with broadening the handover discussion beyond USAID to include PVOs and other development partners.

Stage 3: Open Conflict. Whether violent conflict in the large (a civil war) or violent conflict in the small (within a village, town or district), there a few opportunities for outside interventions. Once the parties to the conflict are prepared to talk rather than fight, there is greater room for support to the negotiation process. But while the violence is raging, about the only successful strategy is using available media, especially radio, to communicate messages supporting non-violent resolution of conflicts. In pursuing such a strategy there is room for collaboration between donors and PVOs with media expertise.

Figure 1. Stages of Conflict

	Upstream		Open	Downstream	
	Quiescence	Crisis	Conflict	Post-Conflict	Return to Normalcy
Level of Violent Conflict					
Development Conditions	• Basic institutions settled • Economic/social stability • Long-term development focus provides basis for investments in human and physical capital	• Contestation over basic institutions • Economic and social instability • Shorter-term crisis focus	• Basic institutions do not function • High levels of economic and social instability • Very short-term conflict focus	• Contestation over basic institutions • Economic and social instability • Shorter-term crisis focus	• Basic institutions settled • Economic/social stability • Long-term development focus provides basis for investments in human and physical capital

Stage 2: Crisis. USAID has begun only recently to engage in efforts specifically designed to address conflicts before they deteriorate into civil war. Upstream efforts to manage and mitigate conflict first focussed countries, such as Macedonia, that were in crisis. As the crisis deepens, the operating environment becomes more and more like that prevailing post-conflict. Political arrangements are called into questions. The economy falters. Elites and citizens both give up long-term plans and focus on the immediate. Consequently the development priority is no longer one of long-term capacity building and sustainability but one of fast-implementing and flexibly targeted campaigns designed to forestall further deterioration and support peaceful resolution of the underlying disputes (the dotted trajectory in Figure 1). Not surprisingly, because of the commonalties in the operating environment, the types of programs that OTI has used with success in post-conflict transitions have worked equally well in pre-conflict crises. But whether OTI is involved in responding to the crisis or not, the key issue is increasing the capabilities of donors and their partners, including PVOs, to recognize the critical changes in the operating environment and to modify program activities accordingly. Improved collaboration between USAID and PVOs on conflict analysis and would be helpful in increasing the range and effectiveness of responses.

Stage 1: Quiescence. The current Administrator has called upon USAID to also focus conflict management and mitigation further upstream, to address the seeds of violence during periods of quiescence and as part of ongoing development efforts in health, education, economic growth and democratic governance. If successful, these efforts promise enormous benefits in saved lives and livelihoods. But mainstreaming conflict management and mitigation into development programming is an enormous task, both programmatically and organizationally. As a first step, the Administrator has established the new Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to lead the mainstreaming efforts within the agency. But there is much more to be done and some internal resistance to doing it. Overcoming the bureaucratic and conceptual hurdles to mainstream a "conflict consciousness" will be much easier if key development partners, especially PVOs, are similarly committed. If so, there are enormous opportunities for effective collaboration on a range of issues including analysis, program design, and training methodologies.

PVO PAPER: 7
Security, Neutrality, and Ethics in Working in Conflict

Prepared by Udaya Manandhar, Ganga Thakali, and Keith D. Leslie
Save the Children-Nepal, U.S.

Save the Children US (SC/US) has been working in the Far Western *terai* of Nepal with selected partner Nepali NGOs and His Majesty's Government (HMG) on participatory community development programs, especially reaching children and women, since 1994. The Far Western region lags behind in almost all of the development indicators in comparison to the other four regions of the country. Therefore, the focus of the SC/US program has been to strengthen local NGOs that represent the most disadvantaged ethnic and caste communities in this region. In this effort, the agency's local partners have been the NNSWA in Kanchanpur District, representing the dalit caste (formerly untouchables) and BASE in Kailali district, representing the indigenous Tharu tribal community. [The total population of Kailali district is 616,697 of whom 269,521 are Tharu and the total population of Kanchanpur district is 377,899 of whom 88,115 are Tharu.]

Over the past couple of years, a Maoist insurgency has spread throughout Nepal. What began in selected districts of the Mid and Far Western regions has spread to every district. The poor development indicators, caste discrimination and the historical suppression of the Tharu community are some of the factors that have influenced the growth of the insurgency in the Far Western terai. Since the Maoists directly attacked the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in November 2001, precipitating a national State of Emergency, there has been a much heavier RNA security presence. In addition, the political environment in Nepal worsened over the last year with the elected national and local governments being dissolved and a new cabinet reporting directly to His Majesty the King taking power in October 2002.

Both Kailali and Kanchanpur are severely affected by the Maoist insurgency. Their proximity to the Indian border, dense forests, large Tharu and dalit populations and easy access to the isolated hill districts make them effective lines of communication for the People's War. Yet within the villages of these two districts, SC/US has continued to implement its women and child-focused programs through our partner NGOs (PNGOs). However, because of the increased presence of both the RNA and the Maoist "People's Army," in order to ensure the security and neutrality of SC/US and PNGO staff, regular working methodologies and procedures have had to change. There is now a constant risk to staff and villagers if they are perceived to be too closely associated with either side of this internal, Nepali conflict. [A recent Amnesty International report estimates 4,366 people have died and of whom 4,050 are believed to be Maoists. ***http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/IndexASA310722002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\NEPAL***].

The key factors that have permitted the SC/US integrated community development program to continue without major disruption include:

- Absolutely apolitical identification of all programs, staff and agencies;
- Total neutrality in speech, action and thoughts regarding the conflict;
- Provision of immediate relief assistance, e.g. health camps for children;
- Hiring local women for staff, particularly from the disadvantaged communities; and
- Reduced number and public display of non-essential training and workshops.

Some of the guidelines that our staff employ to ensure their neutrality during this conflict have included:

1. Be transparent and honest at all times.
2. Identify and recognize the positive aspects of both parties to the conflict.
3. Behave like the local community people where you are visiting.
4. Avoid alcohol or asking for special foods and use only local transportation.
5. Maintain a respectful rapport with the local families, especially children and women.
6. Avoid discrimination on any form in any way (sex, caste and ethnicity, etc).
7. Always be polite. Use simple words and sentences. Avoid the use of English.
8. Listen to what you are told and never use words or expressions that may hurt others.
9. Do not be critical of local culture and tradition.
10. Do not make independent decisions on matters you are not sure about. Let the local leaders know that you will inform them after talking with the concerned authorities.
11. Be energetic and effective in your work, but do not blame anyone else.
12. Avoid organizing programs or walking during the night. Always take care to be on time.
13. Avoid being in any place or forum where political discussion is going on or anticipated.
14. Do not take any decision that benefits only a few people or one that benefits you directly.
15. Do not try to publicize the work you are doing nor try to take credit for this work.

These are a few of the agency's guidelines by which SC/US and its PNGOs have been able to continue to implement our community development programs in a difficult environment of daily tension and armed conflict.

USAID PAPER: 7
Security, Neutrality and Ethics in Working in Conflict

Prepared by Anita Menghetti
USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance

NGOs(are working in situations wherein achieving the appearance of ethical *and* neutral behavior while providing for the security of their staff and beneficiaries may simply be an untenable proposition. This **'achieving the appearance'** is at the crux of our discussion, as, even when we consider our actions to be neutral and ethical, they are often not perceived as such.

> "After the bombing began, it almost immediately became clear to what degree they associated the NGOs with the great Western powers that financed them. It is not simply that foreign workers from groups like the IRC, Oxfam, MSF and others were expelled. Their offices and those of the UN agencies were targeted by Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and pro-Taliban mobs in Pakistan. For them there was no distinction between the Western relief agencies and the U.S.-led coalition that was bombing Afghanistan. Unfortunately, given the incoherence of the relief groups' position, and their increasing participation in the developing international military-humanitarian system, it is difficult to argue that the Taliban's supporters were mistaken." (pp. 250-251, David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night,* Simon & Schuster, 2002)

Despite the provocative example above, the majority of situations wherein NGOs must balance their neutrality, ethics and security are those involving their relationships with host government nationals, beneficiaries, warring factions and their own employees. If a locally hired employee is caught stealing from an NGO, and she also happens to be the niece of a prominent government official who controls NGOs' legal status in the country, can the NGO country director behave ethically, neutrally and ensure staff and beneficiaries safety simultaneously? Perhaps not, but hopefully s/he will have put in place policies, procedures and practices that will allow the NGO to negotiate this delicate situation.

What can USAID do? USAID needs to approach coordination with NGOs in a manner that does not compromise NGOs' perceived neutrality and ultimately their security. To begin with, USAID officials must internalize that not everyone likes the United States, and by extension, they don't like people who work with us, let alone people who seem to work *for* us. USAID must also determine how to provide support and information to our NGO partners including those situations that require NGOs to maintain a healthy distance from US Missions, Embassies and other symbols of American power. USAID/OFDA has attempted to shift operational information gathering, collation and dissemination away from NGOs providing the information to OFDA in formal reports to providing it to Humanitarian Information Centers on the ground where the information is more useful. Though the Rieff excerpt above points out that the UN may not be considered neutral, it is arguably more so than a single donor. USAID should also look at its policies and contracting rules to ensure that we are not forcing our NGO partners into compromising ethical situations.

What can NGOs do? NGOs should critically examine the mixed, or worse, biased, signals they send and compare this to the image they think they are projecting. Following the murder of ICRC delegates in Chechnya, the ICRC extensively reviewed the image they were projecting. They learned that they were perceived as a white, Western, Christian organization. Most remarkable is not the finding itself, but that the image conscious ICRC was surprised. In Kosovo, some NGOs were publicly calling for military action while providing humanitarian assistance. With no intent to debate, if calling for the murder of a certain population in order to stop their abuse of another population a.k.a., 'war on humanitarian grounds' is ethically defensible or not, for organizations that claim a humanitarian mandate, one cannot expect such an action to be perceived as neutral by the populations on the ground. That NGOs tended to 'pair up' with their respective nations' armed forces in providing services to Kosovar refugees in Macedonia is completely understandable on the basis of language, cultural affinity and fund raising, but it does little to impart an image of neutrality and could ultimately undermine their security.

Specifically on security, far too many NGOs have yet to accept their moral, legal and financial obligations to their staff. Finally, too many US PVOs are overly beholden to official donors for their programming funds. All the claims of independence and co-sponsored letters of disapproval of U.S. government policy in the world cannot negate the perception if not the fact, that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

(Although our focus is on USAID and US PVOs, I cannot conceive of a fruitful discussion on the topics at hand without recognizing the entire spectrum of NGOs and other donors.)

Appendix E Bibliography

Selected Reference List Prepared for the USAID–US PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict

Compiled by Marion Pratt, USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance;
Reina Neufeldt, Catholic Relief Services, and Kim Maynard, Independent Consultant

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the bulk of humanitarian assistance programs supported by donors two decades ago were designed in response to such natural disasters as floods, earthquakes, volcanoes and droughts, most disaster assistance funds now are devoted to mitigating the effects of internal and cross-border conflicts around the world. At the same time, countless development programs have been interrupted or even discontinued because of civil unrest or international wars, sometimes resuming with the return of peace to a given area. Because of the high costs of conflict and war, efforts among both humanitarian and development practitioners and scholars to devise new ways to reduce violent solutions to problems have redoubled.

The bibliography has five main parts: the introduction; entries by major topic or sector in which those asterisked entries are annotated separately at the end of the bibliography; a list of guides, guidelines and handbooks; useful websites and institutions; a selection of university-based conflict studies programs; and annotations of selected entries compiled in 2001. This selection of recent books, articles, conference proceedings, reports, websites, and studies programs represents only a small fraction of the wealth of literature and attention devoted to conflict-related issues. The bibliography is designed merely to provide the reader with an impression of the broad range of topics subsumed within conflict studies as they relate to humanitarian and development work undertaken in conflict settings.

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http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/ngopb.htm

http://www.usip.org/ (United States Institute for Peace)

Conflict indicators
http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/checklist_postconflict.htm

DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/OECDdev.htm

Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peace-Building Impact of International Engagement
http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/Synthrep.pdf

Guide to Program Options in Conflict-Prone Settings
http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/pnacm211.pdf

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/policieandpriorities/files/Conflict%20reduction%20strategies

Towards Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
http://www.gtz.de/forum_armut/download/bibliothek/genderMainstreaming.pdf

United Nations Disaster Management Training Program
http://www.undmtp.org/modules_e.htm

Conflict Prevention and European Policy Making
http://www.saferworld.co.uk/netwo.htm

International Association for Impact Assessment
http://www.iaia.org

V. UNIVERSITY-BASED CONFLICT STUDY/PROGRAMS

These web links are only a partial listing:

GMU Peace and Conflict Studies
University of New Brunswick—Centre for Conflict Studies
DePauw University—Department of Conflict Studies
University of Colorado, Boulder—Peace and Conflict Studies
University of California, Irvine—Peace & Conflict Studies
Fresno Pacific University—Conflict Studies
University of California, Berkeley—Peace and Conflict Studies
Royal Roads University—Peace & Conflict Studies Division
Fresno Pacific University—Peacemaking and Conflict Studies
Mount Saint Vincent University—Peace & Conflict Studies
University of Waterloo—Inst. of Peace & Conflict Studies
College & University Peace Studies Programs
Juniata College—Peace and Conflict Studies
Conflict Resolution
African Studies Internet Resources
World Area Studies Internet Resources
Universities for Peace
Oxford Centre for Post-Conflict Studies
Professional, Peace and Conflict Studies
Association for Conflict Resolution: Conflict Resolution Education at Colleges and Universities, by Bill Warters, Wayne
RI: Rotary Centers for International Studies
Galaxy : University Departments and Programs < Education < Peace and Conflict Studies < Social Sciences
Peace and Conflict Studies
Ohio Colleges and Universities with Conflict Management Resources
Schools colleges universities with Conflict Resolution / Peace Studies majors in USA
Earlham College—Peace and Global Studies
The Richardson Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution: Welcome!
University of Idaho—Peace Studies
Access 10,000 + Universities and Colleges at Universities.com—(campus and distance learning schools) Profiles and link
Peace and Conflict Studies: Research Guide
USUniversities.com Search Page
FPU Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies—Careers
Peace and Conflict Studies
Langara College—Peace and Conflict Studies
98-517 Peace and Conflict Studies (USIP)
PS&IS—Rotary Centre For International Studies In Peace & Conflict Resolution
Conrad Grebel University College—Certificate Program in Conflict Management
Peace Studies by Country
Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
Peace and Conflict Studies
Humanitarian Training: Arts and Science (Peace and Conflict Studies) Diploma
Peace Studies by Name
University of Sydney Library. Peace and Conflict Studies Internet Guide
UW Office of Research—UW Centres... (INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES)
Peterson's—Study Abroad: AustraLearn: North American Center for Australian Universities
STAFF ? PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES
Peace and Conflict Studies
Open Directory—Science: Social Sciences: Ethnic Studies
Tools for Conflict Resolution Instructors
African Studies Programs

Course Database Query Form
PS&IS—Postgraduate Studies In Peace & Conflict Resolution
Centre for Conflict Studies
Conflict Resolution Education and Training Programs
Seats of Learning/Centres of Conflict: Contradictory Expectations for Northern Universities
Programs @ the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Mediation and other Alternative Dispute Resolution Careers—Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies
UofT. Peace & Conflict Studies. The Challange
Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Other Universities' Peace and Conflict Pages
The Evolution of an Interdisciplinary Peace Studies Centre
Home
Peace Studies, Conflict Resolution Graduate Programs outside U.S.A.
Menno Simons College
South Asian Studies: Rainbow Partnership Organisation
WELCOME TO THE MASTER'S DEGREE IN CONFLICT STUDIES
"PeaCon—Peace and Conflict Studies"
E Texts—Journal of Conflict Studies
The Rotary Centers for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution
ABCNEWS.com : Study: Academic-Industry Conflict of Interest Growing
INCORE: Conflict Data Service: More Resources: Programs
Web Site Of Fresno Pacific University—brought to you by Universities.com.
The Test Equipment Supply Company: Studies in Conflict
The Communication Initiative—Events Calendar—Peace Studies & Conflict Resolution (May 25-27 2001)—May 25, 2001
OJPCR 2.2: Graduate Studies in Dispute Resolution
Ethnic Studies Conflict Spontaneous
Israeli universities take up study of conflict resolution (August 03, 2001)
Cornell PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution
Alger: Peace Studies at the Ohio State University
University of Lancaster: Richardson Institute for Peace Studies
c971417 Case Studies in Campus Conflict: Filling Entrepreneurship Chairs (00/97)
Brookdale Community College » Center for World War II Studies and Conflict Resolution
Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University
Assessment Plan for Conflict Resolution and Legal Studies Program
Center for Conflict Management
Catholic Colleges and Universities: Educating peacemakers
PARC Graduate Studies
The Martin Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
The Development of Conflict Knowledge
UofM: Centre for Defence and Security Studies
DIRECTORY.TERADEX.COM—Science/Tech/Social Sciences/Ethnic Studies
Conflict Analysis and Resolution Internet Subject Guide
PUC | Peace Education | Peace Studies

VI. PEACEBUILDING ASSESSMENT, MONITORING AND EVALUATION ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (5/18/02)

Compiled by Reina C. Neufeldt,
Peacebuilding Program Specialist, Catholic Relief Services

Bock, Joseph G.
2004 *Towards participatory communal appraisal.* Jerusalem: Paper presented at the 28th International Conference of Social Welfare.

Outlines why a participatory approach to evaluation is preferable to an assessment approach (using the "Social Harmony Impact Assessment Tool") in development programs designed to address communal tension. Assessment is problematic because it emphasizes screening out rather than listening to participants. Three advantages of the participatory approach are: 1) result is an organic assessment of problems and needs; 2) target communities more likely to have ownership; 3) project monitoring becomes a matter of accountability to the target group not merely the donor. Suggestions to make the PRA more applicable to conflict situations (based on Lederach and Anderson): 1) include views of multiple sides (defenders, aggressors) in interviews; 2) identify identity group clusters in community mapping; 3) produce a flow diagram of the escalation of communal tension into violence; 4) Use communally balanced teams when conducting field research; 5) prepare a seasonal calendar, include religious festivals, and chart relative to outbreaks of violence; 6) identify options for conflict transformation (identify who will benefit materially and symbolically; did this project help cultivate belonging amongst disparate groups, etc.); 7) identify unintended consequences for exacerbating tensions.

Bush, Kenneth
2002 *A Measure of Peace: peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) of development projects in conflict zones* (Working Paper No. 1). Ottawa, ON: The International Development Research Centre.

Argues peace building should not be regarded as a specific activity, but rather an impact on the peace and conflict environment of development projects. Presents the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) tool, which is designed to anticipate, monitor and evaluate impacts of proposed and completed development projects for structures and processes which strengthen prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease likelihood of outbreak, recurrence or continuation of

violent conflict. Suggests PCIA is only appropriate for "at risk" locations and outlines some ways to identify those areas. Identifies four Pre-project considerations: location, timing, political context, and other salient factors affecting the impact of the conflict on the project. He then identifies three broad categories of questions to assess environmental factors (risk assessment), project-specific considerations and interaction between the two, which can become a baseline for future reference. Environmental factors focus on predictability of environment, infrastructure conditions, opportunity structure. Project-specific considerations focus on resources, comparative advantage, project "tolerance level," and suitable personnel availability. Correspondence between the environment and proposed project include focus on level of political support for project, trust of authorities (gatekeepers), trust, support and participation of community, sustainability. Suggest impact should be understood as a scale, from positive to negative. Sources for information on impact include: situation reports, chronologies of conflict, local and international human rights reports, media reports, academic studies, and especially lived experiences of those in conflict zones. Argues indicators should be determined by the users in a participatory process and involve multiple stakeholders. Indicators may focus on security, psychological, social, political and judicial dimensions. Post-project impact may be assessed in a number of areas. Identifies 5 main areas of potential impact: 1) institutional capacity to manage/resolve violent conflict and build peace; 2) military and human security; 3) political structures and processes; 4) economic structures and processes; 5) social reconstruction and empowerment.

Bush, Kenneth

2003 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: the commodification of an idea (response paper), in *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.* Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at: ***http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/cf.htm***

Responds to Hoffman (2001) criticisms of PCIA, particularly focusing on the politics of PCIA and the possibility of using it for empowerment rather than as a methodological tool. PCIA emerged to initiate an open-ended conversation that was to be Southern-led. Argues that pre-cooked indicators are inappropriate (not context relevant and often driven by interests elsewhere) and they need to be user-driven, and emerge from a participatory process with stakeholders (and therefore may include competing indicators). Suggests that the interconnections between sectors will emerge from the thick details and specificities of each case. Suggests Hoffman's comparison between PCIA and Early Warning is appropriate because the latter suffered from lack of political will, as PCIA may also given state's limited interest in changing negative conflict impact behaviour. Bush further emphasizes the importance of immediate, direct contact and experience over time within the specific context. Makes a plea for organic, process-oriented, community-controlled, responsive and non-linear programs to achieve sustainable, effective humanitarian/development/peacebuilding initiatives.

Hoffman, Mark

2004 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: evolving art form or practical dead end? *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.* Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at: ***http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/cf.htm***

Articles reviews four current approaches to developing 'peace and conflict impact assessment' methodologies for assessing the impact of development and humanitarian programming by multi-mandate organizations and "niche" conflict resolution and peacebuilding NGOs. First, "Traditional Donor Evaluation," which frequently uses the criteria of impact and coverage, relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency, timeliness, sustainability, and coherence, coordination and complementarity. In this approach evaluators typically use a logframe and establish "observable verifiable indicators." Identified weaknesses of this approach: linear causality, difficulty identifying appropriate indicators, static analysis, limited identification of opportunities, and project "killer assumption" that conflict is a risk. Second, Ken Bush's PCIA (1998), which frames peacebuilding as an impact not an activity, emphasizes knowing where to look for impact, and developing an understanding of conditions under which impacts may occur. Includes pre-assessment screening and post-assessment questions that largely cascade from general to specific. Weaknesses include lack of clarity, lack of correspondence between the pre-assessment (also to serve as a baseline) and post-assessment, lack of clear indicators, and no way to examine dynamic interaction between sectors. Third, an INTRAC methodology being developed for DfID, comprised of 3 components: strategic conflict assessment, conflict impact assessment, and a peacebuilding framework. This is being developed inductively. Hoffman reviews some of the early features (e.g. importance of conflict assessment interplay between sectors) and weaknesses (e.g. lack of a clear tool, danger of over-contextualization, donor domination). Fourth, Action Evaluation and ARIA framework by conflict resolution practitioner Jay Rothman and Marc Howard Ross. This approach involves three phases: establishing a goals baseline, negotiating interventions, articulating evolved criteria. Internal and external criteria are identified as well as 3 areas for impact/change: 1) within workshop participants, 2) direct result of the workshop, 3) observed changes in behaviour and relationships between parties involved. Weaknesses include failure to develop linkages from specific activities to larger processes, danger of goals being lowest common denominator, and the process itself is deeply imbued with Western individualism, and rationality.

Laprise,
2005 *Programming for Results in Peacebuilding—Objectives "Tree" and Performance Indicators.* Hull, Quebec: Canadian International Development Agency. Available on-line at the CIDA web page

Central goal identified is to contribute in a sustainable way to the establishment of lasting peace in the country or region. Six objectives are identified and specific process/performance indicators are identified for each item: 1. Increase domestic capacity and propensity for peaceful resolution of conflict. 2. Support the resolution of ongoing conflicts and help prevent emergence or escalation of new conflicts. 3. Help establish or restore political, legal, security and civil society structures necessary for lasting peace. 4. Assist country/region in recovering from damage inflicted by war. 5. Enable women to fully contribute to and benefit from peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. 6. Increase understanding of and support for peacebuilding at home and abroad. Report available on-line at the CIDA website in the Compendium of Peacebuilding (***http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/peace***).

Leonhardt, Manuela
2006 Towards a Unified Methodology: reframing PCIA (a response paper), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.* Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at: ***http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/cf.htm***

Identifies five main issues that emerge from the Hoffman and Bush exchange on PCIA. First, greater emphasis should be put on the needs of aid agencies and their interest in reflection and learning. Four functions of evaluation noted are: control and legitimization, marketing, project/process management, and institutional learning. Leonhardt highlights that the methodologies Hoffman reviews were each developed for specific interests, for donors (INTRAC), implementing agencies (IDRC), and civil society organizations (ARIA), further that all three largely support conflict analysis and strategic planning. Second, generic frameworks for peacebuilding evaluation are likely to be flawed because of the variety of conflict situations, peacebuilding approaches and processes. Reasons for this position are the contested role of aid agencies in peacebuilding, contested nature of peace itself, differing 'theories of action,' and the dynamics of the peacebuilding process. Third, PCIA has not yet tackled issues of causality and attribution, which constitute the main criticisms of the method. In particular, need to address questions of how to related individual peacebuilding projects to the wider conflict context, how to attribute changes in the situation to third party interventions and how to monitor unintended positive and negative effects of intervention. Fourth, PCIA methodology is not empowering in itself but has the potential to be, which needs to be pursued. Notes that similarly, at its best, PRA cannot replace real democracy in a country where it doesn't exist, but it nevertheless there is a critical potential to be safeguarded. Fifth, to assess its potential PCIA needs to be placed in the wider context of instruments aid agencies use.

Lund, Michael
2007 Evaluating NGO Peacebuilding Initiatives in Africa: Getting Beyond Good Intentions or Cynicism. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, 27 March 2002.

This paper describes the unit of analysis, evaluation criteria, and data collection methods that were used in a project in the Greater Horn of Africa to systematically evaluate the impacts on conflict and peace of eight cases of three different kinds of NGO peacebuilding initiatives: peace radio, national track-two dialogues, and local traditional peace processes. After laying out the methodology, the paper presents some of the conclusions that were arrived at regarding the impacts, in particular, of the three cases of national-level unofficial dialogues. Although definite effects on the prevention of violence and the promoting of a negotiations process were achieved in the Kenya case, the unofficial dialogues in Somaliland and Burundi had limited spill-over into their countries' wider conflicts, whether violent or simply political, or on other wider effects, such as on inter-communal relations and the economy. The strongest impacts were seen in creating communication channels that otherwise would not exist for identifying and addressing though not resolving public policy or conflict issues, and thus in creating models for negotiated policymaking but not necessarily transplanting those models in the governing structures of their societies.

Neufeldt, Reina C. & Fast, Larissa A.
2008 Strategic and Comprehensive Lenses on Peacebuilding Evaluation. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, 27 March 2002.

Includes a review of the available literature and current debates in three areas of peacebuilding evaluation: (1) methodology and measures; (2) "impact"; and (3) the research process and social change. A map for an assessment, monitoring and evaluation process is identified that emphasizes "good process"—defined as participatory and capable of dealing with conflicts in internal operations. This process then informs the next steps of comprehensive visioning and strategic analysis in monitoring and evaluation. The link between micro projects and macro-level is then examined to lay the foundation for strategic analysis and comprehensive visioning. It is proposed that comprehensive visioning is used to set overarching goals in an Appreciative Inquiry tradition. Strategic analysis is used to determine more specific indicators, baseline and/or impacts. It is suggested within the strategic analysis framework that the micro to macro link between programming and context is made when programs move from supporting individual actors to networks, and from building local capacity to building infrastructure in the short to long term.

Nyberg Sørenson, Nina, Finn Stepputat and Nicholas Van Herr

2003 *Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building: State of the Art / Annotated Bibliography* (Sida Evaluation 00/37:1). Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. ***http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=582&a=4317***

An annotated bibliography of 21 reports divided into three categories: synthesis reports (8), country studies (7), and project-specific studies (6). Identify two mains types of criteria used in the reports, OECD "traditional" and ALNAP criteria; the reviewers apply the ALNAP criteria (although "somewhat awkwardly") to determine success and failure. The reviewers also distinguish between 3 types of interventions: instruments directly aiming at peacebuilding; structural peacebuilding/conflict prevention; indirect forms of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In their review of lessons learned, 4 sub-themes emerged in "appropriateness and timeliness:" knowledge and understanding, local partners and channels of funding, timing and appropriate methods. In "coherence and co-ordination," they found demands on co-ordination are high (although time consuming and complicated) and coherence is generally low. For "connectedness" they found connections between levels of actors and networks important, and related to timing. The reviewers suggested "coverage" is ill-suited to peacebuilding, although identified possible multiplication efforts, e.g. through media. In "effectiveness and efficiency" noted the evaluations were vague as the usual benchmarks do not apply to peacebuilding and sometimes efficiency is traded for peace and stability. For "impact/outcome" the reviewers found the most important impact was ability to provide an un-polarized space, language, and channel of communication.

Ross, Marc Howard

2002 evaluation in the theory and practice of conflict resolution." *Peace and Conflict Studies,* 8(1). Available on-line at: ***http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs***

Examines Rothman's Action Evaluation (1997) as a theory of practice. Action Evaluation seeks to incorporate goal setting and evaluation into project designs, to recognize the changing nature of goals through the life of an intervention and to use attention to goals as a mechanism for developing and committing an intervention to internal and external standards of evaluation. Ross provides an overview of Action Evaluation, the core assumptions (impact of participation on attitudes and behavior, goal setting as an iterative and incremental process, social construction of goals, and the interrelationship between theory and practice). Ross provides an overview of one example of Action Evaluation in practice, and also notes that in no case to date has the method been used long enough to track changes in goals over time. He then identifies areas of weakness in the evaluation method, including: ways to better incorporate the role of the Action Evaluator; need to make more explicit the link between articulating and monitoring changes in goals to commitment and achievement; identifying if Action Evaluation is more appropriate in some kinds of conflicts than others; make clear how identifying goals leads to the development of operational evaluation criteria; there is no assurance that there will be agreement across stakeholders on the goals or how they are measured; by forcing participants to establish a common set of goals, the least common denominator may emerge (less controversial and easier to achieve); need to identify ways to deal with tensions that emerge when different goals are raised; the link between goal identification and action is not well-developed; Action Evaluation is a form of third-party intervention and needs to be evaluated as such.

Ross, Marc Howard

2003 PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool (a response paper), Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berlin, Germany: *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.* Available at: ***http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/cf.htm***

Reacts to the dialogue between Hoffman and Bush by focusing on 3 issues. First, the need for more explicit concern with theory in planning, organization and evaluation of interventions because theories indicate how people see the world working, and it makes explicit how a project's activities are to affect behaviours and attitudes of those directly involved and the wider conflict setting (affects priority setting, resource allocation, points of maximum impact, and interconnections). Second, difficulties that many projects will have in making sense of PCIA as it is currently written—not user friendly and Ross suggests adding stakeholder goal and indicator generation to the process. Third, argues that accountability requires deciding when and to what degree a project is successful. To this end, gaol and indicator setting by stakeholders as in Rothman's approach, is useful. Although, notes that in Rothman's ARIA project and PCIA, the implicit idea that contextually and locally defined, diverse indicators can be successfully linked to more general peace and conflict impact goals, although it isn't clear how so. Finally, Ross emphasizes the importance of integrating evaluation into development and peacebuilding projects as practitioners take responsibility for altering, refining and redesigning programs to make them more effective.

Rothman, Jay

2004 *Applying Action Evaluation to community and neighborhood development initiatives* (Paper presented at the Fannie-Mae Foundation Research Roundtable "Alternative Approaches to Measuring Neighborhood Change"). Washington, DC: Fannie-Mae Foundation. Available on-line at: ***http://www.ariassociates.haverford.edu/papers/fanniemae.html***

Provides an overview of Rothman's Action Evaluation (AE) methodology. The purpose is to include evaluation in design as well as after the intervention (summative and formative) to help project stakeholders define and reflexively evolve their goals in a participatory way. Suggests that this method leads to enhanced program effectiveness. The method includes a systematic process for cooperative goal-setting, teambuilding and participatory decision-making within and between project stakeholder groups and a computer assisted and web-based instrument and database for on-going data analysis and program monitoring. AE is facilitated by a

specially trained in-house or external "Action Evaluator" who collects data on goals from stakeholders and summarizes the data in terms of what is shared, unique and contrasting within and, later on, across stakeholders. The Action Evaluator is to have close and trusting relationships with participants but maintain some analytic detachment. Consensus is sought on goals through a negotiation process within the stakeholder groups until a project-wide agreement on goals is met. The gaol-setting process is used as a baseline, and the intention is that the process is repeated at the midpoint and terminal point of the initiative. The article includes an example of data gathered from a particular Community Improvement Corporation intervention.

SIPU International AB, Centre for Development Research, & International Peace Research Institute

2005 *Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building* (Final Report). Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIPU International AB, Centre for Development Research, & International Peace Research Institute, 2000) Available on-line at: ***http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=582&a=4317***

Report contains summary of "state of the art" annotated bibliography review, as well as case study summaries and lessons-learned (Western Balkans, Israel and the West Bank, Liberia, South Africa, and East Timor). The preliminary evaluations used the ALNAP criteria of: appropriateness, coherence, connectedness, gender equality, flexibility, location(s) of responsibility, pressure for success/ possibility of failure; institutional competence/ staff base. Overall, they found the Sida interventions were largely appropriate although desk officers were sometimes ill informed of the conflict context. Coherence was largely positive although suggestions made for planning frameworks. Projects were positively connected with local partners and ownership although weak on sustainability. Projects had mixed record for gender equality. Found Sida was a flexible funder, although needed to balance with clear strategic frameworks. Found clear division of labour between Sida and grant recipients; also Sida did not appear to pressure too much for success, although questioned how to gauge impact. Found patchy and low institutional competence. The report also includes suggestions for improving the ALNAP criteria. These include breaking down "connectedness" into its constituent parts; developing a means of assessing "impact" that using non-quantitative, responsive measures that work in messy conflict environments; developing "relationships of trust" were important in the case studies and should be added as a separate performance criteria; found in most cases sub-goals can and should be expressed quantitatively. The report also notes the need for closer coordination with the foreign affairs ministry because of the often highly political nature of involvement.

Stiefel, Matthias

2006 Participatory action research as a tool for peacebuilding: the WSP experience. In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide.* L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz, eds. Pp. 265-276. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Based on reflections from War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) in post-violent conflict regions. Begins by identifying the challenges of rebuilding war-torn societies, including mending relations and restoring dignity, trust, and faith, as well as the development challenges of growth, stability and sustainability in complex conflict environments. Briefly discusses postwar development, external assistance and peacebuilding. Provides a brief overview of participatory action research (PAR) as a rebuilding tool. The strengths of PAR identified for peacebuilding are that it can promote better understanding of the holistic nature of post-conflict problems, can facilitate the search for more integrated policy responses, and can contribute to consensus building and promoting a democratic political culture.